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Abstract
For over fifty years, mortgages have been securitised by selling the rights to the 
mortgage cash flows to third party investors Over the past ten years or so, a similar 
securitisation process has been undertaken with corporate debt The claims on the cash 
flowing from the corporate debt portfolio are called collateralised debt obligations 
(CDO)
CDO cash flows are dependent on the interaction o f a portfolio o f debt securities over 
many time periods They are particularly sensitive to the correlation among the 
underlying secunties and to the terms o f the indenture While much progress has been 
made in modelling debt portfolios over a single period, there has been a lot less 
published about the interaction o f debt secunties m a portfolio over many penods
This thesis develops a model for valuing CDOs using a nsk-neutral approach in a multi­
period setting A model is also developed which reproduces Moody’s CDO rating The 
Moody’s rating is compared to that which is implied from applying the nsk-neutral 
model, the differences analysed and the implications for regulatory capital for CDOs 
explored
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Executive Summary
In recent years, as liquidity in the credit default swap market has increased for the 
largest borrowing firms in the market, many debt portfolio-based structured products 
have been created. For example, single-tranche collateralised debt obligations and rP -  
to-default swaps are traded in huge volum e. The theoretical framework necessary to 
underpin an analysis o f  these products has been developed and has gained widespread 
acceptance. The emphasis has now m oved onto the analysis o f  more com plex products 
referencing the same underlying names for w hich there is a liquid credit default swap 
(CDS) available.
B y comparison, the market for structured credit products referencing names for which  
there is no liquid credit default swap market has grown a lot more slow ly. This section  
o f  the market includes approximately 34,000 publicly quoted firms worldwide 
compared to the 500 or so for w hich an active CDS market exists. It is estimated that 
the debt issuance by these 34,000 firms exceeds that o f  the top 500 issuers. It comprises, 
in the main, privately issued debt, provided primarily by banks. Relatively little o f  this 
debt is traded; hence price information is lacking.
However, since the firms in this latter category have publicly-quoted equity, it is 
possible to infer the credit quality o f  the issuer’s debt from the characteristics o f  its 
equity and the correlation between the firm s’ asset returns, as one firm, M oody’s KM V  
(KM V), has done. With this information, the probability distribution o f  debt portfolio 
values at a future date can be derived, giving the portfolio owner the information 
necessary to manage the credit risks presented.
KM V have never publicly disclosed the m ethodology that they em ploy in developing  
their credit portfolio model. Thus, the academic com m unity has largely ignored their 
approach. But the market has embraced their approach, and their portfolio management 
product is the clear market leader. This gap betw een the academic and market 
approaches is a puzzle.
Credit Portfolio Model Development
This first innovation presented in this thesis is the developm ent o f  a credit portfolio 
m odel in the spirit o f  KM V. In so doing, it shows for the very first time how  the KM V  
approach sits within current academic thinking. Using only their data and their very
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limited public references to their m ethodology, their portfolio m odelling approach is re­
created and their results replicated It thus provides confirmation that their approach is  
founded on traditional portfolio management principles identified within the academic 
literature It is hoped that this w ill enable a debate to begin m academic circles 
regarding the merits o f  their approach, a debate that has not occurred to date because o f  
the lack o f  understanding o f  the approach that KM V adopted
Assessing the Marginal Impact of a Loan on a Portfolio
A  major disadvantage o f  current portfolio m odels is their failure to assess the marginal 
impact o f  a proposed new facility on a pre-existing portfolio o f  credits They are 
primarily directed at analysing the performance o f  a portfolio o f  credit exposures In 
short, they determine the impact o f  a facility on the portfolio after the fact W hile this is 
clearly important information, it is being delivered too late to give effect to portfolio 
management action W ithm m ost banks, exposures are being w ntten by a large number 
o f  credit officers dispersed throughout the organisation w hile the portfolio is being  
m odelled at periodic intervals by the credit portfolio function
This m odel enables putative new facilities to be added to the current portfolio and the 
capital required to support the new facility to be determined immediately Thus, the 
second innovation o f  this thesis is the creation o f  a m odel which is capable o f  giving  
effect to portfolio decisions m real-time since the portfolio impact o f  potential new  
facilities can be determined ex ante compared to current m odels which deliver this 
information ex post
Developing a Coherent Measure of Credit Concentration
A  primary concern o f  banks and bank regulators has been with credit risk concentration 
However, the approaches adopted hitherto have been largely intuitive with very little by  
way o f  theoretical underpinning M ost banks use sim plistic rules o f  thumb to place 
lim its on acceptable maxim um  exposures to individual obligors, industries and 
countries Even under the Basel II proposals, the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) has not attempted to quantify the impact o f  concentrations on the capital required 
to support credit portfolios, withdrawing their onginal proposal for a granularity 
adjustment in calculating credit portfolio capital
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The third innovation presented m  this thesis is the developm ent o f  an approach to 
measuring the impact o f  concentrations on credit portfolios In particular, a key issue o f  
concern to the managers o f  credit portfolios -  namely, the ex ante assessment o f  the 
maximum econom ic holding o f  a syndicated loan -  is answered The framework 
provides portfolio managers the basis for measuring the cost o f  concentrations to 
favoured relationship clients in a theoretically rigorous manner It also provides a basis 
for setting limits for clients -  a single capital number can becom e the basis for limits to 
all customers replacing the qualitative limit framework currently em ployed in the 
market Finally, it provides regulators a basis on w hich to set capital requirements
The analysis also questions the use o f  contribution to the volatility o f  portfolio value - 
the market standard method o f  allocating portfolio capital among the component 
securities - for allocating capital in debt portfolios This approach is w ell suited to 
allocating capital in portfolios o f  traded secunties w hose returns are near-normal over 
the holding penod However, illiquid credit portfolios do not meet these requirements 
An alternative framework, contribution to Expected Tail Loss, is proposed which is 
found to give results that accord more closely  with intuition In particular, the proposed 
alternative is shown to be much more sensitive to credit concentrations than the 
contribution to portfolio volatility framework
Extending the Credit Portfolio Model to a Multi-Period Setting
The credit portfolio m odels m ost com m only used m the marketplace are based on a 
single time penod They are ill equipped to assess structured secunties such as CDOs 
that denve their value from cash flow s from a credit portfolio over many time penods 
W hile the reduced form approach has been applied to value structured secunties which  
reference names for which liquid CDS exist, it is not w ell suited to m odelling portfolios 
o f names w hich lack the pncing transparency that CDS provide
The fourth innovation presented in this thesis is the developm ent o f  a m ulti-penod  
credit portfolio m odel This m odel extends current m odelling approaches along two 
dimensions
•  It takes the structural m odel from its single-penod frame o f  reference to the multi- 
penod frame necessary to deal with the com plexities o f  portfolio-based secunties 
The reduced form paradigm is the preferred approach when m odelling credit
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exposures over more than one time period. The author is unaware o f  any 
published research that uses the structural m odel in a multi-period setting.
•  It incorporates the com plexities o f  the waterfall, w hich are central to the 
structuring o f  portfolios o f  cash flow  securitisations. B y comparison, the market 
standard for m odelling credit portfolios, a copula approach, is primarily geared to 
m odelling credit exposures in synthetic form.
Furthermore, since the m odel tracks the portfolio o f  underlying securities over time, it 
can be adapted to deal with a CDO where the underlying collateral comprises tranches 
o f  other CDOs. These CDO-squared securities, as they are called, have never before 
been analysed using a structural approach to the author’s knowledge.
Comparing the Rating Assessments
The rating agencies serve a critical role in assessing the credit risk o f  firms and 
securities. A s products have becom e more structured, and hence more com plex, market 
participants have com e to rely to an ever greater extent on the rating agency assessm ent 
o f  credit risk. Their credit assessm ent o f  collateralised debt obligations w ill becom e still 
more important in the future given the special position granted to them in the revised  
Basel Accord.
The fifth innovation o f  this thesis is to compare the rating agency assessm ent o f  CDO  
risk with that o f  the structural m odel based on KM V data. This required that the model 
developed by M oody’s for evaluating CDOs - their so-called Binomial Expansion  
M odel - be re-created based on the publications in which they outline their approach. 
The model is then tested to confirm that it successfully replicates the M oody’s rating for 
a sample o f  deals in the marketplace. The expected loss under the Binom ial Expansion  
M odel, from which M oody’s infer their rating, is compared with the expected loss 
predicted by the multi-period m odel. This provides a basis for assessing the validity o f  
the binomial approach.
Assessing the Moody’s Rating Assessment Methodology
Despite making the rating agencies the sole arbiters o f  the creditworthiness o f  CDOs 
purchased by investors, regulatory doubts about the validity o f  the rating agency  
approach remain. In particular, their decision to apply different risk w eightings to CDOs 
and corporate debt o f  the same rating confirms their unease with the m eaning o f  ratings
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given to structured securities Equally, the market demands higher spreads for structured 
products than for corporate debt with the same rating It is unclear whether this 
additional premium is a charge for the reduced liquidity o f  CDOs, or compensation for 
the extra effort in com ing to understand the com plexity o f  the product, or a charge for 
risks not adequately captured in the agency rating process
The sixth innovation is to exam ine the validity o f  the agency credit rating approach to 
structured debt It highlights the shortcoming o f  expected loss as a measure o f  CDO  
risk, ignoring as it does the variability around the average In particular, by ignoring the 
systematic risk that these products bring to a credit portfolio, it fails to provide the 
regulator with a coherent basis for setting capital to be assigned to CDOs It confirms 
that the regulators have good reason for demanding that that more capital is held against 
subordinated CDO tranches than similarly rated corporate secunties
Conclusion
This thesis extends current know ledge as outlined above The approach is new and the 
results have important implications for investors and regulators In particular, the new  
model demonstrates that the rating agency approach to grading CDOs under-estimates 
the embedded risk It suggests that the more onerous nsk-w eighting o f  m ezzanine 
CDOs compared with similarly-rated corporate debt under Basel II is justified It also 
supports the market requirement for wider spreads for these subordinated tranches 
compared to similarly-rated corporate debt
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter
❖ exam ines the background to the developm ent o f  the collateralised debt obligations 
(CDO) market, explores the reasons for its phenomenal growth and discusses the 
unique valuation challenges w hich CDOs present,
❖ details the objective o f  this thesis, namely, to create a m odel which values CDO  
tranches m a rigorous manner,
❖ descnbes the key research issues which are addressed, and
❖ gives a chapter-by-chapter overview o f  the research undertaken
1.2 Background
The CDO product w ill be examined in detail m Chapter 2 However, a brief 
introduction w ill be provided here m order to give context to the discussion
A  CDO is an asset-backed secunty (A B S) where the underlying securities are debt 
instruments The CDO market has grown at a tremendous pace since first introduced ten 
years ago M any factors have contributed to this growth Som e banks have embraced 
securitisation as a w ay to manage their regulatory capital requirements Lower quality 
financial institutions -  with a rating o f  single-A  or less -  w hich cannot fund them selves 
in the inter-bank market at Libor, or w hich lack a deposit base, have secuntised their 
debt assets as a means to achieving funding at a lower rate Various financial 
organisations -  including investment companies and banks -  have seen debt 
securitisation as an asset management opportunity enabling them to earn fee incom e 
managing other people’s capital rather than margin incom e through investing their own  
capital
H owever, the new securities that are created through debt securitisation present many 
new  and challenging valuation issues that remain unresolved
♦♦ The resulting securities -  CDO -  are the product o f  the interaction o f  a portfolio 
o f  debt securities, m ost o f  which are unquoted or are highly illiquid
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❖ The portfolio theory that exists was developed to cater for equities rather than 
debt. There is very little research published in the academic literature in the area 
o f  debt portfolio management. M ost o f  the debate is occurring within the trade 
literature or at practitioner conferences.
The rating agencies have assumed a central role in creating the framework within which  
these securities are structured and graded. W ithout a rating agency grade, a CDO  
tranche becom es almost unmarketable and, therefore, much o f  the structuring which  
takes place and m ost o f  the underlying collateral purchase decisions are driven by rating 
agency requirements.
The practice o f  m odelling debt portfolios in still at an embryonic stage and regulators 
remain unconvinced by rating agency assessm ents o f  the credit risk o f  structured debt. 
(BIS 1999a). This is confirmed by the more onerous treatment o f  lower-rated CDO  
securities compared to equally rated single name corporate debt securities (BIS 2001a). 
The CDO rating m ethodologies em ployed by the rating agencies were subject to 
particular criticism in the 2001-2 period due to the significantly higher level o f  re-rating 
compared to similarly-rated corporate debt securities.
1.3 Objective
There is an obvious gap between academic scientific research and market practice in 
relation to CDOs. The rigorous academic approach to the subject fails to address the 
many critical structural issues. Likewise, the practitioners, w hile addressing these 
structural issues, settle for extrem ely heuristic approaches to many other aspects o f  the 
structure.
This thesis attempts to embed academic rigour in a m odel that incorporates the many 
com plex structural features typical o f  the CDO product. It develops a new  m odel that 
transforms the current state-of-the-art portfolio m odelling approach from a single time 
period framework to a multi-period setting and values the CDO tranches created from  
the credit portfolio in a risk-neutral framework. The results o f  this m odel w ill then be 
compared to those obtained by one o f  the rating agencies, M oody’s Investors Service 
(M oody’s). In order to do this, it w ill be necessary to replicate the state-of-the-art credit 
portfolio m odel currently em ployed by KM V (KM V), the leading credit portfolio risk 
software vendors, in their product, Portfolio Manager and the CDO tranche rating 
m ethodology em ployed by M oody’s.
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It is hoped that the main contribution o f  this thesis to the literature w ill be the 
developm ent o f  a new  m odel for valuing CDO tranches based on the structural 
approach, and the comparison o f  this alternative approach with the rating process 
currently em ployed by the rating agencies.
The research proceeds as follows:
A  one-time period structural m odel is developed using K M V ’s assessm ent o f  default 
probabilities and asset correlations. This enables the value o f  the individual facilities to 
be determined, the capital required to support the loan portfolio estimated, and the risk 
contribution o f  each facility within the portfolio gauged.
This one time period m odel is extended to a multi-period setting in order to value CDO  
tranches. This m odel comprises two modules: (i) A  multi-time step M onte Carlo 
simulation m odule to ascertain the behaviour o f  the credit portfolio between CDO  
coupon payment dates, and (ii) a cash flow  m odel to disburse the cash flow s to the 
tranches in accordance with the cash flow  waterfall.
The M oody’s CDO tranche rating m odel is re-created and the grade o f  each o f  the 
tranches is inferred from this model. This grade is compared to that suggested by  
application o f  the M oody’s rating process.
In v iew  o f  the enormous size o f  the CDO market -  in excess o f  $250 billion are extant - 
and the controversy which surrounds the rating process, it is suggested that this research 
is tim ely and it is hoped it w ill make a valuable contribution to the literature and help in 
furthering current understanding o f  the issues.
1.4 Key Research Issues Addressed
The thesis addresses many significant research issues:
❖ It exam ines the nature o f  the interaction among debt securities in portfolios, a
subject about which little has been written in the academic literature.
❖ It measures the impact o f  facilities -  both new  and existing - on a credit portfolio.
❖ It develops a framework for deciding on the maximum amount o f  a syndicated
loan a bank should purchase.
♦♦ It presents a m ethodology for setting credit limits.
❖ It takes the structural approach to credit risk from its standard single period
framework into a multi-period setting
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❖ It draws on the two main types o f  rating data -  the rating agency letter grade and 
the probability o f  default (PD) metric, expected default frequency (EDF), 
em ployed b y  KM V
❖ It exam ines actual CDO structures under both approaches
1.5 Overview of Thesis Approach
The thesis proceeds as follow s
Chapter 2 introduces the CDO product, discusses the size o f  the market and its 
developm ent over the years, and the regulatory attitude to the product
Chapter 3 undertakes a review o f  the academic literature in the areas o f  portfolio 
management, credit default probability assessm ent and credit portfolio management It 
exam ines the two principal competing approaches -  the contingent claims approach and 
the reduced form -  and summarises the mam strands in the literature It then proceeds to 
discuss the practical implementation o f  these approaches It draws on research published 
in practitioner journals and trade literature published by  system s vendors
The state-of-the-art single time period credit portfolio m odel in use in the market, that 
employed by KM V and delivered in their Portfolio Manager software offering, is re­
created in Chapter 4 A  new method for determining the impact o f  a new facility on an 
existing loan portfolio is also developed m this chapter as w ell as a framework for 
determining the cost o f  portfolio concentration and borrower limit setting
Chapter 5 describes the developm ent o f  a new m odel for valuing CDO tranches that is 
the centrepiece o f  this thesis This new m odel takes the state-of-the-art single time 
period credit portfolio m odel and converts it into a multi-period model that incorporates 
the CDO indenture In so doing, it is, to the author’s knowledge, the first academic 
research to take the current market standard credit portfolio paradigm into the structured 
securities arena
The principal measure o f  CDO tranche quality quoted m the market is the rating 
agency-assigned rating Chapter 6 replicates the tranche rating m ethodology em ployed  
by M oody’s so that their rating can be attributed to tranches o f  any deal
Chapter 7 compares the results o f  the new ly developed m odel with those from M oody’s 
m odel for a variety o f  CDO structures The differences betw een the m odel-im plied
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rating and the M oody’s rating are explored for each o f  the tranches The reasons for 
these differences are examined and the validity o f  the com peting approaches is assessed
Chapter 8 summarises the contribution o f  this thesis to the literature It critically 
evaluates the m odel’s assumptions and makes suggestions for further research
The Appendix develops the CreditM etncs approach to credit portfolio m odelling and 
confirms their published results
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief overview  o f  the CDO market and a summary o f  the 
research agenda The next chapter exam ines the CDO product in much greater detail 
and the regulatory approach thereto
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Chapter 2. The CDO Market
2.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, the market for CDOs is examined and the many product variations are 
introduced. The nature o f  the CDO product gives regulators particular cause for 
concern; the regulatory attitude and response are detailed.
2.2 CDO Market
W hile the CDO market began in the late 1980s, the market really only becam e  
significant in 1996 as reported by Tavakoli (2003) citing Bank o f  America and M oody’s 
and shown in Figure 2.1 below:
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Figure 2.1 CDO Market Size
However, Tavakoli (2003) distinguishes between what she terms ‘the old paradigm’ o f  
cash flow  CDOs which accounted for most o f  the volum e up to 1999 and ‘the new  
paradigm’ o f  synthetic CDOs which accounts for m ost o f  the growth since then. 
“Synthetics facilitate more efficient portfolio ramp-up, synthetics facilitate getting a 
higher average credit rating, and synthetics facilitate more efficient portfolio
12
diversification ” (p8) The synthetic arbitrage is facilitated by the feasibility o f  a smaller 
equity tranche, w hich creates more leverage The synthetic arbitrage gets a further huge 
boost from the large, inexpensive super senior tranche that makes up the bulk o f  the 
synthetic deal
The synthetic market accounted for $187 5 billion o f  the CDOs extant in 2002  
compared to $62 5 billion o f  cash flow  CDOs, Tavakoh notes But she emphasises that 
the absolute size o f  synthetic CDO issuance is exaggerated by these figures “Assum ing  
the super senior tranche makes up 90 per cent on average o f  the synthetic CDO, only  
about $18 75 billion o f  synthetic CDO product is available to traditional in vestors” 
( p i2) She further notes that the super senior tranche is held m the trading book and is 
‘marked to market’ m theory, but not m practice
The M oody’s review o f  2001 was the last one to have been reported on a global basis It 
reported 277 transactions covering $101bn o f  tranche issuance in 2001 compared to 189 
transactions in 2000 and $121bn o f  issuance Their report on 2003 U  S CDO activity  
reflects similar trends but, since it focuses only on U  S tranches which they rated, 
presents somewhat different numbers Figure 2 2 below  shows the number o f  new  
transactions and associated volum e o f  M oody’s-rated CDO tranches year-by-year since 
the CDO market took o ff  in the m id-1990s as reported by Gluck (2004)
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Figure 2.2 Growth of Moody’s-Rated U.S. CDOs
The paradigm shift that Tavakoli noted m ay w ell have run its course. Commenting on 
activity in the fourth quarter o f  2003, Gluck notes the notable reversal o f  the long-term  
trend towards synthetics. Only 12 o f  the 58 fourth quarter CDOs took synthetic form, or 
just over 20%. “The pattern shift was entirely due to the lack o f  arbitrage opportunity in 
the investment-grade corporate sector.” Gluck (2004, p2)
The product m ix underlying the CDO market has shifted dramatically in the past few  
years. The product which was the primary driver o f  the market in its early years, the 
high-yield collateralised bond obligation (CBO), was “nearly dormant” in 2003 (p6). 
High-yield CBOs accounted for 30% o f  M oody’s-rated U .S. CDOs in 2001; by 2003, 
that had fallen to a mere 2% as shown in Figure 2.3 below . A ll acronyms are explained  
in the List o f  Acronym s below:
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Composition of Moody1 s-rated U.S. CDO Market in 2003
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Figure 2.3 Composition of Moody’s-rated U.S. CDO Market in 2003
Likewise, there has been a dramatic shift from bonds to structured debt in the collateral 
underlying the CDO product as evidenced in Table 2-1 below  based on Gluck (2004, 
2003)
2003 2002
Corporate Bonds 36% 54%
Loans 24% 17%
Structured Debt 40% 29%
Table 2-1 Collateral Underlying Moody’s-rated U.S. CDO Deals
2.3 Overview of the CDO Product
A  CDO is an asset-backed security backed by a diversified pool o f  one or more classes 
o f  debt. In a CDO structure, there is an asset manager responsible for m anaging the 
portfolio o f  debt obligations. There are restrictive covenants im posed on what the 
manager m ay do and certain tests that must be satisfied for the debt obligations to 
maintain the credit rating assigned at the time o f  issuance.
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Collateralised debt obligations are structured debt products. They are liabilities o f  a 
special purpose vehicle w hose only assets are debt securities -  either loans or bonds - 
issued by corporates. These assets by definition, present credit risk. Therefore, the 
starting point for this research is to gain a thorough understanding o f  the credit risk o f  
individual firms.
“A  traditional securitisation is a structure where the cash flow  from an underlying pool 
o f  exposures is used to service at least two different stratified risk positions or tranches 
reflecting different degrees o f  credit risk. Payments to the investors depend upon the 
performance o f  the specified underlying exposures, as opposed to being derived from an 
obligation o f  the entity originating those exposures.” BIS (2003, p i 00) They suggest the 
primary difference between the stratified/tranched structures that characterise 
securitisations and ordinary senior/subordinated debt instruments relates to the cash 
flow  diversion mechanism: junior securitisation tranches can absorb losses without 
interrupting contractual payments to more senior tranches, whereas subordination in a 
senior/subordinated debt structure is a matter o f  priority o f  rights to the proceeds o f  a 
liquidation.
An understanding o f  the credit risk o f  the issuing firms individually w ill not suffice. The 
value o f  a CDO is determined by the interaction o f  many debt securities. A ny attempt to 
value a CDO must seek to gain an in-depth appreciation o f  the manner in which those 
individual credit risks behave as a group because the cash flow s from the asset pool are 
channelled through the cash flow  waterfall to the individual CDO tranches in order o f  
priority.
2.3.1 CDO Sponsor Motivation
BIS (2001a) notes that banks that securitise assets are able to accom plish several 
objectives. B y  securitising rather than holding the originated assets, they suggest banks 
attain a number o f  objectives: (i) they can secure a reduction in regulatory capital 
requirements; (ii) they can tap an additional source o f  funding, generally at a lower cost; 
(iii) they can enhance their financial ratios; and (iv) they can manage their portfolio risk 
by reducing large exposures or sectoral concentrations. B y  investing in tranches o f  other 
banks’ securitisations, they suggest banks are able to diversify their portfolios by 
acquiring different asset types from different geographic areas.
Bluhm (2003) suggests four possible m otives for CDO creation:
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Spread arbitrage: This occurs where the total spread collected on single credit risky 
instruments at the asset side o f  the transaction exceeds the total ‘diversified’ spread to 
be paid to investors on the tranched liability side o f  the structure. Such a mismatch  
typically creates a significant arbitrage potential which offers an attractive excess spread 
to the equity or subordinated notes investor.
Regulatory capital relief: The Basel I regulatory capital requirements often exceed the 
econom ic capital required given the risks that many loan assets embed. In such 
circumstances, it is possible for a bank to obtain credit protection for a relatively m odest 
cost once it retains a tranche that absorbs m ost o f  the loss which is likely to be 
experienced. The capital associated with the first-loss piece combined with the 20%  
risk-weighting o f  the super-senior credit default swap w ill necessitate significantly less 
-  50% or less - regulatory capital than would otherwise be required to hold low-risk  
assets on balance sheet. A s ‘opportunity costs’ for capital relief, the originating bank 
has to pay interest to notes investors, a super senior swap premium, upfront costs (rating 
agencies, lawyers, structuring and underwriting costs) ongoing administration costs and 
possibly som e other expenses. “A  full calculation o f  costs compared to the decline o f  
regulatory capital costs is required to judge about the econom ics o f  such transactions.”
<P7)
Funding: For banks with sub-AA ratings, funding can becom e too expensive to allow  
them put high-quality assets on balance sheet. Equally, even highly rated institutions 
like to have a range o f  funding sources available should they ever need it. For non-bank 
institutions, accessing relatively inexpensive funding through securitisation is a key  
consideration. The advantage o f  refinancing by means o f  securitisations is that resulting 
funding costs are mainly related to the “credit quality o f  the transferred assets and not so 
much to the rating o f  the originator.” (p8) He notes, however, that som e linkage remains 
to the originator’s rating, i f  the SPV also enters into a servicer agreement with the 
originating bank. In such cases, investors and rating agencies w ill evaluate the servicer 
risk inherent in the transaction.
Econom ic risk transfer: The final motivation Bluhm suggests is econom ic risk 
reduction. This is a key reason for many regional banks undertaking securitisations. 
Where they have a strong local franchise but no global presence, concentrations to key  
customers develop. These concentrations, i f  held on balance sheet, require significant 
capital; however, they w ill not present any concentration risk to investors outside the
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region and can be supported by  substantially less capital Securitising its excess  
exposures to its best customers is a w ay o f  deriving portfolio benefits H owever, Bluhm, 
commenting on som e transactions undertaken primarily for regulatory or funding 
reasons, notes that the capitalisation rate for the remaimng portfolio can be higher as a 
result o f  poor sub-portfolio selection “[SJecuritising a subportfoho can cause some 
negative effect on the econom ic capital o f  the residual source portfolio” (p9) due to the 
diversification turn-down caused by taking away a pool o f  diversifying assets
2 3 2 CDO Market Practice
The 2002 Survey o f  Credit Portfolio Management Practices undertaken by  the 
International A ssociation o f  Credit Portfolio Managers asked financial institutions about 
their use o f  securitisation The questions and responses are given below
In order to transfer loans from the institution, has your institution issued a CLO -  either 
cash or synthetic9
N o 27%
Y es, traditional CLOs 20%
Y es, synthetic CLOs 24%
Yes -  both cash and synthetic CLOs 29%
If your institution has issued a CLO, rank these m otivations by order o f  importance 
(U se 1 to denote the m ost important and 3 to denote the least important )
Regulatory capital 1 68
Econom ic capital 2 21
Exposure management (freeing lines) 2 07
Has your institution used a CLO structure as a w ay o f  transferring loan exposures into 
the institution7 That is, have you purchased the equity or subordinated tranches o f  
som eone e lse ’s CLO or have you set up a CLO structure using assets from other 
originators as a w ay o f  importing credit risk7
N o 59%
Y es, traditional CLOs 10%
Y es, synthetic CLOs 13 %
Y es -  both cash and synthetic CLOs 18%
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It is clear from these survey results that financial institutions have embraced CLOs 
largely as a w ay o f  circumventing the Basel 1 rules w hich militate against holding high- 
quality assets on balance sheet The preferred vehicle for achieving this result is the 
synthetic CLO
2.4 CDO Categories
The two mam categories o f  CDO transaction can be distinguished based on sponsor 
m otivation described in 2 3 1 above
Arbitrage Transaction This is the name given to a transaction where the primary 
motivation o f  the sponsor is to earn a spread betw een the yield offered on the collateral 
assets and the payments made to the various tranches
Balance Sheet Transaction When the sponsor’s mam concern is to remove debt 
instruments from its balance sheet, it is classed as a balance sheet transaction This type 
o f  structure is often adopted by a financial institution seeking to reduce its capital 
requirements where the regulatory capital necessary to support the debt exceeds the 
econom ic capital
M em tt et al (2001) further sub-divide these categories as shown in Figure 2 4 below
Market for CDOs
Balance
Sheet Arbitrage
CDOs CDOs
Traditional Synthetic Traditional Traditional Synthetic
Cash Flow Market
Value
Figure 2 4 Categorisation of CDOs
There is a clear gap between the treatment o f  synthetic structures and those based on  
cash flow s These differences are neatly summarised by Cifuentes et al (2004, p lO l)
19
Characteristic Typical Cash CDO Typical Synthetic CDO
Collateral Leveraged loans High-yield bonds
CDS referencing balance sheet 
assets
Size $200m - $600m $lbn plus
Collateral Quality Sub-investment grade
Diversity 60 80
Payment Frequency Semi-annually Quarterly
Maturity 7-12 years 3-5 years
Prepayment Risk Yes No
Equity Leverage 8-12 tunes 30-100 times
Interest Rate Risk Managed with swaps None
Management Typically managed Typically static
Table 2-2 Comparison of Cash and Synthetic CDOs
This thesis w ill focus on cash CDOs with the charactenstics summarised in Table 2-2
2 41 Arbitrage Transactions
Arbitrage CDO transactions may be further categonsed based on the primary source o f  
funds to repay the tranches
Market value transactions rely heavily on the total return generated from the active 
management o f  the collateral assets Funds used to repay liability principal are denved  
primarily from collateral liquidation
In contrast, cash flow transactions are those in w hich the interest and principal from 
maturing assets are the primary source o f  cash with which to repay the tranches
2 4 11 Market Value Transactions
Market value CDOs are transactions “in w hich the credit enhancement is reflected in a 
cushion between the current market value o f  the collateral and the face value o f  the 
structure’s obligations ” Falcone and Gluck (1998, p i )  W hereas cash flow  transactions 
normally provide for the diversion o f  cash flow s from junior to senior classes i f  certain 
tests that relate to the structure’s soundness are not met, in a market value transaction, 
“the collateral must normally be liquidated, either in w hole or in part, i f  the ratio o f  the 
market value o f  the collateral to the obligations falls below  som e threshold ” (p i)  The 
liquidated collateral is used to pay down obligations, bringing the structure back into 
balance
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Market value transactions depend upon the ability o f  the fund manager to maintain and 
improve the market value o f  the collateral. “Ratings are based on collateral price 
volatility, liquidity, and market value.” Goodman and Fabozzi (2001, p i 74). The 
manager focuses on m axim ising total return subject to an acceptable volatility level. 
The market value o f  the collateral assets, multiplied by rating agency-specified advance 
rates, must exceed the value o f  debt outstanding. Failure to m eet these over­
collateralisation tests requires the manager to undertake collateral sales and liability  
redemption to bring the test back into compliance.
Market value transactions give more flexibility to the manager in choosing collateral. 
Distressed debt and debt w hich matures beyond the life o f  the transaction can be  
accommodated within a market value structure whereas they would prove w holly  
unsuited to a cash flow  structure. The liquidity premium, which has made high-yield  
debt attractive to the buy-and-hold investor, w ill be relinquished i f  the manager is 
obliged to sell the asset.
Cash flow  CDOs exhibit minimal trading. On the other hand, market value CDOs m ay  
be expected to trade frequently. “A  market value CDO is one for which the CDO  
tranches receive payments based essentially on the mark-to-market returns o f  the 
collateral pool, which depends on the trading performance o f  the CDO asset manager.” 
D uffie and Singleton (2003, p250). A nalysis o f  market value CDOs is primarily an 
analysis o f  the trading behaviour o f  the CDO manager they suggest. Thus, the portfolio  
manager has a much bigger influence on the performance o f  a market value transaction. 
Potential investors must carefully examine the manager’s investment style and 
philosophy and the investment criteria adopted.
Market value deals face risks that are distinctly different from those faced by cash flow  
deals despite the fact that the underlying assets are largely similar. The biggest risk in a 
market value transaction is a sudden decline in the value o f  the collateral pool, 
according to Goodman and Fabozzi (2001, p i 74). Thus, the rating agency focus is on 
the price volatility and liquidity o f  the assets and this is reflected in a set o f  advance 
rates designed to provide a cushion against market risk.
Market value deals represent a minority o f  CDOs. Indeed, M oody’s rated only a single 
market value deal in the w hole o f  2003 though they were projecting an increase in 
activity for 2004. Current market value proposals tend to focus on more liquid, and thus 
more easily marked, asset classes, Gluck (2004, p6) suggests.
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This thesis addresses the risk o f  credit assets in a primarily static portfolio. It does not 
attempt to m odel the market risk created by short-term price changes and the 
requirement to sell assets to return to compliance. W hile the risk driver in market value 
CDOs is credit, the tim e frame is short and credit risk presents itse lf as market risk. The 
framework that is developed is incapable o f  addressing this market risk. For this reason, 
but also because o f  the fact that this sector o f  the market is particularly small, market 
value deals w ill not be examined further.
2.4.1.2 Cash Flow Transactions
According to D uffie and Singleton (2003, p250), a cash flow  CDO is one for w hich the 
collateral portfolio is not subject to active trading by the CDO manager, im plying that 
the uncertainty regarding interest and principal payments to the CDO tranches is 
determined m ainly by the number and tim ing o f  defaults o f  the collateral securities.
The objective o f  the asset manager in a cash flow  transaction is to generate cash flow  
for the senior and m ezzanine tranches without active trading o f  bonds. Because the cash 
flow s from the structure are designed to accom plish the objective for each tranche, 
restrictions are im posed on the asset manager. Goodman and Fabozzi (2001, p i 5) note 
that the asset manager is very limited in his or her authority to buy and sell bonds. The 
conditions for disposing o f  issues held are specified and are usually driven by credit risk 
management. A lso, in assem bling the portfolio, the asset manager must m eet certain 
requirements set forth by the rating agencies that rate the deal. They conclude that the 
m ost important o f  these requirements are embedded in the, so-called, cash flow  
waterfall, described in 2.5.2 below.
Two further tests are im posed by the rating agencies to ensure that the asset manager 
does not adversely affect the quality o f  the collateral:
•  A  maximum weighted-average rating factor (W ARF) is set for the collateral pool.
•  A  minimum diversity score is set for the asset pool.
More com plete details o f  the M oody’s papers describing the calculation o f  W ARF and 
diversity score are given in 3.9.1.1 below.
2.4.1.3 Source and Sustainability of the Arbitrage
Tavakoli cautions: “There is no such thing as a CDO arbitrage.” (2003, p i 5) Cifuentes 
(2004, p4) et al concur, choosing instead to characterise the ‘arbitrage’ as a ‘funding
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gap’. This is, o f  course, true since profit, i f  it is made, w ill not be riskless. However, the 
market persists in using the term loosely.
Deal econom ics are determined by the extent o f  the arbitrage that exists between the 
assets and liabilities and issuance volum e rises or falls with the ‘arb’. The most com m on  
CDO asset class is the high-yield bond or leveraged loan, with an average rating 
between B1 and B3. Typically, 70% o f  the liabilities w ill earn an AAA rating; a further 
15% could earn a BBB rating with the 15% balance supported by equity. Clearly, the 
m ezzanine tranche could be further tranched to achieve higher and lower ratings, or 
attempting to achieve higher diversity could reduce the equity.
Cifuentes et al (p3) describe the market conditions w hich must exist for an arbitrage 
CDO to be created. The portfolio weighted average yield less the weighted average cost 
o f  debt less expenses associated with arranging the CDO must leave sufficient residual 
cash flow s to make the equity position attractive, they conclude.
A number o f  researchers have addressed the reason for the existence o f  the arbitrage 
that is fundamental to the existence o f  the market. Common themes running through 
this literature are market imperfection and adverse selection.
Part o f  the reason for the arbitrage Cifuentes et al suggest is the low  funding cost locked  
in at the outset o f  the transaction. They suggest that the senior noteholders are the ones 
providing the funding subsidy: If the investors were to borrow m oney from a bank to 
fund the purchase o f  the portfolio, the “costs would clearly be higher, as bank funding 
costs, up-front fees and bank profit margins are factored in.” (2004, p4)
The CDO product was created to address problems arising from market imperfections: 
D uffie and Singleton (2003, p252) contend that in perfect capital markets, CDOs would  
serve no purpose as the costs o f  constructing and marketing a CDO would inhibit its 
creation. They cite two imperfections w hich could support a CDO market: first, banks 
and certain other financial institutions have regulatory capital requirements that make it 
valuable for them to securitise and sell som e portion o f  their assets, reducing the amount 
o f  (expensive) regulatory capital they must hold. They also note that as individual bonds 
or loans m ay be illiquid, this may lead to a reduction in their market values. 
Securitisation and prioritisation m ay improve liquidity, they suggest, and thereby raise 
the total market value o f  the CDO structure relative to the sum o f  the market values o f  
its collateral components.
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Falcone and Gluck (1998, p i)  contend that, in large part, cash flow  CDOs have 
succeeded because they exploit the illiquidity o f  the high-yield markets. The spreads on 
high-yield debt have historically more than compensated for the default risk associated  
with such debt, according to Bencivenga (1997). The gap between the yield on the high- 
yielding assets and the cost o f  the low er-yielding liabilities offers the equity the 
opportunity to earn a return. Clearly, the extent to which that potential return is realised 
depends on the ability o f  the asset manager to show good selection skills. In m ost deals, 
the asset manager also holds between 20% and 49.9%  o f  the equity o f  the deal and also 
earns a performance-based bonus. In most cases, 2% o f  the liabilities issued are used to 
meet upfront expenses and a further 70bp p.a. o f  ongoing expenses is typical. W hen the 
projected internal rate o f  return (IRR) on the equity tranche rises above 15% p.a., 
activity in the CDO market is known to pick up. Since equity is approximately a six- 
tim es leveraged position in the underlying assets, any improvement in the ‘arb’ makes 
the equity decidedly more attractive.
A  substantial part o f  the arbitrage CDO market is based on sub-investment grade debt, 
so-called ‘junk’ bonds and loans. There is a suspicion that significant amounts o f  
private information exist regarding the credit quality o f  this debt and outside investors 
may find them selves ‘picked o f f  when trading this debt. The reduction in price ow ing  
to adverse selection was called a lemon’s premium by A kerlof (1970).
DeM arzo (1998) suggests that the CDO structure helps mitigate this lemon's premium, 
drawing investors to the CDO market who would be unwilling to invest in the 
underlying debt directly. D uffie and Singleton (2003, p253), surmise that the seller 
achieves a higher total valuation (for what is sold and what is retained) by designing the 
CDO structure so as to concentrate the majority o f  the risk about which there m ay be 
fear o f  adverse selection into small subordinate tranches. They conclude that this allows 
a large senior tranche, relatively immune to the effects o f  adverse selection, to be sold at 
a small lem on’s premium.
The extent o f  the arbitrage varies w idely over the credit cycle and issuance volum es are 
highly correlated with its size. The narrowing o f  the arbitrage in recent years has had a 
marked impact on the market. Gluck (2004, p3) comments that the single m ost striking 
developm ent in the U .S. CDO market during 2003 was the narrowing o f  corporate, and, 
to a lesser extent, structured instrument credit spreads. Because the impact o f  this spread 
narrowing was far more dramatic on the collateral side than on the CDO liability
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tranche side, the opportunity to earn arbitrage gams from the gap between asset- and 
liability-side spreads contracted sharply He concludes that the collapse in the arbitrage 
opportunity w as m ost notable for transactions backed by mvestment-grade corporates
1 e for conventional synthetics
Som e are questioning the future o f  the arbitrage CDO market Gluck (2004, p6) 
projected near-zero growth in the U S market during 2004 and opined that it was 
difficult to envision a widening o f  credit spreads to the point where the corporate CDO  
arbitrage opportunity improves dramatically He wonders i f  the increasing ability to 
hedge corporate credit risk through synthetics had resulted in a permanent contraction o f  
the liquidity component within corporate credit spreads He suggests that hedging costs 
have at least theoretically been cut through the increase in the number o f  liquid names 
traded m the credit default swap market He surmises that a more likely source o f  a 
restored arbitrage opportunity w ould be a narrowing o f  CDO liability costs
2 4 2 Balance Sheet Transactions
The benefit o f  securitisation to issuers is in the o ff  balance sheet treatment achieved, as 
w ell as the capital relief gamed to the extent that the underlying assets attract regulatory 
capital charges According to D uffie and Singleton (2003, 252), the balance sheet CDO, 
typically in the form o f  a CLO, is usually designed to rem ove loans from the balance 
sheet o f  banks, achieving capital relief and perhaps also increasing the valuation o f  the 
assets through an increase in liquidity Another essential benefit is the diversification o f  
funding sources Funding through securitisation is som etim es cheaper than raising 
unsecured debt for banks with ratings less than A A , they suggest
W hen balance sheet transactions were first undertaken m the early 1990s, a bank 
typically sold a pool o f  high-quality loans to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and took  
back the first loss piece The bank benefited to the extent o f  the difference between the 
mandated 8% regulatory capital requirement and the lower econom ic capital 
requirement
H owever, while a balance sheet CLO solved the capital problem, two problems 
remained (i) funding cost and (11) confidentiality
Funding Cost banks have a lower cost o f  funds than the typical purchaser o f  AAA-rated 
debt does Banks give up this funding advantage by issuing v4yL4-rated debt to fund its 
loans
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Confidentiality If a loan is transferred into an SPV, borrower notification and, 
som etim es, borrower consent are required Banks are loath to make their clients aware 
that they are selling their loans D uffie and Singleton (2003, p252) claim that the direct 
sale o f  loans to SPVs may som etim es compromise client relationships or secrecy, or can 
be costly because o f  contractual restrictions on transferring the underlying loans
For these reasons, balance sheet securitisations have migrated from being fully funded 
CLOs involving asset transfer to fully funded synthetic structures where the assets 
stayed on the institution’s balance sheet but their credit risk was hedged using credit 
derivatives Still later, partially funded synthetic CDOs replaced fully funded where a 
guarantee from an OECD bank replaced the collateral as the source o f  reimbursement in 
case o f  default More recently still, the m ost senior piece -  typically the top 85% o f  the 
structure -  is treated as 20% risk-weighted for regulatory purposes regardless as to 
whether there is a credit default swap referencing it This m ost senior tranche is often  
referred to as the ‘super semor p iece’ because it ranks ahead o f  other debt that is rated 
AAA
This thesis focuses on cash flow  structures rather than synthetic structures that absorb 
credit risk through the use o f  credit default swaps There have been no new cash flow - 
based balance sheet CDOs issued m recent years Thus, what follow s m ay be seen to 
refer only to arbitrage structures
2.5 CDO Structure
A typical CDO structure is shown m 2 5 above
Figure 2 5 Typical CDO Structure
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The funds to purchase the collateral assets are obtained from the issuance o f  debt 
obligations, known as tranches. Typically, three tranches o f  debt are issued: senior, 
m ezzanine and subordinate/ equity and these tranches m ay be further sub-divided. There 
w ill be a rating sought for all but the subordinate/ equity tranche. An ^-rating at least 
w ill usually be sought for the senior tranche w hile a rating o f  BBB but no less than B 
w ill be sought for the m ezzanine tranche. The subordinate/ equity tranche receives the 
residual cash flow  and is invariably unrated.
The fund manager decides on the com position o f  the collateral portfolio and earns a fee. 
Should there be any mismatch between the liabilities and the assets, either in currency 
or interest rate, hedges need to be put in place to avoid penal treatment from the rating 
agencies. Am ortising interest rate swaps are put in place i f  there is an interest rate 
mismatch. Since prepayments and defaults cannot be anticipated exactly, swaptions are 
taken out on a portion o f  the mismatch.
The order o f  priority o f  the payments o f  interest and principal to the CDO tranches is 
specified in the prospectus. Payments are made in such a w ay as to provide the highest 
level o f  protection to senior tranches in the structure. This is achieved by providing 
certain tests that must be satisfied before any distribution o f  interest and principal may 
be made to other tranches in the structure. If these tests are failed, the senior tranches 
are paid down until the tests are passed.
The ability o f  the asset manager to make the interest and principal payments to the debt 
holders depends on the performance o f  the collateral assets. The proceeds to m eet the 
tranche obligations com e from (i) coupon interest payments from the collateral assets, 
(ii) maturity o f  collateral assets, and (iii) recovery on defaulted assets.
2.5.1 CDO Life Cycle
There are three relevant periods in the life o f  a CDO:
Ramp-up period: The first period, known as the ramp-up period, usually lasts less than a 
year; during this period, the asset manager begins investing the proceeds from the sale 
o f  the debt obligations. Frequently, when a financial institution is the asset manager, 
many o f  the assets w ill be pre-purchased by the manager and held on the institution’s 
own balance sheet so that the ramp-up period m ay be shortened and the negative carry 
associated with having investors’ funds only earning Libor may be minimised.
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Reinvestment penod The next period, known as the reinvestment period is that in 
which the manager m ay reinvest pnncipal proceeds from maturing or pre-paying assets, 
subject to com pliance with the relevant tests This penod is, typically, five years or 
more
Final penod The final penod sees the cash flow  from matunng assets paid to the 
investors H owever, early termination may be tnggered by failure to com ply with  
certain covenants or failure to m eet payments to the senior tranches The equity-holders 
may also tngger the collapse o f  the structure by  calling the deal i f  they perceive that 
there is greater value for them in doing so
2 5 2 CDO Cash Flow Waterfall
One o f  the m ost important details o f  a CDO structure is the specified pn on ty  o f  
payments to the tranches This payment p n on ty  is usually called the cash flow  
waterfall, getting its name from the fact that cash flow s down the structure based on a 
set o f  tests descnbed below  A  typical cash flow  waterfall is shown in Figure 2 7
Interest
Figure 2 6 Cash Flow Waterfall
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Interest payments are allocated to the tranches in sequence in accordance with the 
priority shown. K ey to the channelling o f  cash through the waterfall is the passing o f  
coverage tests. Two types o f  coverage tests exist: overcollateralisation (O/C) tests and 
interest coverage (I/C) tests.
The O/C ratio for a tranche is defined as follows:
Tranche O/C = PrlnciPal Par value ° 1 the CollateralAssets Equation 2-1
Principal fo r  Tranche + All Tranches senior to it
The O/C test for a tranche involves a comparison o f  the tranche’s O/C ratio with the 
required minimum ratio, the O/C trigger. The lower the seniority, the lower the trigger, 
not surprisingly given that the denominator is larger the more junior the tranche.
The other test is an I/C test. The I/C ratio, is defined analogously:
m T T/„  Interest Due to the Collateral Assets _  -  -Tranche I/C  = ----------------------------------------------------------------  Equation 2-2Interest due to Tranche + All tranches senior to it
The I/C test is passed i f  the I/C ratio exceeds the minimum ratio specified in the 
prospectus.
2.5.3 Problems in Structuring CDOs
Other researchers have argued that, while the CDO structure helps mitigate the lemon’s 
premium, it creates problems o f  moral hazard in its place. Investors fear the manager 
m ay engage in cherry-picking the worst assets from its ow n portfolio for inclusion in 
the CDO. A lso o f  concern to investors is that the manager m ay engage in front-running 
the CDO.
Thus, the issuer has an incentive to indicate to the market that it w ill not engage in such 
activities. Many managers retain significant portions -  typically between 20% and 
49.9%  - o f  one or more subordinate tranches. Likewise, Schorin and W einrich (1998) 
point out that in many deals, more than h a lf o f  the management fees m ay be 
subordinated to the issued tranches.
2.6 Synthetic Credit Products
Traditional CDOs enable the transfer o f  credit portfolio risk on a fully funded basis. The 
requirement to fund the purchase o f  the underlying credit assets necessitates the 
issuance o f  CDO tranches. This requirement to pay cash for CDO tranches introduces
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two complications: (i) the purchaser o f  a CDO tranche needs to be able to fund itse lf in 
an efficient manner and (ii) the fully funded nature o f  the assets requires that a trustee 
be retained to hold the assets and collect and disburse the associated cash flows.
Traditional CDOs, with all their attendant cash flow  com plications, remained the only  
form o f  portfolio credit risk transfer throughout m ost o f  the 1990s. Their high-cost 
nature substantially limited their scope for application. M odelling, structuring and 
placing the tranches in the market required that an investment bank be retained. The 
need to fund the entire structure demanded that all the tranches apart from the first loss  
piece be rated. Furtermore, a trustee was required to keep the assets separate from the 
sponsor who typically managed the assets.
Funding the CDO tranches significantly reduces the potential investor universe. 
Insurance companies and hedge funds are loath to fund such investment though they  
m ay be quite happy with corporate credit as an asset class. Likewise, the handling o f  
cash flow s adds significantly to the administration costs.
Interest rate risk further com plicates the issue. W hile many investors m ay feel 
comfortable assuming pure credit risk, they inadvertently assume an element o f  interest 
rate risk when investing in CDOs. Swaps alone w ill fail to hedge interest rate 
mismatches between assets and liabilities because o f  the uncertain principal repayment 
profile caused by prepayment, reinvestment and default. The residual interest risk needs 
to be hedged using options, an additional expense that erodes the return that would  
otherwise be available to those w illing to bear credit risk.
Participants sought ways o f  circumventing these problems thereby creating a corporate 
credit portfolio asset class that was less expensive and could appeal to a wider investor 
base.
2.6.1 Credit Default Swaps
Credit derivatives provided the answer. Credit derivatives -  in particular, credit default 
swaps (CDS) -  have becom e the investment medium o f  choice in recent years for those 
w ishing to take on pure credit risk. Their unfunded nature makes them the ideal 
instrument for those without easy access to funding at a com petitive rate. This has 
greatly increased market liquidity that in turn has narrowed bid-ask spreads, improving 
efficiency. It enables those with a credit risk appetite to take on the credit risk o f
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companies with a higher credit rating than their own since they can do so on an 
unfunded basis.
Credit Derivative Market Breakdown by Derivative Type
Qedit Default Swaps 
73%
Credit-linked Notes 
3%
Options and hybrids 
1% Portfolio Correlation Products 
22%
Total Return Swaps 
1%
Source: Risk Magazine 2003 Credit Derivatives Survey
Figure 2.7 Credit Derivative Market: Breakdown by Derivative Type
Figure 2.7 above and Figure 2.8 below  show the com position o f  the credit derivative 
market by derivative type and market participant, respectively, based on a poll o f  tw elve  
dealers at the end o f  2002. The total notional market outstanding across all credit 
derivative products was estimated at $2.3 trillion, a 50% increase on the previous year. 
O ’Kane et al (2003, p i)  remark: “W hile not directly comparable, it is worth noting that 
the total notional outstanding o f  global investment-grade corporate bond issuance 
currently stands at $3.1 trillion.”
31
Credit Derivative Market Breakdown by End User
Reinsurance Banks (synthetic securitisation)
Insurance
14%
Hedge Funds 
13% Banks (other) 38%Third-party Asset 
Managers 
7%
Corporates
3%
Source: Risk Magazine 2003 Credit Derivatives Survey
Figure 2.8 Credit Derivative Market: Breakdown by End User
Banks are the biggest users o f  credit derivatives, using them both to take on and to 
hedge credit risk. Credit default swaps are the dominant product type but portfolio 
correlation products have increased in significance compared to previous years.
The credit default swap is the basic building block for m ost exotic credit derivatives, 
transferring as it does the credit risk o f  a reference entity from one party to another. 
Follow ing a credit event, the protection buyer typically delivers the cheapest reference 
asset in return for par. Approximately 500 names world-wide have liquid CDS. These 
firms are large household names, and predominantly investment-grade.
2.6.2 Credit Correlation Products
The portfolio correlation product category is comprised o f  synthetic CDOs and default 
baskets with a total notional value o f  $449 billion. The market for portfolio correlation 
products has grown in line with the credit derivatives market itself. This is to be 
expected because there is a sym biotic relationship between the single-nam e CDS market 
and the synthetic CDO market: synthetic tranche products are hedged using CDS.
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2 6 2 1 Basket Default Products
The simplest correlation product is the basket default swap It is similar to a CDS except 
that the trigger is the n-th credit event in a specified basket o f  reference entities The 
contingent payment typically involves physical delivery o f  the defaulted asset in return 
for a payment o f  the par amount in cash A  first-to-default (FTD) basket is a w ay o f  
leveraging the credit risk by increasing the probability o f  loss without increasing the 
size o f  the potential loss
2 6 2 2 Traded CDS Portfolio Products
Traded CDS portfolio products have developed significant liquidity in recent years 
They enable the investor go long or short a portfolio o f  CDS is one transaction TRAC- 
X  is one such index
2 6 2 3 Synthetic CDOs
Synthetic CDOs were first used m 1997 as a flexible, low -cost mechanism for 
transferring credit risk o ff  bank balance sheets Their primary motivation was regulatory 
capital arbitrage They provided banks with a mechanism for transferring the credit risk 
o f  loans without the need to sell these loans, which could otherwise have required 
informing the borrower or possibly even seeking borrower consent They also provided 
a w ay o f  m anaging the credit risk o f  revolving credits, something to which fully-funded  
CDOs were unsuited
Under Basel II, synthetic CDOs w ill no longer be created for regulatory capital arbitrage 
because the nsk-w eightm g o f  high-quality assets w ill be reduced to reflect their lower 
risk Furthermore, as discussed in 2 7 4, Basel II ensures that the regulatory capital 
required to be held against a portfolio o f  loans on a bank’s balance sheet w ill be less 
than the capital to be held against the CDO tranches o f  synthetic CDO referencing those 
same assets
In more recent years, synthetic CDOs have found a w hole new role Gluck (2003, p6) 
notes that, beginning m 2000, the synthetic structure began to be adopted for arbitrage 
CDOs and becam e close substitutes for cash flow, mvestment-grade CDOs The so- 
called custom ised CDO has been created w hich enables investors assume credit n sk  that 
exactly matches their appetite The Risk 2003 survey shows the total market size to be
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approximately $500 billion Investors can specify the amount o f  tranche subordination -  
the attachment point -  and the tranche thickness, matching their exact requirements
Full Capital Structure Synthetic CDOs
In a typical full capital structure synthetic, 10% or less o f  the credit protection is funded 
through the issuance o f  notes These proceeds are typically invested in high-quality  
securities The remaining 90%, or more, o f  the credit protection is distributed in an 
unfunded format via a senior swap This substantially reduces the cost o f  obtaining 
credit protection compared to the fully funded traditional CDO Instead o f  paying 45bp  
over Libor for funding, w hich in many cases could have been achieved by a bank at 
close to Libor, a CDS premium o f  less than lObp was required, significantly reducing 
the cost AAA-rated reinsurers who were keen to provide the CDS would be incapable 
o f  funding a senior tranche
Another major advautage that the synthetic CDO enjoys over its traditional cousin is 
sim plicity the reference portfolio, typically, is static, all the referenced credits are for a 
single maturity, there is no interest rate n sk  and there are no cash flow s to be managed 
Little wonder, therefore, that synthetic CDO volum es have far out-weighed traditional 
CDO volum es in recent years for mvestment-grade names, which, in total issuance 
terms, dominate the market
Single-Tranche CDOs
A s the name im plies, smgle-tranche and full capital structure CDOs differ as regards the 
extent o f  liability tranches w hich are created W hile the full capital structure CDO  
issued equity, m ezzanine and senior parts o f  the capital structure, customised synthetics, 
more frequently called ‘single-tranche’, may issue just one tranche
Gluck (2004, p5) comments that smgle-tranche synthetics allow investors to take on 
exposures to credit baskets o f  the investors’ choosing The investors, he surmises, may 
be motivated by view s on default/recovery rates that differ from those o f  the market, or 
by different view s regarding default correlation Dealers can absorb the risks that arise 
from these reverse-mquiry deals by delta-hedgmg in the single-nam e CDS market
They are custom ised m that the investor can specify the credits in the collateral, the 
trade maturity, the attachment point, and the tranche width The tranches frequently 
carry an agency rating, w hich avoids regulatory nsk-w eighting issues that frequently
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accompany FTD baskets The resulting tranches often achieve mvestment-grade ratings 
despite their subordination within the capital structure and offer higher spreads than 
comparably rated single-nam e corporate debt It is a matter o f  debate whether the rating 
is comparable though it m ay take many years for the truth to emerge
Other Synthetics
The standard synthetic CDO product is a relatively sim ple product to structure and 
p nce Closed-form  solutions exist for pricing and for delta-hedging the various 
underlying credits Inevitably, variations on the basic schem e were developed in order 
to make som e o f  the tranches appeal to new investor categories
Som e introduced structural features such as reserve account funding which divert excess  
spread into a reserve account which is then available to absorb losses Others re­
introduced the over-collateralisation triggers com m only found m traditional structures 
Still others introduced principal-protected versions m w hich only the size o f  coupon is 
impacted by losses The recently introduced managed synthetic gives the asset manager 
the flexibility to trade names m the portfolio
Finally, the CDO o f  CDOs, more com m only known as ‘CDO squared5, has grown in 
popularity The underlying collateral, typically, comprises m ezzanine tranches o f  other 
CDOs Thus, an additional layer o f  leverage is applied to the traditional CDO This 
product clearly compounds the com plexity o f  the traditional CDO where than the basic 
synthetic CDO sim plifies it
2.7 Regulatory Approach
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, known as the Committee, o f  BIS has 
expressed its view s regarding credit n sk  m odelling and securitisation on a number o f  
occasions m the past few  years In particular, it has considered the potential for portfolio 
credit risk m odels in setting regulatory capital requirements “The Committee 
commends the use and continued developm ent o f  such m o d e ls” BIS (1999, p41) It 
acknowledges that credit n sk  m odels may enable better n sk  management withm  banks 
It also suggests that such m odels would have the potential to be used by  regulators in 
their bank supervisory role
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2 7 1 Regulatory Attitude to Credit Risk Modelling
However, it expresses reservations about the use o f  such m odels in setting regulatory 
capital for credit risk A m ong the concerns it cites, data availability, model validation  
and the need for banks to prove that they are actively managing n sk  based on m odel 
outputs, were paramount The Committee has stated that it w ill monitor developm ents 
It is clear, however, that it view s as significant the hurdles that remain to be cleared It is 
equally clear that the adoption o f  a credit n sk  m odel-based approach to the setting o f  
regulatory capital is many years away
Credit portfolio risk m odelling is not sufficiently w ell-developed in the Com m ittee’s 
view  to trust model outputs for tranche capital “[T]he Group has ruled out the 
possibility o f  allowing banks to rely on their own assessm ents o f  the credit n sk  o f  
securitisation exposures for regulatory capital purposes” (2001, p2) The reason they 
suggest is that this w ould require banks to use credit n sk  m odels ,for assessing  
conelation effects within the underlying pool They contend that “credit n sk  m odels are 
not yet at the stage where they can play an explicit part m setting regulatory capital 
requirem ents” (1999, p l4 )  Five years later, they concede that the final Basel II 
document “stops short o f  allowing the results o f  such credit risk m odels to be used for 
regulatory capital purposes ” BIS (2004, p5)
2 7 2 Regulatory Attitude to Asset Securitisation
BIS has expressed m isgivings about the role o f  asset secuntisation for many years For 
example, m discussing the m ents and weaknesses o f  the 1988 Capital Accord in its 
1999 consultative paper, it speaks o f  the ability o f  banks to arbitrage their regulatory 
capital requirement and exploit divergences between true econom ic n sk  and nsk  
measured under the Accord BIS (1999, p9) They note that secuntisation facilitates 
regulatory capital arbitrage and can lead to a shift m banks’ portfolio concentrations to 
lower quality assets They note that through such techniques, a bank m ay be able to 
achieve an overall nsk-based capital ratio that is nom inally high but which m ay hide 
capital weakness in relation to the actual econom ic risks inherent m the bank’s 
portfolio (p36) CDO structures are explicitly targeted when they say that their proposal 
is pnm anly addressing transactions that result in a special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
issuing paper secured on a pool o f  assets
36
They include securitisation tranches in the higher n sk  category and propose to establish 
a 150% n sk  w eighting category to include secuntisation tranches that are rated between  
B B + and BB- (p32) They also propose that securitisation tranches “rated B + or below  
or unrated w ould be deducted from capital (p36) In so doing, they were, for the first 
time, suggesting that the capital required to support a secuntisation tranche should  
exceed that required to support similarly rated corporate debt In a later document, BIS 
(2003), they revised the n sk  weighting to be applied to the tranches m  the B B + to B B - 
category from 150% to 350% However, this treatment was limited to investing banks 
only O ngm atm g banks are obliged to treat as a capital deduction all retained 
secuntisation exposures rated below  investment grade ( p i06)
They elaborate on their v iew  o f  the nsks involved in secuntisations in their first 
working paper on asset secuntisation (2001) “ [A] w ell-diversified portfolio o f  A B S  
tranches (each backed by a diversified pool o f  corporate loans) can be expected to 
exhibit higher default correlations among underlying tranches than a w ell-diversified  
portfolio o f  similarly-rated corporate loans ” (p7) They suggest that this reflects the fact 
that much o f  the credit n sk  inherent in a single corporate loan is idiosyncratic n sk  that 
can be diversified away withm  a larger portfolio They state that the IRB n sk  weight 
formula for corporate exposures assumes that bank portfolios are w ell diversified and, 
hence, presumes substantial n sk  reductions through diversification when individual 
corporate loans are combined withm  a bank’s portfolio “In contrast, the automatic 
pooling o f  loans withm a secuntisation im plies that an A B S tranche already is purged o f  
much o f  the idiosyncratic risks o f  the underlying assets ” (p7)
In their W orking Paper on the Treatment o f  A sset Secuntisations, they comment that in  
developing an IRB treatment for secuntisation, “the Group has ruled out the possibility  
o f  basing the capital requirement on banks’ internal assessm ents o f  the credit risk o f  
individual secuntisation tranches ” BIS (2001, p2)
BIS (2003, p8) makes its reservations even more explicit “One noteworthy point is the 
difference m treatment o f  lower and unrated secuntisations vis-a-vis comparable 
corporate exposures In a secuntisation, such exposures are designed to absorb all losses  
on the underlying pool o f  exposures up to a certain level ” Therefore, the Committee 
decided this concentration o f  n sk  warranted higher capital requirements In particular, 
for banks using the standardised approach, unrated secuntisation positions must be  
deducted from capital
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2 7 3 Regulatory Attitude to Agency CDO Ratings
The Committee emphasises the difference between rating agency measures o f  credit risk 
and the dim ension o f  risk that is o f  concern to the regulator They suggest agency  
ratings are linked to default probabilities or expected losses (EL) on the tranche and do 
not directly reflect unexpected losses (UL) This expression o f  standalone risk is not 
what concerns the regulator, capital charges are intended to capture an asset’s marginal 
contribution to portfolio risk (defined as EL + UL) under the assumption that the bank’s 
overall credit portfolio is w ell diversified and highly granular (In the final Basel II 
document, published in June, 2004, capital w as defined as covering UL only, EL was 
explicitly excluded in the final agreed form ula)
They suggest that the link between EL and UL can be expressed in a fairly 
straightforward fashion for w hole loans with “only a single additional regulatory 
parameter (representing the correlation o f  the borrower’s performance with systematic 
risk)” required BIS (2002, p5) However, they suggest that for tranches o f  a 
securitisation, the relationship between EL and UL is much more com plex and is 
sensitive to the com position o f  the underlying pool (p6)
N ot only does the econom ic capital for a securitisation tranche depend on the risk 
characteristics (e g PD and LGD) o f  the individual underlying exposures securitised, 
they suggest It also depends on the average asset correlation among the exposures, the 
number o f  exposures in the pool, the credit enhancement level o f  the tranche in 
question, and the tranche's thickness They state that the current Ratings-Based  
Approach (R BA ) nsk-w eights attempt to take account o f  these variables in a w ay that 
ensures prudential capital levels for a w ide variety o f  possible securitisation structures 
(P6)
The Committee cites tranche thickness, system atic risk and pool granularity as reasons 
for requiring much more capital to support a CDO than a similarly rated corporate bond
Tranche Thickness Apart from the very senior positions, tranches are very thin, 
accounting for only a small portion o f  the pool This w ill cause the tranches to exhibit 
loss-rates in the event o f  default that exceed those for corporate bonds having the same 
rating (p6)
Systematic Risk Structured securities backed by a granular pool likely em body more 
systematic risk than a similarly rated corporate loan w hose risk is largely idiosyncratic
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The diversification that occurs within the securitisation structure creates system atic n sk  
withm  securitisation tranches They point out that the stand-alone credit n sk  o f  a 
secuntisation tranche backed by an infinitely granular pool w ill be effectively  all 
systematic Thus, they conclude “the marginal contribution to portfolio risk o f  such a 
tranche w ill be larger than a corporate bond with a similar rating ” (p6)
Pool Granulantv They suggest that pool granulanty is a key parameter in determining 
the n sk  weighting o f  senior tranches in non-granular pools As the pool o f  exposures 
underlying a secuntisation becom es less diversified, the volatility o f  payoffs on the pool 
increase The marginal value-at-nsk measures for tranches with different levels o f  
protection, they suggest, becom e increasingly similar and hence appropnate capital 
charges for more senior tranches increase (2002, p7)
They comment that senior and higher m ezzanine tranches backed by  less diversified  
pools are accompanied by low er external ratings than those backed by diversified pools 
They surmise that this seem s to reflect the impact o f  the im plied increase in volatility on 
the expected loss or default probability o f  these tranches They wonder i f  the 
adjustments made are intended to allow for the increase m unexpected loss on tranches 
that occurs They conclude that withm the ratmgs-based approach, the higher capital 
requirement that a tranche attracts when its pool is less diversified sim ply because o f  the 
lower rating m ay still not be sufficient to reflect the greater unexpected loss (p7)
The industry reaction to the higher n sk  weightings was, rather unsurpnsingly, one o f  
dismay In the second W orking Paper on Secuntisation (W P2), however, the Committee 
conclude that many within the risk management community “now  seem  to accept the 
view  that secuntisation tranches and loans having identical ratings may warrant 
different capital charges 55 BIS (2002, p6)
2 7 4 CDO Treatment under Basel II
The B asel II document (BIS, 2004) w as finalised m M ay 2004 Banks opting for the 
standardised approach to credit n sk  under Basel II must apply the n sk  weightings to 
CDO tranches outlined m Table 2-3 below
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Credit Rating AAA to AA-
A+ to 
A-
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to BB
B+ and below or 
unrated
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 350% Deduction
Table 2-3 CDO Tranche Risk Weightings by Rating Agency Rating
Furthermore, originators must deduct from capital below  mvestment-grade exposures 
which they retain
Banks adopting the R BA  must apply the follow ing n sk  weights
External Rating 
(Illustrative)
Risk weights for 
senior positions 
and eligible 
senior IAA 
exposures
Base risk 
weights
Risk weights for 
tranches backed by 
non-granular pools
AAA 7% 12% 20%
AA 8% 15% 25%
A+ 10% 18%
A 12% 20% 35%
A- 20% 35%
BBB+ 35% 50%
BBB 60% 75%
BBB- 100%
BB+ 250%
BB 425%
BB- 650%
Below BB- and unrated Deduction
Figure 2 9 RBA risk weights
The effect o f  applying the Supervisory Formula under the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) 
approach for a CDO portfolio with an IRB-determmed capitalisation rate o f  5% is 
shown m Figure 2 10
4 0
Supenisory Formula
C red i t  E nhancement  Level
Figure 2.10 Total Capital for Subordinated Tranches -  KiRB = 5%
Thus, i f  the bank chooses to hold on its own balance sheet a first-loss tranche up to 5% 
in thickness, the bank would suffer a full capital deduction equal to the amount retained. 
However, i f  their tranche exceeded the K m  capital requirement, they would be obliged  
to hold still more capital. For example, i f  they chose to retain the lowest 10% tranche, 
they would be obliged to hold 6.66%, exceeding the 5% K IRB level. This w ill 
effectively  put an end to the arbitraging o f  regulatory capital requirements by ensuring 
that the capital required to support a loan portfolio w ill increase on securitisation 
compared to holding the same portfolio on balance sheet. This can also be see by  
plotting the capital required to support a € lm  tranche o f  a €100m  portfolio with an IRB 
capital requirement o f  5% as shown in Figure 2.11:
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Figure 2.11 Regulatory Treatment of CDO Tranches under Basel II
This demonstrates that € lm  tranches within the K IRB layer bear a € lm  regulatory 
capital burden but, for example, a € lm  tranche with 10% subordination w ill still require 
€175,000 o f  capital; the regulators clearly are uncomfortable with tranched credit 
portfolio risk.
However, follow ing discussions with industry, BIS (2002, p4) relented and agreed to 
cap the total capital allocated to all securitisation tranches retained by an originator at 
K irb . Thus, w hile securitisation is not penalised, banks w ill no longer securitise their 
loans for the purpose o f  regulatory capital arbitrage.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter presented a detailed analysis o f  the CDO product, market and regulatory 
treatment. It highlighted the important role o f  the CDO in the financial markets, it 
identified the com plexities that an evaluation o f  the cash flow  CDO presents, and it 
discussed the regulators’ concerns.
The next chapter summarises the academic research that has been undertaken in the 
areas o f  relevance to structured securities. It exam ines the developm ent o f  
m ethodologies for assessing borrower default probability and it summarises the
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literature regarding portfolio theory as applied to equities and the extension o f  that 
theory to credit portfolios
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Chapter 3. Literature Review
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter explores the current state o f  research as it relates to CDO valuation
It begins by establishing the areas o f  the literature w hich are relevant to structured debt 
valuation and proceeds to summarise the seminal contributions to the literature These 
contnbutions lie m the areas o f  default probability estimation, portfolio theory as 
originally developed m an equity context, and the adaptation o f  portfolio concepts to the 
credit context
The performance o f  the theory when subjected to empirical testing is  then exam ined and 
the shortcomings identified by  the empirical academic research com e centre-stage The 
test results reflect rather poorly on the theory suggesting that the theory can provide no 
more than a framework for thinking about the issues
N ext, industry efforts to make the academic research discussed m this chapter work in 
practice are addressed
Financial products that have assumed a central role m credit portfolio valuation are 
explored In particular, the role o f  credit default swaps and credit correlation products 
are explored
The CDO indenture contains many details that the academic literature ignores These 
details are central to the rating agency m odelling approach Furthermore, these are 
central to the valuation issue but are rarely addressed m  the academic journals The 
chapter concludes with an overview  o f  a rating agency approach to CDO tranche 
grading
The theoretical framework that the academic researchers developed is central to the 
solution However, m many cases, it has to be supplemented by  empirical research 
Chapter 4 exam ines the market-leading solution to the credit portfolio m odelling  
challenge m greater detail
3.2 Risk Dimensions of Debt Portfolios
Before attempting to build a m odel for the valuation o f  CDO tranches, the literature 
relevant to the various aspects o f  the issues to be encountered w ill be reviewed
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First, the literature relating to the estimation o f  the default n sk  o f  individual firms w ill 
be reviewed follow ed by the literature dealing with the valuation o f  debt securities 
issued by corporate entities
Then, the focus switches to the behaviour o f  securities in portfolios The literature 
relating to portfolio theory as applied to equities w ill be reviewed briefly before the 
emerging theory on the behaviour o f  portfolios o f  debt securities is examined
3.3 Individual Borrower Credit Risk
A fundamental concern o f  all involved in the extension o f  credit is the developm ent o f  
robust m ethodologies for the evaluation o f  the credit n sk  that a borrower presents This 
credit n sk  measurement challenge is som etim es disaggregated into the separate 
calculation o f  PD and loss given default (LGD)
Two pnncipal schools o f  thought have emerged about how best to address this credit 
nsk  measurement issue the contingent claims and the reduced form approaches The 
follow ing sections explore the literature on assessing the credit n sk  o f  the individual 
borrower using these two approaches
3 31 The Contingent Claims Approach
The fundamental concept underlying the contingent claims approach is that default is a 
structural issue when a bonow ing firm’s assets falls below  the level o f  its outstanding 
liabilities, the firm w ill avail o f  the nght which limited liability confers on it, the nght to 
renege on debt repayment To the extent that default is a logical outcome o f  the decline  
in a firm’s fortunes as reflected in the market value o f  its assets, default is considered to 
be ‘structural’ It is this structural feature o f  default that characterises the approach that 
distinguishes it from the mam com peting approach, the reduced form approach, in 
which default is charactensed by a Poisson am val time, which, by definition, is 
incapable o f  being anticipated
Janow  and Turnbull (1995, p55) state that the Merton m odel is called a ‘structural’ 
model o f  credit n sk  because the assumptions underlying the m odel are im posed on the 
firm ’s balance sheet, the firm ’s structure The structural approach is frequently called  
the contingent claim s approach because it regards all corporate secunties as claims on 
com pany cash flow s The paragraphs that fo llow  sum m anse the contnbutions o f  the 
pnncipal proponents o f  this approach
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M ason and Merton (1985, p25) proclaim the benefits o f  this approach They bem oan the 
fact that the traditional approach to the pricing o f  corporate liabilities is disjointed, as 
exem plified by the structure o f  a typical, vintage corporate finance textbook, with  
separate chapters on the pricing o f  equity, and on the pricing o f  long-term debt, each 
em ploying a different valuation technique Rarely, i f  ever, they comment, are any 
attempts made to integrate the various components o f  a firm ’s capital structure as even a 
check on the internal consistency o f  these diverse valuation m ethodologies In contrast, 
they claim that the contingent claims approach to the pricing o f  corporate liabilities 
begins with the firm ’s total capital structure and uses a single evaluation technique to 
sim ultaneously price each o f  the individual components o f  that structure
3 3 11 Black and Scholes
Black and Scholes (1973) put research m the area o f  credit risk on a sound theoretical 
basis for the first time A s almost all corporate liabilities can be view ed as combinations 
o f  options, they suggest, the option-pricing formula and the analysis that led to it are 
also applicable to corporate liabilities such as com m on stock, corporate bonds, and 
warrants In particular, they note, the formula can be used to derive the discount that 
should be applied to a corporate bond because o f  the possibility o f  default (p637)
They note further that corporate liabilities other than warrants m ay be view ed as 
options The bondholders own the com pany’s assets, but they have given options to the 
stockholders to buy the assets back, they com m ent “By subtracting the value o f  the 
bonds given by  this formula from the value they w ould have i f  there were no default 
risk, w e can figure the discount that should be applied to the bonds due to the existence  
o f  default risk ” (p 649-650) They further note that i f  a company has coupon bonds 
rather than pure discount bonds outstanding, then the com m on stock can be view ed as a 
‘compound option’
Jones et al (1984) argue that Black and Scholes’ contingent claim s insight is o f  more 
academic and practical value than their option pricing m odel
Option Pricing Formulae
The stock price is assumed to follow  geometric Brownian motion, namely,
dS—  = pidt + adz Equation 3-1
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where S  is the stock price, ji  the expected stock return, a  the standard deviation o f  
stock returns, t is time and dz a drawing from a standard normal distribution U sing  
ito ’s Lemma, Black and Scholes (1973) showed that a function, F, a derivative o f  S, 
would satisfy
dF = ÔF _ dF I d 2 F  2c2—  uS + — +  T a SÔS dt 2 d S 1
dFdt + —  oS dz Equation 3-2dS
where r is the continuously compounded risk-free spot rate over penod t 
B y letting F -  l n ^ ) , w e get
dF =
.2 ' \
f l - dt + o  dz Equation 3-3
Black and Scholes demonstrated that it is possible to create a hedged position, 
consisting o f  a long position m the stock and a short position in the option, w hose value 
w ill not depend on the price o f  the stock, but w ill depend only on time and the values o f  
known constants (p 641) The long position m the stock is set equal to the partial 
derivative o f  the option price with respect to the stock price If the hedge is maintained 
continuously, they note, the return on the hedged position becom es certain (p 641)
They showed that any derivative o f  S  would satisfy the partial differential equation
ÔF „ d F  1 2 „2+ rS —  H— a  Sdt ÔS 2
d 2F
ÔS2 ~ rF  Equation 3-4
subject to appropriate boundary conditions For a non-dividend-paying stock, the 
solution for a European call, c, on S with a strike price, X , expiring at T is
c=SN
In( s ) f > f ( f  r 2 )— + r + — T In — + r ------U  J I 2 , V„~rT U ; I 2 J
<j 4 t
Equation 3-5
where # ( • )  is the standard normal cumulative probability distribution function  
3 3 12 Merton
Merton (1974) formalised these insights in the context o f  a com pany financed by zero- 
coupon debt and non-dividend-paymg stock A ssum ing the value o f  the firm ’s assets
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follow s geometric Brownian motion, the value o f  the debt, F, must satisfy a similar 
partial differential equation to that developed already b y  Black and Scholes
8F dF 1 2 , 8 2F—  + r V — +—a l V —  dt dV  2 d V 2 = rF Equation 3-6
where V, the value o f  the firm, now takes the place o f  S, the value o f  the shares The 
boundary condition at maturity is
F  = Min\V , B ] Equation 3-'
where B is the face value o f  the debt Equity, / ,  is the exact equivalent o f  a call on V 
with a stnke price, B (Equation 9, p 454)
f  = V N
In( V ' ) f— + r + —I 2 J
- Be~rTN
In
r a i W
+ r -  —I 2 ,
c t4t Equation 3-8
The difference between V and/ is F, the value o f  nsky debt (Equation 13)
F = Be~rT N'
i -  °"2^ ' - I n  2
(B e~ 'T Y
I  y  J > + VN<
a 2T  ,
------------- +ln2
r ^ Y i
I  y  J
a 4 f <j 4 t
Equation 3-9
The credit spread, 7 ? ( r ) - r , is the difference in yield between the riskless and the nsk y  
bonds (Equation 14) where the bond matures at T
R { T ) - r = - h n <
f
,  +1 - M
\ ( (  _  2 t  ^
f - '» M
y
N 2 + v  N 2V ^  J
o 4 t + B e - * N & 4 t
V ) \ A
Equation 3-10
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Thus, for a given asset volatility and debt level, the value o f  the debt and equity can be
uniquely determined, as shown in Figure 3.1:
/  -
Value of Debt and Equity Contingent on Value of Firm
Figure 3.1 Value of Debt and Equity Contingent on Value of Firm
VFigure 3.2 below  exam ines the effect o f  — - _ — , w hich Merton calls the leverage ratio,
d , on the term structure o f  credit spreads. This is one o f  the more controversial results o f  
the Merton m odel. W hile it indicates a rising term structure o f  credit spreads for low - 
leverage firms, it suggests a declining term structure for highly leveraged firms. Sarig 
and Warga (1989), Franks and Torous (1989) and W ei and Guo (1997) discuss the issue 
at length. A  declining term structure is rarely observed in practice although this may be 
because many issues contain a prepayment option, a factor that Merton did not consider. 
Furthermore, it shows the credit spread goes to zero for low  leverage firms as they 
approach maturity. “Empirically w e do not observe this to be the case.” Jarrow and 
Turnbull, (1998, p i 6) These issues w ill be re-examined in 3.3.3 below.
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Risk Premium as a function of Debt/Equity and Maturity
Maturity
•0 — 0.25 - ± - 0 . 5  - * - 0 .7 5  - * - 1  - # - 1 .2 5  — 1— 1.5
Figure 3.2 The Term Structure of Credit Spreads
Given the unique relationship that both debt and equity have with the asset value for a 
given asset volatility, they also have a unique relationship with one another, as shown in 
Figure 3.3:
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Figure 3.3 Value of Senior Debt vs Value of Equity
The value o f the default put option, p , or equivalently, the cost o f the credit derivative, 
may be expressed as:
f f  V  > \ f (  V  > \In In V - \ ( 7 2T{ B e -rT J 1 A U J. KBe-rT )2 + B e 'rTN 2
g 4 t c j'J r
\ J /
p = — V N
This cost is a homogeneous function o f the leverage ratio, d . 
The PD in a risk-neutral world is
Equation 3-11
r (  V  x In
1 - N Be
- r T J
1
Equation 3-12
and this enables the value o f the credit derivative to be written as:
N ( -  d 2) Equation 3-13
where
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In Be ■rT + rT
a ^ T
Equation 3-14
and
In
d 2 =-
rT
■4t
Equation 3-15
Crouhy et al (2001, p 364) point out
The absolute value o f  the first term inside the brackets in Equation 3-13 for the credit 
derivative is the expected discounted recovery value o f  the loan, conditional on default 
It represents the nsk-neutral expected payment to the bank m the case where the firm 
defaults The second term m side the brackets is the value o f  a nsk-free bond
Thus, the sum o f  the two terms m side the brackets is the expected shortfall in present 
value terms, conditional on the firm being m default at T M ultiplying this present value 
o f  the expected shortfall by the PD gives the premium for insurance against default The 
price o f  a credit derivative (CD) and its component parts -  PD, also known as expected  
default frequency (EDF), and the present value o f  the LGD - are shown in Figure 3 4 for 
a loan o f  100 to a firm
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Components of Credit Derivative Cost
\ . Firm  Value
5 .Û ts
5 Ôêe
Figure 3.4 Components of Credit Derivative Cost
However, practitioners do not think o f LGD in present value terms, and rating agencies 
quote recovery rates as a percentage o f par value. Hence, it is common practice to 
express LGD in actual monetary terms. Re-arranging the previous equation and 
expressing it in future value terms, we get:
ELt - B 1 - N ( d 2)~ N i-dJ Equation 3-16
Hence, the expected payoff from the debt at maturity is
M -  d x)B — ELt — B N (d 2)+ Equation 3-17
so the expected cost o f default, in yield terms, is:
- - I nT
B N id ^  + N i -d , )— .
B Equation 3-18
which is the same as the expression previously derived for the credit spread.
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Merton showed how  the cost o f  eliminating credit risk can be derived from the value o f  
the firm’s assets, V. However, it is not possible to observe V in most instances -  usually 
only the equity is traded and there are no liquid prices quoted for the other liabilities in  
the firm’s capital structure. A s a practical matter, therefore, it is necessary to be able to 
express a relationship between debt and equity rather than debt and assets as heretofore. 
If debt is to be hedged and priced, it must be done via the equity.
The value o f  equity according to Merton (1974) is:
f  = V N (dx) - F e - rTN{d2) Equation 3-19
As Crouhy et al (2001, p367) note, the equity value is a function o f  the same parameters 
as the default put option. They note that a put can be created synthetically by selling  
short N (-  d x) units o f  the firm’s assets, and buying B e~rTN (-  d 2) units o f  government
bonds maturing at T, with face value o f  B. They conclude that by selling short
units o f  the s to c k ,/ , a short position in the firm’s assets o f  N ( - d {) units is created. 
Thus, even i f  V is not directly traded or observed, a put option can be created 
dynam ically by selling short the appropriate number o f  shares.
Equity is a leveraged position in the asset and its volatility relationship with the assets 
reflects this leverage:
N(d{)V „  . . . .af - Tjf v a - — cr Equation 3-20
where rjf  v is the instantaneous elasticity o f  equity with respect to the firm’s value,
d f  V • Bensoussan et al (1994, 1995) showed that hedge ratio and the formula linking
firm volatility and equity volatility above can both be used despite the fact that firm 
volatility is stochastic, changing with K, which is not theoretically correct i f  the Black  
and Scholes m odel is to be applicable.
3.3.1.3 Vasicek
V asicek (1997, p i )  summarises the contingent claims approach to the measurement of 
borrower PD. Traditional credit analysis, he notes, involves detailed examination o f  the 
com pany’s operations, projection o f  cash flow s, and assessm ent o f  the future earning
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power o f  the firm But, he contends, such analysis is not necessary, not because future 
prospects o f  the firm are not o f  primary importance -  clearly they are - but because an 
assessment, based on all currently available information on the com pany’s future, has 
already been made by  the aggregate o f  the market participants, and reflected in the 
firm’s current market value He proceeds to emphasise that this assessm ent is accurate 
not in the sense that its im plicit forecasts o f  future prospects w ill be realised, only that 
any one person or institution is unlikely to arrive at a superior valuation The challenge, 
he says, is properly to interpret the changing share pnces
He proceeds to extend the contingent claims approach to the valuation o f  subordinate 
debt withm a capital structure that contains semor debt and equity also He derives the 
expected loss in a nsk-neutral environment, Q, as
(d t +
(a - f ) erTN
ln(DT + C T)-\n{A  -  F )-rT + ± < t 2T 
c t-J t
ln (D r + C T) - \ n ( A - F ) - r T - \ < j 2T
- C t N \n(CT) - \ n { A - F ) - r T  + \ a 2T
Equation 3-21
{ A - F ) erTN
a 4 r
\n(CT) - \ n ( A - F ) - r T - \ a 2T
o 4 f
where D  is the market value o f  the subordinated debt, Dr is the face value o f  the
subordinated debt, C is the market value o f  the senior debt, CT is the face value o f  the
senior debt, A is the market value o f  the assets, F  is the present value o f  dividends and 
interest paid over the term o f  the loan, T' and where r is the risk-free interest rate
The value o f  the subordinated debt is
D = (Dr -Q )e - r T Equation 3-22
The impact o f  firm value and volatility on the value o f  the subordinated debt with a 
nsk-free present value o f  50 is shown in Figure 3 5 for a range o f  asset values
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Figure 3.5 Value of Subordinated Debt as a Function of Firm Value
3.3.1.4 Other Contributions to the Contingent Claims Literature
Black and Cox (1976, p351) focus on the assumptions made by Black and Scholes and 
Merton who had assumed that the bond contract renders the firm’s investment, payout, 
and further financing policies determinate and that the fortunes o f  the firm m ay cause its 
value to dwindle to nearly nothing without any sort o f  reorganisation occurring in the 
firm’s financial arrangements. (p352) A s they point out, in reality, the firm may be 
reorganised i f  the asset value reaches upper or lower boundaries. These boundaries, they 
suggest, m ay be given exogenously by the contract specifications or determined 
endogenously as part o f  the optimal decision problem. (p352)
Black and Cox allow for coupon-paying debt and for default prior to maturity by  
introducing an exogenously determined lower boundary, which, when crossed, triggers 
default. In the Merton framework, they note, the time o f  receipt o f  each potential 
payment was known but not the amount which would actually be received. They  
contrast this with their new approach in w hich the amount to be received at each 
boundary is a known function specified by the contract, but the time o f  receipt is a 
random variable. (p353) The closed form solution that they develop confirms the
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benefits to debtholders o f  covenants that trigger debt repayment m the face o f  
deteriorating com pany fortunes
Shimko, Tejima and van Deventer (1993) allowed for stochastic interest rates as per 
Vasicek (1977) m the Merton (1974) framework They conclude that the correlation 
between interest rate m ovem ents and the returns on the underlying asset is an important 
variable in determining the credit spread on nsky debt having shown that for reasonable 
parameter values, as the correlation increases, the credit spread increases (p64)
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) address the “clearly unrealistic” assumption in the 
standard contingent claim s approach that default w ill only occur “when the firm  
exhausts its assets” (p789) They attempt to extend the Black and Cox (1976) m odel by 
incorporating both default and interest rate risk and by explicitly allowing for deviations 
from strict absolute priority which they do by  exogenously im posing a recovery rate for 
different securities They conclude that “credit spreads are strongly negatively related to 
the level o f  interest rates” (p791) and that for mvestment-grade bonds, “changes in 
interest rates account for more o f  the variation m credit spreads than changes in the 
value o f  the assets o f  the firm ” (p815)
3 3 15 Other Contingent Claims Models
M odels based on this contm gent-claim s approach compare the value o f  an issuer’s 
assets with the level o f  debt in the issuer’s capital structure to determine the PD D uffle  
and Singleton (1998) define this m odelling framework as the “structural” approach to 
nsky debt valuation Bohn (2000) says that m the Black and Scholes and Merton 
version o f  this m odel, default is assumed to occur when the market value o f  assets has 
fallen to a sufficiently low  level relative to the issuer’s total liabilities Bohn notes that 
the key characteristic shared by  structural m odels is their reliance on econom ic  
arguments for w hy firms default (p 54)
Lando (1997) demonstrates that the Merton formula for the value o f  n sk y  debt, F, can 
be re-cast as the value o f  a default-free loan o f  the same amount plus a short position in 
a put option on the firm ’s assets with a strike price equal to the debt’s face value
57
f
EL=B N  -
v
F= e~rT (B-EL)
[ l n ^  + r r - i g ^ - l n ^  V ( - ^ j v )  + rT + { ^ T - \n { B ) }  
a y f f  )  e ,T \  <j4t
Equation 3-23
Thus, the value o f  risky debt is the value o f  otherwise similar, default risk-free debt less 
the present value o f  the expected loss, EL, given that the com pany defaults Bohn notes 
that this expected loss term can be divided into two components The first term, the 
expected loss on the debt m the case o f  no recovery, equals the face value o f  the debt, B, 
multiplied by  the nsk-neutral PD The second term represents the expected recovery m  
the event o f  default
However, Bohn comments the mam difficulty with the formulation is empirically 
finding all the necessary inputs He proposes a simpler characterisation o f  default as a 
binary option m which the lender incurs a loss o f  a fixed amount, L, when the borrower 
defaults, where L is fixed as a percentage o f  face value, and nothing i f  the borrower 
does not default The formulation for EL above can then be seen as the expected loss 
with no recovery (i e nsk-neutral PD times the face value o f  the debt) less the expected  
recovery in the event o f  default
The expected p ayoff at m atunty m a nsk-neutral world is the sum o f  the payoff m the 
case o f  no default tim es the probability o f  no default plus the payoff in the case o f  
default tim es the probability o f  default He calls the nsk-neutral PD, Q, and denves the 
follow ing equation
F  = Be~rT [(l -  2X 0+  8( l ~ L)]=Be-rT [l -  QL] Equation 3-24
Bohn proposes an approach to calculating Q by adjusting the actual PD by the market 
p n ce o f  nsk  and a function o f  time The actual PD, p , that the value o f  the firm’s assets 
w ill be less than the face value o f  debt at m atunty is
p  = N \n{B)-\n(V)~ fiT + {(j'l T
a 4 f
Equation 3-25
The nsk-neutral PD is given by the same formula with the expected asset return, | i , 
replaced by  the default nsk-free rate r
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Q = N l n ( g ) - l n ( F ) - r r  +  | g - 2r
o 4 f Equation 3-26
Bohn proposes a factor-pncing framework to formulate a relationship between the 
expected return on the firm’s assets and the overall expected return on the market 
U sing the Capital Asset Pricing M odel to describe this relationship
covir , r ) o
M - r = -------------
Equation 3-27
Mm ~ r
where jum is the expected return on the market, a m is the volatility o f  market returns
and X is the overall market Sharpe ratio Substituting into the previous equation for p, a 
formula for Q can be denved
Q = n [n ~x{p )+ p  A V i7) Equation 3-28
In this formulation, p is the correlation o f  the return on the firm’s assets, rv, with the
return on the market, rm Although suggesting the CAPM  framework to describe the
concept, he proposes the use o f  a more sophisticated factor model to determine the 
amount o f  variation m the return explained by the firm’s sensitivity to certain market
factors H e suggests that the sensitivity parameter, p , be set equal to ^¡R2 , where R 2 
is the coefficient o f  determination resulting from estimation o f  a suitable multi-factor 
model
In this framework, the firm defaults with a probability, Q, and in which case the firm 
pays (l -  L)B or it does not default with a probability (l -  Q) and pays back B
F=e~rT (B -  LBQ)  Equation 3-29
Hence, the term structure o f  credit spreads is then given by
R ( T ) - r  = - ln(l ~ LQ} Equation 3-30
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This valuation framework has been adopted by KMV. They use a 120-factor model in 
their credit portfolio modelling product, Portfolio M anager, described in detail in 
4.3.2.1 below.
3.3.2 The Reduced Form Approach
Structural models begin with an economic argument about why a firm defaults. In this 
framework, default can never occur by surprise. As time to maturity goes to zero, credit 
spreads also approach zero. However, in practice, non-zero credit spreads are 
observable in the market regardless o f  maturity.
By comparison, in the reduced form framework, default is always an unpredictable 
event governed by an intensity-based or hazard-rate process according to Duffie and 
Singleton (1998). Reduced form models eliminate the need for an economic explanation 
o f default, comments Bohn (2000, p54). According to Jarrow and van Deventer (1999), 
the approach is ‘reduced form ’, because the assumptions underlying the model are 
imposed on the prices o f the firm ’s traded liabilities that can be deduced from the 
structural models.
Iovino (1999) characterised the difference between the structural and reduced form 
approaches. She stated that both approaches attempted to model the time a firm defaults. 
However, while the structural approach addressed the problem by “modelling the time a 
firm defaults”, that is, attaching meaning to each o f the underlined words, the reduced 
form approach instead models the time a firm  defaults, (p i 5)
Bohn (2000) formulates the value o f a zero-coupon bond issued by a firm with one class 
o f equity as follows:
F  = Be~rT{ \ - L  Q(t* < T)) Equation 3-31
where, as previously, F  is the market value o f the zero-coupon debt, B  is the face value 
o f  the debt, L  is the LGD expressed as a fraction o f face value, r is the risk-free rate and 
T  is the time to maturity.
He states that the difference between the structural characterisation and reduced form 
characterisation o f  the model lies in the specification o f Q. In the reduced form model, 
Q indicates the risk-neutral probability the unpredictable event o f default occurred at 
time x*, which happened to precede the maturity o f the debt. The time o f default is 
assumed to follow a stochastic process governed by its own distribution that must be
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parameterised by an intensity or hazard rate process. “The default or ‘stopping’ time is 
inaccessible i.e. it jumps out at you (from nowhere).” p.63
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) developed one o f  the first reduced form m odels in w hich  
they assumed a constant LGD and an exponentially distributed default-time. They  
m odelled risky bonds as foreign currency bonds denominated in “promised” dollars. 
The exchange rate is 1 in the absence o f  default and (1-LG D) i f  default has occurred. 
Default is a Poisson arrival. This assumption o f  constant default intensity is unrealistic, 
however. For example, in reality, strong firms becom e weaker over time indicating the 
necessity for time varying default intensity.
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) addressed this weakness. They m odelled default as 
the first time a continuous-time Markov chain with K  states hits the absorbing K -th 
state. States 1 to AT are associated with credit ratings where 1 is the strongest rating and 
the K -th state is default. However, in order to implement such a m odel, one needs to 
estimate an entire generator matrix to arrive at transition probabilities for each possible  
change in state. A s a first approximation, they suggest using historical rating agency  
transition probability matrices.
D uffie and Singleton use reduced form m odels to value risky debt as i f  it were default 
risk-free by replacing the usual short-term default risk-free rate with the default- 
adjusted short-rate process. They show how  to specify a reduced form m odel in the 
context o f  popular default risk-free term structure m odels such as Heath, Jarrow and 
Morton (1992):
tTn  - I  R dtF = E q e " B 
R = rt +htLt +  lt
Equation 3-32
where rt is the default risk-free rate, ht is the arrival intensity at time t (under Q) o f  a 
Poisson process w hose first jump occurs at default, Lt is the fractional LGD, and lt is a 
variable that is intended to capture liquidity effects. Credit spread data can be used to 
im ply the risk-neutral mean expected loss rate, htLT.
D uffie and Lando (1997) show how  to formulate a structural m odel such that it can be  
represented as a reduced form m odel in the D uffie and Singleton framework. They  
begin with a diffusion process for the firm’s asset value and a default barrier that marks
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the asset value at which the firm defaults They then derive a formula for the hazard 
rate, ht , in terms o f  the asset value volatility, the default barrier, and the conditional
distribution o f  asset value given the history o f  information available to investors The 
mechanism creating the inaccessible default stopping time is imperfect accounting 
information W ith imperfect accounting data, credit spreads remain bounded away from  
zero even as maturity approaches zero Thus, this version o f  a structural m odel is recast 
m a reduced form framework
3 3 3 Assessment of the Different Modelling Approaches
Next, the success, or otherwise, o f  the structural and reduced form approaches to 
evaluating credit risk is examined
3 3 3 1 Evaluating Structural Models
Jones, M ason and Rosenfeld (1983, 1984) found that contingent claims m odels 
produced credit spreads which were significantly lower than actual credit spreads They  
concluded that they produced results w hich were no more accurate than those obtained 
by discounting at the nsk-free rate m the case o f  mvestment-grade debt The Contingent 
Claims A nalysis (CCA) m odel, they assert, is not an improvement over a naive, riskless 
m odel for investment grade bonds H owever, the CCA m odel “does appear to have 
incremental explanatory power over the naive m odel for non-mvestment-grade bonds ” 
(1984, p624)
The naive m odel prices are obtained by discounting the promised cash flow s at the risk- 
free rate Based on a sign test, the CCA m odel outperforms the naive m odel for 139 o f  
the 176 mvestment-grade debt and for 117 o f  the 129 non-investment grade debt All 
these results are significant at the 95% level However, for pricing, the results were less 
impressive
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Overall results Number ofbonds Percentage Error Absolute Percentage Error
CCA Model Naive Model CCA Model Naive Model
Entire sample 305 Mean
Standard
Deviation
0 0452 
0 1003
0 0876 
0 1441
0 0845 
0 0705
0 1143 
0 1240
Investment grade 176 Mean
Standard
Deviation
0 0047 
0 0727
0 0149 
0 0703
0 0587 
0 0432
0 0574 
0 0432
Non-investment grade 129 Mean
Standard
Deviation
0 1005 
0 1063
0 1867 
0 1590
0 1197 
0 0840
0 1919 
0 1528
Table 3-1 Pricing comparisons CCA and Naive Models vs Market Prices
Table 3 o f  their paper, reproduced as Table 3-1 above, shows the difference between the 
m odel p nce and market price expressed as a percentage o f  the market price The mean  
pricing error for investment grade debt was small (0 47% o f  market value), but the mean  
error o f  for sub-investment grade debt was large and positive (10 05%) Likewise, 
fluctuations around the mean errors were large in both sub-samples -  the standard 
deviations were 7 27% and 10 63%, respectively, and the mean absolute errors were 
5 87% and 11 97%, respectively
They surmise that the key assumptions which give rise to these negative conclusions 
include constant asset volatility, the absolute priority rule (APR), perfect asset liquidity 
enabling firms to sell assets as necessary, Ito dynamics, the frequent requirement to 
retire bonds via periodic sinking fund provisions, and a non-stochastic term structure 
and suggest that “introducing stochastic interest rates, as w ell as taxes, would improve 
the m odel’s performance ” Franks and Torous (1989) concurred with their findings
Sang and Warga (1989) estimated the term structure o f  credit spreads using a small 
number o f  zero-coupon corporate bonds and zero-coupon treasury bonds They  
demonstrated curve shapes consistent with contingent claim s m odel predictions, 
namely, upward sloping for investment grade debt, humped shaped for lower grade 
debt, and downward sloping for very low  grade debt
Delianedis and Geske (1998) used the Black Scholes Merton framework to estimate 
nsk-neutral probabilities o f  default They found that rating migrations and defaults are 
detected months before m the equity markets, lending support to the m odelling o f  
default as a diffusion process rather than as a Poisson event
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Fons (1987) used a risk-neutral m odel to exam ine low-grade bonds and concluded  
either that there is systematic m ispricing by investors o f  low-rated corporate bonds or 
that the risk-neutral m odel he derived could not fully capture the market’s assessm ent o f  
the PD o f  those securities. In a 1994 article, Fons again found his risk-neutral m odel 
seriously underestimated the spreads he obtained from fitting linear regressions through 
data within different classes, but particularly investment grade bonds.
A  fundamental assumption o f  the structural m odel is that APR, which requires that 
senior claimants be paid in full before more junior claimants get anything, holds. This is 
seldom  the case in practice. Franks and Torous (1989) found that 21 out o f  27  
recapitalisations exhibited a violation o f  APR. In 21 o f  30 cases examined by LoPucki 
and Whitford (1990) in which the total value to be distributed was less than that due to 
creditors, stockholders received value, averaging 5.6% o f  the total value o f  all 
distributions. Garbade (2001, p l0 4 ) concludes that “[v io la tio n  o f  the absolute priority 
rule does not com e as a surprise to market participants” and that “[s]enior debt is not 
priced on the assumption that it w ill be paid in full before subordinated creditors and 
stockholders get anything.”
The structural m odel assumes that bankruptcy is instantaneous and costless. In practice, 
it is neither. Warner (1977) found that bankruptcy costs for eleven large railroads 
averaged 5.3%, ranging between 1.7% and 9.1%. Altman (1984) found bankruptcy 
costs averaged 6.0% o f  the debtor’s value for a sample o f  seven industrial firms and 
tw elve retailers.
W hile acknowledging the APR violation and bankruptcy cost issues, Garbade (2001) 
suggests that the problem is deeper, as the CCA m ethodology demands that an analyst 
recognise not only the existing operating characteristics, capital structure, and 
contractual obligations o f  the firm but also the prospect o f  change attributable to 
managerial discretion and decision making. (p387) He concludes: “The challenge is to 
extend the analytical framework to include the role o f  discretion in the exercise o f  
im plicit management options.” (p387)
Structural m odels have been used to value callable debt, with m ixed results. Som e o f  
the pricing errors can be attributed to a failure to allow  for fluctuations in yields on 
default-proof fixed income securities, Garbade suggests (2001, pi 14). Vu (1986) found 
evidence o f  ‘unexpectedly late’ redemption o f  callable bonds that he suggested m ight be 
optimal because o f  the costs associated with calling and refinancing. Likewise, he found
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evidence o f  ‘unexpectedly early’ redemption conjecturing that firms chose to do so in 
order to elim inate restrictive covenants Asquith and W izm an (1990) found that firms 
com m only called bonds for early redemption to eliminate restrictive covenants that 
would otherwise impede a planned buyout H owever, this type o f  ‘event risk’ associated  
with apparently suboptimal calling o f  debt cannot be m odelled correctly m the structural 
framework
Ingersoll (1977a) and Brennan and Schwartz (1977, 1980) were among the first to 
analyse the contingent value o f  convertible debt However, their m odels failed to 
explain corporate behaviour satisfactorily It was Ingersoll (1977b, 463) h im self who 
pointed out that, compared to the conversion behaviour suggested by his structural form  
m odel, companies com m only waited “too long” to call their convertible debt Jaffee and 
Shleifer (1990) suggested that taking proper account o f  the notice period between  
announcement o f  a call and actual redemption could rectify the m ost egregious failings 
o f  the Ingersoll m odel
Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993) valued coupon-paying debt using the Cox, 
Ingersoll and Ross (1985) interest rate m odel and an exogenously defined recovery rate 
They conclude that their approach is plausible as it generates yield spreads on corporate 
bonds consistent with those observed m the marketplace They further conclude that 
stochastic interest rates seem  to play an important role in determining the yield  
differentials between a callable corporate bond and an equivalent government bond 
“due to the interactions between call provisions and default risk” ( p i27)
Jarrow and van Deventer (1999) criticise the im plicit assumptions embedded in the 
structural approach regarding corporate capital structure policy The structural 
approach, they claim, assumes that the corporate capital structure policy is static, with 
the liability structure fixed and unchanging This assumes that management puts a debt 
structure m place and leaves it unchanged even i f  the value o f  corporate assets has 
doubled, they note “This is too sim plistic to realistically capture management 
behaviour and the dynamics o f  bankruptcy ” (p302)
Conventional w isdom  has it that structural m odels provide good insights into the cause 
o f  default but fail the test o f  providing good m odels for valuation H owever, Bohn  
(2000) suggests that small sample sizes, doubts about the quality o f  bond pricing data, 
and the lack o f  focus on the appropriate default risk-free rate leave us without
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conclusive evidence regarding the power o f  structural m odels “The resolution o f  these 
empirical issues awaits further research ”, Bohn com m ents (p66)
Gemmill (2002) examined the credit spreads on zero-dividend preference shares (ZDP) 
issued by split-capital trusts in the U K He confirms that two o f  the biases consistently  
reported are present m his analysis, namely, that m odel credit spreads are too small for 
bonds that are near maturity and also for companies with low  leverage and volatility  
H is study once again casts doubt on the appropriateness o f  the Merton m odel that 
assumes the assets follow  geom etnc Brownian m otion and, hence, that the spread 
should reduce to zero as time to maturity and/or volatility goes to zero It is clear the 
market has not excluded the possibility o f  a jump in asset value
However, o f  greater significance is G em m iirs finding that market and m odel spreads 
are o f  similar magnitude and, in line with market practice, the Merton m odel 
consistently produces an upward-sloping term-structure (p i)
The standard Merton m odel suggests a downward-sloping term structure o f  credit 
spreads for risky bonds as shown in Figure 3 2 above whereas the observed term 
structures in the market are invariably rising Gem m ill comments “The solution to this 
conundrum appears to be that the leverage o f  the companies changes over time, being 
higher when bonds are issued than when they mature ” (p3) The Gemmill model allows 
for this leverage effect and leads to m odel term structures o f  credit nsk  which are 
upward-sloping, as empirically observed (p3) He notes his results reinforce the 
conclusion o f  Collm -Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) “that it is important to take account 
o f  the expected trajectory o f  leverage when computing credit spreads ” (p3) He suggests 
that firms have a target leverage ratio which they try to maintain by issuing or retiring 
debt (p4)
3 3 3 2 Evaluating Reduced Form Models
M any reduced form m odels are parametensed on rating agency ratings and transition 
data Kealhofer et al (1998) take issue with the rating agency approach to grading 
securities in discrete rating classes In particular they reject the notion that all assets 
within the rating grade have a single default rate, and the default rate is equal to the 
historical average default rate (p40)
They assert that even when all loans within a grade have the same default rate, the 
histoncal average default rate can deviate significantly from the actual default rate
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Similarly, they state that the historical transition probabilities can deviate significantly  
from the actual transition probabilities
There are substantial differences o f  default rate within bond rating grade, with som e  
bonds in a higher grade having greater default rates than som e bonds in a lower grade, 
indicating an overlap in default probability ranges The overlap, they suggest, appears to 
be caused by lack o f  tim eliness in upgrade and downgrade decisions
They claim the range o f  default rates within a rating grade can cause the mean default 
rate to significantly exceed the median default rate within a grade They suggest the 
mean m ay be almost tw ice as large as the median, and as m any as 75% o f  the borrowers 
within a rating grade may have default rates that are less than the mean
They also state that historical default rates are statistics for the mean default rate, and 
thus may be biased upwards by as much as double from the typical default rate within 
the grade
They claim that the lack o f  tim eliness m rating changes causes a significant bias in 
transition probabilities In consequence, the “probability o f  remaining at the same 
quality is overstated by  about double for m ost grades, whereas the probabilities for 
changing to other non-default grades are significantly understated ” (p40)
They also take issue with the assumption that ratings and default rates are synonym ous 
They find that the highest EDF withm a given grade is m excess o f  four times the low est 
whereas the ratio o f  mean EDFs from one grade to the next is approximately two to one 
They conclude that grades overlap significantly They further conclude that the equity 
markets are faster than the rating agencies m reflecting information on the condition o f  
firms This is borne out by their research, which concludes that “about 70% o f  apparent 
spread variation is actually due to EDF variation within a rating grade over time ” (p50)
U sing non-overlappmg ranges o f  default probabilities, they calculate the one-year 
transition m atnx for 6,000 publicly rated U  S firms reproduced in Table 3-2
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Initial
Rating AAA AA
Rating at Year-end
A BBB BB B CCC Default
AAA 66 26% 22 22% 7 37% 2 45% 0 86% 0 67% 0 14% 0 02%
AA 21 66% 43 04% 25 83% 6 56% 1 99% 0 68% 0 20% 0 04%
A 2 76% 20 34% 44 19% 22 94% 7 42% 1 97% 0 28% 0 10%
BBB 0 30% 2 80% 22 63% 42 54% 23 52% 6 95% 1 00% 0 26%
BB 0 08% 0 24% 3 69% 22 93% 44 41% 24 53% 3 41% 0 71%
B 0 01% 0 05% 0 39% 3 48% 20 47% 53 00% 20 58% 2 01%
ccc 0 00% 0 01% 0 09% 0 26% 1 79% 17 77% 69 94% 10 13%
Table 3-2 Implied KMV Transition Matrix
The corresponding table, drawn from Standard & Poor’s CreditWeek, April 15, 1996, 
and reproduced in Table 3-3, notes the transition o f  rated firms
Initial
Rating AAA AA
Rating at Year-end
A BBB BB B CCC Default
AAA 90 81% 8 33% 0 68% 0 06% 0 12% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00%
AA 0 70% 90 65% 7 79% 0 64% 0 06% 0 14% 0 02% 0 00%
A 0 09% 2 27% 91 05% 5 52% 0 74% 0 26% 0 01% 0 06%
BBB 0 02% 0 33% 5 95% 86 93% 5 30% 1 17% 0 12% 0 18%
BB 0 03% 0 14% 0 67% 7 73% 80 53% 8 84% 1 00% 1 06%
B 0 00% 0 11% 0 24% 0 43% 6 48% 83 46% 4 07% 5 20%
CCC 0 22% 0 00% 0 22% 1 30% 2 38% 11 24% 64 86% 19 79%
Table 3-3 S&P Transition Matrix
The probability o f  staying in an S&P grade is approximately 90% for m ost ratings, 
which is about tw ice that recorded by  KM V Furthermore, the default probability for the 
lower S&P grades is about tw ice that in the KM V matrix
In sum, they conclude that ratings-based probabilities w ill tend to overstate the n sk  for 
maturities near to the measurement horizon, due to the overstated default rate, but w ill 
tend to understate the n sk  for longer m atunties, due to the overstated probability o f  
credit quality remaining the same (p53)
D uffee (1996) used m onthly pnces from 1985 to 1994 for the corporate bonds in the 
Lehman Brothers Bond indexes and the Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull model He finds 
strong evidence o f  m is-specification as the m odel fails to produce the term structures o f
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credit spreads m ost com m only experienced in the market Although the m odel fits 
mvestment-grade corporate bond prices reasonably w ell, he concludes that single-factor 
m odels o f  instantaneous default probabilities “face a substantial challenge in matching 
the dynamic behaviour o f  corporate bond term structures” (p 26)
A s discussed above, the structural model is often criticised for producing a declining  
term structure for low-grade bonds A  similar criticism can be levelled at reduced form 
m odels such as that o f  Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1995) and Markov-chain m odels 
which rely on rating agency transition matrices I f  a low-grade firm does not default in 
the first year, its annual default probability declines m subsequent years
3.4 Portfolio Risk
All research in the area o f  portfolio theory invariably begins with references to the work 
o f  M arkowitz (1952, 1959) His work attempts to characterise the interaction o f  a 
portfolio o f  equities and proceeds to calculate the efficient portfolio, that combination o f  
available equities w hich m axim ises the m ean-vanance trade-off
M arkowitz assumes that equity returns are normally distributed and that investors’ 
utility functions are quadratic At the end o f  an investment period, an investor’s 
portfolio has a value W = W0{l + rp ) U sing Taylor’s theorem, the utility derived from
that portfolio is given by
u{rp)=u{E(?p))+{rp -  E{rp)p'+\{rp -E{rpf u ” + Equation 3-33
Taking the expectation o f  this expression and assuming third- and higher-order terms 
are o f  minor importance, M arkowitz get the expression
E[u p^ )\=u{E{rp ))+±v{rp )u"E{rp) Equation 3-34
where v{rp ) is the variance o f  the rate o f  return Under these assumptions, the
investor’s utility is a function only o f  the mean and variance o f  the rate o f  return on the 
portfolio
The exclusive focus on the mean and the variance o f  returns is inappropriate in a credit 
context for two reasons (1) Credit returns are far from normal, with limited upside 
potential -  the highest price that can be achieved is a risk-free price that w ill never be 
m uch higher than par - whereas the minimum price is zero (11) Credit portfolios are
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invariably leveraged Thus, the focus cannot solely  rest on the standard deviation The 
downside tail is o f  critical importance as the institution that holds the portfolio becom es 
insolvent when losses exceed its capital This is not a concern for equity portfolios that 
are m ostly unlevered
Thus, credit portfolio research has had to adapt traditional equity portfolio concepts 
quite significantly to make them applicable to the issues they face
3 4 1 Credit Portfolio Risk
W hen the asset return distributions for two firms, rA and rB are normally distributed 
with an instantaneous correlation coefficient o f  p between their returns, then their joint 
returns w ill be described by  the bivanate normal distribution
The bivanate normal distnbution can be used to calculate the joint probability o f  both 
borrowers defaulting over a penod
where d 2 and d% are the distances to default for A and B , respectively
The probability o f  joint default is, therefore, the volum e under the cumulative standard 
bivanate normal distnbution
3 4 11 The Normal Inverse Distribution
Vasicek (1997b) explored the situation m w hich a portfolio o f  debt secunties is financed  
by equity and notes He developed a m ethodology for determining the capital necessary  
to support the desired rating o f  a lender’s notes The credit quality o f  the lender’s notes 
w ill depend on the probability that the loss on the portfolio exceeds the equity capital, 
he suggests The equity capital allocated to the portfolio “must be equal to the ordinate 
o f  the distribution o f  the portfolio loss that corresponds to the desired probability ” (p i)
He also examined the probability distnbution o f  portfolio losses He assumed that the 
portfolio consisted o f  n loans o f  equal dollar amounts, the PD o f  any one loan is p , the
Equation 3-35
Pr(DefA, DefB )=?r{vA < VDefA, VB < VDeJB )=  Pr(rA < d A2 , rB < d “ )=  N 2 ( -  d * , d B2 , p )
Equation 3-36
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asset returns o f  the borrowing companies are correlated with a coefficient p for any two 
companies, and all loans had the same term, T
He defines a default indicator Lx to be one i f  the z-th borrower defaults and zero 
otherwise Thus, the variable Lt is the gross loss (before recovenes) on the z-th loan and
P [ L , - \ ] - P  Equation 3-37
P [ L = 0 } = \ - p
and the expected value and variance o f  the loan loss is
ELt = pt \ \ Equation 3-38Var{Lt) = p k - p )
1 nHe defines L - ~ t o  be the portfolio percentage gross loss and he proceeds to n
calculate the probability distnbution o f  L , that is, the probabilities
, k  = 0,1, ,n  Equation 3-39pk = p L = y/ n
Assum ing that all borrowers’ assets fo llow  the process
dAx -  jul A x dt + <71 A t dxt Equation 3-40
where x, are correlated joint W iener processes with correlation p
E(dxt )2 = dt f \( \ Equation 3-41E(dxl fldXj) - p d t ^ i ^ j
The PD is
' \ n ( F ) - \ n { A X 0 ) ) - » ,T  + \ a 2Tp =p [L i =1  }=p [a Xt ) < f , ]= p [x , < c , ] = N
Equation 3-42
where At is the value o f  the z-th b on ow er’s assets, Ft is the value o f  obligations 
payable, and X t is defined as
x  = f c  (T)~_xt (°)) Equatlon 3.43
4 t
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The variables X t are jointly normal with equal pairwise correlations p and he  
represents them as
X t = -JpY + -y/l -  p Z t Equation 3-44
where 7 ,Z 1?Z 2, Zn are mutually independent standard normal variables He 
interprets the Y variable as a com m on factor, such as the state o f  the econom y, over the 
interval (0,7), the term ^ 7  as the com pany exposure to the com m on factor (the
systematic nsk) and the term ^/l -  p  Z, as the com pany-specific risk
Conditional on Y, the variables Lt are independent equally distributed zero-one  
variables with the conditional probability
p {y )= i { l =\\y ]=p [x 1< c\y }=p z. < =  {c - 4 p y \ =N H = = ( ' - 4 p y )V1 - P
Equation 3-45
He calculates the portfolio loss distribution as
P ,= P L = *n \ ] j  O7^ ))* 0  ” p (y )Y k dN { ï )  Equation 3-46
which can be evaluated numerically
He then proceeds to exam ine the behaviour o f  this integral as the number o f  loans in the 
portfolio increases Because the defaults are not independent, the conditions o f  the 
central lim it theorem are not satisfied, he argues, and L is not asymptotically normal It 
turns out, he notes, that the distribution o f  the portfolio loss does converge to a limiting 
form, w hich “can be then conveniently used for large portfolios instead o f  the integral 
form ” (p5)
He calls the cumulative distribution function
Q (x ,p ,p ) -N  - j =  { j \ ~  p N  X{x )-N  1 (/?)) Equation 3-47
U P
the normal inverse distribution, being the distribution o f  the variable
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L = N
.VP
Equation 3-48
where X  is a standard normal distribution. He derives the density function for this 
distribution as
Q'(x;p,p)= p - ^  e x p i 2p t ir '(x ) }  - 2 ^ N - l(x)N-l(p)+{N-'(p)f]2 p
Equation 3-49
The mean o f  the distribution is p  and the variance is N 2 (n ~1 ( p \  N~l ( p \  p ) - p 2 while  
the a  -percentile value o f  L is
La = Q~l ( a ; p , p )= Q (a ; 1 -  p , 1 -  p )  Equation 3-50
“The normal inverse distribution is highly skewed and leptokurtic.” (p8) This is 
observed in Figure 3.6 below  in w hich the loan loss distribution is plotted for a range o f  
asset correlation values:
Figure 3.6 Normal Inverse Loan Loss Distribution for Varying Asset Correlation
This fam ily o f  distributions varies between two extremes: a normal distribution centred 
on the loan loss probability when the asset correlation is zero, and a binomial
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distribution exhibiting 0% loss with a probability (1 -  p) and 100% loss with a 
probability p
This, albeit sim plistic, characterisation o f  the loan loss distribution points to the 
challenge o f  m odelling loan loss portfolios and, consequently, the valuation o f  
derivative products such as CDOs The number o f  standard deviations from the mean, 
__
— ------ , for combinations o f  asset correlation and a  -percentile for a portfolio with a
portfolio PD o f  1% is shown in Table 3-4 below
Alpha-percentile
10% 1% 0 1% 0 01%
0 1 1 19 3 82 7 01 10 67
Asset 0 2 0 97 4 22 8 77 14 19
Correlation 03 0 75 4 41 10 04 1661
0 4 0 55 4 51 11 04 18 19
Normal 1 28 2 33 3 09 3 72
Table 3-4 Standard Deviations Corresponding to Percentiles of the Inverse
Normal PD = 1%
H owever, this situation is further exacerbated i f  there is low  default probability Table 
3-5 shows the corresponding table where the borrower default probability is lObp, 
typical o f  an mvestment-grade portfolio It shows that an institution with a portfolio o f  
loans with average asset correlation o f  40% w ill have to hold capital equal to 13 
standard deviations i f  it w ishes to secure a AA- rating -  a PD o f  1 Obp - for itse lf
Alpha-percentile
10% 1% 0 1% 0 01%
0 1 0 98 4 09 8 83 15 37
Asset 0 2 0 60 4 10 11 16 22 39
Correlation 03 031 3 75 12 45 27 65
0 4 0 12 3 25 13 18 31 76
Normal 1 28 2 33 3 09 3 72
Table 3-5 Standard Deviations Corresponding to Percentiles of the Inverse
Normal PD = 0 1%
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3 4 1 2  Conditional Approaches to Credit Portfolio Loss Distributions
Finger (1999) addressed the issue o f  credit portfolio loss distributions conditioned on 
the outcome o f  a market vanable His interest in the issue stemmed from the slow  
convergence exhibited by M onte Carlo simulation o f  credit portfolios He noted that 
reliance on M onte Carlo simulation was unnecessary once account was taken o f  the 
assumed correlation structure “[OJnce w e condition on the industry factors that drive 
the m odel, all defaults and rating changes are independent ” ( p i4)
He adopted the same approach as Vasicek (1997b) outlined m 3 4 1 1 above whereby  
each normalised asset value change can be expressed as
and each obligor has the same default probability, p, and default threshold, a  , where
a = <f) “l (p) Equation 3-52
and all obligors have the same pairwise asset correlation, w2 Once the market factor, Z, 
is fixed, he notes, everything else that happens to the obligors is independent, the 
obligors are conditionally independent given Z ( p i5) The conditional independence, he 
contends, proves crucial, as it transforms the com plex problem o f  aggregating correlated 
exposures into the w ell understood problem o f  convolution, or the aggregation o f  
independent exposures
Conditioned on Z, an obligor defaults i f
a -  wZ _  „ ^
st < r  . =  Equation 3-53•VI — w 2
and since s t is a standard normal deviate, the PD conditioned on Z is
Z, -  wZ+ V l -  w 2 £t Equation 3-51
Equation 3-54
He deduces that the portfolio variance is
Equation 3-55
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where the first term is the same as V asicek’s and the last term is due to idiosyncratic 
variance w hich is not perfectly diversified due to the finite number o f  obligors
He derives the portfolio distribution as
W hile this does not have an analytical solution, a numerical solution can be found 
substantially more quickly than would the M onte Carlo solution He notes that “the real 
dimensionality o f  the problem is not the number o f  obligors, but the number o f  
market factors” (p33) and suggests that em ploying this approach w ill enable the same 
accuracy as standard M onte Carlo be achieved in a fraction o f  the time
3 4 1 3  Other Credit Portfolio Models
K oyluoglu and Hickman (1998) showed that despite the apparent differences in 
approach adopted by the mam m odels used m the marketplace -  CreditMetrics, Credit 
Suisse Financial Products’ CreditRisk+, M cK insey’s CreditPortfolioView and K M V ’s 
Portfolio Manager -  the m odels “in fact represent a remarkable consensus in the 
underlying framework, differing primarily in calculation procedures and parameters 
rather than financial intuition ” (p29)
A ll the m odels, they suggest, fit within a general framework consisting o f  three 
components (p32)
Joint default behaviour portfolio correlation is reflected by borrowers’ conditional 
default rates varying together in different states
Conditional distribution o f  portfolio default rate for a given ‘state o f  the world’, the 
conditional distribution can be calculated, they note, as i f  borrowers are independent 
because the joint default behaviour is accounted for m generating conditional default 
rates
Convolution/Aggregation They com m ent that the unconditional distribution o f  
portfolio defaults is obtained by  com bining conditional default rate distributions in each 
state
Equation 3-56
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They decom pose the change in asset value into a set o f  norm ally distributed orthogonal 
system ic factors, xk, and a normally distributed idiosyncratic component, s :
A A} -b^x^ + bl2x2 + + Equation3-57
where bt k are the factor loadings, and xk and are ~  11  d N [0,1]
For a given set o f  values for the system ic factors, the portfolio default rate can be 
expressed as
k
k X k
i - I * .
Equation 3-58
where c is the threshold value o f  the standard normal variable at which default occurs
For a hom ogeneous portfolio, they summarise the system ic factors by a single variable, 
m, sim plifying the expression for the portfolio default rate to
p\ = ®* tM
: - s [ p m
V1- p
Equation 3-59
where m -  N [0,1] and p  = ^ b 2k is the asset correlation
k
They proceed to derive the probability density function for the default rate, f ( p )
f(p )= -
/1 _ /I /A c - 4 \ - p < i> - '{ p )P v •Jp Equation 3-60
For a hom ogeneous portfolio o f  loans with a PD o f  1 16%, c = 0  1 [l 16%] =  -2 27, the 
probability distribution o f  the default rate is plotted in Figure 3 7
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Portfolio Default Probability Density Function
p=1.16%
Asset Correlation=0.073
Portfolio Default Rate
^  d
Figure 3.7 Probability Distribution of Portfolio Default Rate
The unconditional probability distribution o f portfolio defaults is obtained by 
combining the conditional distributions across all ‘states o f the world’. While they point 
out the similarities in approach to developing the unconditional default probability, they 
identify differences in the way joint default behaviour is modelled. W hereas the 
Merton-based models o f CreditMetrics and KMV use pairwise asset correlation, the 
actuarial model employed by CreditRisk+ uses sector weightings and default rate 
volatilities. They emphasise, however, that despite the parameter differences, “they 
contain equivalent information to characterise default behaviour.” (p35)
They present the generalised framework reproduced as Figure 3.8 below. W hile their 
comments are specifically directed at CreditMetrics, they suggest they apply 
‘reasonably well to Portfolio Manager’ also:
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CreditMetrics CreditPortfolioView CreditRisk+
Jomt-default
Behaviour
Distribution of systemic factors (normal)
Conditional Default Rate
Macroeconomic 
RegressionMerton Model
Default rate 
distribution
(gamma)
Conditional Poisson
Default Binomial Distribution _^  . DistnbutionDistribution
Convolution/
Aggregation Monte Carlo simulation
Numeric
Algorithm
Figure 3 8 Framework for Comparing Credit Portfolio Models
They conclude “Any significant model differences can be attributed to parameter 
value estimates that have inconsistent implications for the observable default rate 
behaviour ” (p35)
3.5 Modelling Correlation
Duffie and Singleton (2003, p230), summarise the m ost popular approaches to 
modelling correlated defaults
CreditMetrics, they characterise as a method by which ratings transitions for multiple 
entities can be simulated with the correlation induced by underlying correlated drivers, 
such as asset returns
Doubly stochastic correlated default-intensity processes  is, they state, an approach to 
modelling multi-entity default risk in which “correlation is captured through correlated 
changes in the default intensities o f the entities 55
Copulas, they describe as devices that allow entity-by-entity default models “to be 
linked with auxiliary correlating variables ”
Intensity-based models o f  default with jo in t credit events can, they suggest, cause 
multiple issuers to default simultaneously “The simplest example is the multivariate 
exponential model o f default times, which has constant default intensities ”
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3 51 The CreditMetrics Approach
CreditM etncs uses the counterparty’s asset returns, X {, as the driving variable Each 
counterparty’s asset returns are assumed to be normally distributed, and the asset returns 
for multiple counterparties, X }, X }, , X n are assumed to be multivariate normally 
distributed, with a covariance matrix, E The Cholesky decomposition o f X is C  such 
that C C T = £  By simulating independent standard normal variables, Z 1,Z 1, ,Z n, the 
drivers with the appropriate means and covariances can be simulated by letting 
X ,= E ( X , ) + C i1Z 1+C,2Z 2 + + CmZ n
CreditM etncs suggest that the necessary covanance information can be obtained from 
the volatilities and correlations o f equity returns for the n firms m the case o f publicly 
traded firms Duffle and Singleton (2003, p232), suggest that one could also “take the 
drivers to be the KMV measures o f distance to default, firm by firm, which is more 
in the spirit o f the asset-retum foundation o f the CreditM etncs model ” They add that 
time senes data on distances to default for pairs o f firms could be used to estimate the 
covanance m atnx
Landò (1998) considered correlation within the framework o f finite-state continuous- 
time Markov chains for each entity’s rating However, the approach proves to be rather 
intractable because the state space is nb where there are b borrowers and n rating states
3 5 2 Copula-Based Correlation Modelling
It was Li (2000) who first applied the copula-based approach to simulating correlated 
defaults He began by lettmg T  represent a security’s time-until-default, and F (i) 
denote the distribution function o f T,
F(i)=Pr(r < t \  t > 0 Equation 3-61
He defines the probability density function
f(t)=F'(t)=Lim ?r\t~ T<t + Equation 3-62
A—>0+ A
and he defines
qx -  P r [ r - x < l | r > x ]  Equation 3-63
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as the marginal probability o f  default in the next year conditional on survival until the 
beginning o f  the year “A  credit curve is then sim ply defined as the sequence o f  
#o > 0i > > 0 n in discrete m odels ” (p43)
Next, he introduces the hazard rate function, h(x), as the instantaneous default 
probability for a secunty that has attained age x
Li points out that i f  the typical assumption o f  a constant hazard rate is made, the density 
function is
He states “M odelling a default process is equivalent to m odelling a hazard function ” 
(p47) He also notes “[TJhere are a lot o f  similarities between the hazard rate function  
and the short rate M any m odelling techniques for the short rate processes can be readily 
borrowed to m odel the hazard rate ” (p48) Indeed this is exactly how  much credit risk 
m odelling has progressed over the past ten years, and the hazard rate function is called  
the credit curve because o f  its similarity to a yield curve
He proceeds to define the joint distributional function for two entities, A and B , as
/(-x)A x  
1 -F (x )
/z(x)Ax
Equation 3-64
where
h(x)= ^ X )  v Equation 3-651 -F {x )
The survival function can be defined as
so that
f ( t )=  S(t)h(t) Equation 3-67
f { t ) - h e  ht Equation 3-68
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F(5,i)=Pr[r, <s ,Tb <t\ Equation 3-69
and defines the survival time correlation as
EquationJ-70jrar(Tjrar{T,) Jrar{T,)rar{T,)
He suggests three methods could be used to extract the term structure o f  default rates 
(1) using historical default information from rating agencies, (11) applying the Merton 
option theoretical approach, and (111) taking an im plied approach using market pnces o f  
defaultable bonds or asset swap spreads
The last approach is the “one used by most credit derivative desks ” (p53) Li (1998), 
demonstrated how  to build the credit curve for individual credits from market 
information based on the D uffie and Singleton (1996) default treatment The challenge, 
he says, is to create “a joint distribution function with given marginal distributions and a 
correlation structure ” (p9) W hile it is straightforward to derive the marginal 
distributions and the correlation structure i f  the joint distribution is known, creating a 
joint distribution from a given set o f  marginals and a correlation structure, he 
comments, is rather more difficult The copula function is the mechanism he chooses to 
accomplish this
A  copula function links univariate marginal distributions with a joint distribution For 
given univariate marginal distribution functions, Fl (xt ), F2 (x2), , Fm (xm), the function
C(Fl(x,),F2(x2), ,Fm(xm))=F(Xl,x2, , x m) Equation 3-71
which is defined using a copula function, C , results in a multivariate distribution with  
univariate marginal distributions, Fx (xt ), F2 (x2), , Fm {xm)
Sklar (1959) proved the converse He showed that any m ultivanate distribution, F, 
could be w ntten in the form o f  a copula function He proved that i f  F{xx, x2, , xm) is a
joint multivariate distribution function with univariate marginal distribution functions 
F{(xj) ,F2(x2 ), , Fm (xm), then there exists a copula function C(ul , u2, ,um) such that
If each Ft is continuous then C is unique
f ( ^ , x2, xm)= ClF,(x,),F2(x2), , Fm(xm)) Equation 3-72
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Li showed that the copula function embedded m CreditM etncs is the bivanate normal
C (w ,v )= 0 2(0 " 1(w ),0"1(v),/?) Equation 3-73
where p is defined as the correlation between the default times o f u and v For 
example, if  the one-year default probabilities for two credits, A  and B, are qA and qB, 
respectively, the default thresholds are given by
1 a  =Pr[-Z’ < Z A]
Equation 3-74
qB = ? r [ Z < Z B]
where Z is a standard normal random variable If  p is the asset correlation, the joint 
default probability for credit A  and B  is
Pr[z < Z A Z < Z B\= |  ^<p(x,y\p)dxdy=Q>2{ZA, Z B, p )  Equation 3-75
—c o -00
This is graphed m Figure 3 9 for an asset correlation o f 0 3 This probability is most 
easily visualised as the volume under the surface m Figure 3 10 in the bottom left hand 
com er below the specified y -value and to the left o f the specified x- value
He comments that CreditM etncs uses a bivanate normal copula function with the asset 
correlation as the correlation parameter m the copula function Thus, to generate 
survival times o f two credit nsks, a bivanate normal copula function is used with a 
correlation parameter equal to the CreditM etncs asset correlation (p i3)
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Bivariate Normal Distribution
Figure 3.9 Bivariate Normal Distribution
Figure 3.10 Bivariate Normal Distribution -  Plan View
He further notes: “Conveniently, the marginal distribution o f  any subset o f  an n 
dimensional normal distribution is still a normal distribution. U sing asset correlations,
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w e can construct high dimensional normal copula functions to m odel the credit portfolio 
o f  any size ” (p i 3) This has becom e the standard m odelling m ethodology in the market
O ’Kane et al (2003) comment that although both the structural and the reduced form  
approaches can m principle be extended to the multivariate case, structural m odels 
calibrated to market-implied default probabilities (often called ‘hybrid’ m odels) have 
gained favour among practitioners because o f  their tractabihty m high dimensions 
“Hybrid m odels use the dependence among asset returns to generate joint defaults, 
therefore avoiding the need for a direct estimation o f  joint default probabilities ” (p34)
These hybnd m odels are M onte Carlo m odels w hich generate default paths, where each 
path is a list o f  default times for each o f  the credits m the reference portfolio drawn at 
random from the joint default distribution Once the time and identity o f  each default 
event is known, any credit portfolio product m ay be valued
The choice o f  copula is non-tnvial as pointed out by Marshal and Naldi (2002) They  
demonstrate that the Gaussian copula is unable to explain the extreme co-m ovem ents 
that are observed m the market The assumption o f  normality o f  asset returns, however, 
“is certainly not innocuous, since a multivariate normal distribution does not allow  for 
extreme joint events to happen with the frequency that the data suggests ” (p41) The 
multivariate normal distribution exhibits a tail dependence o f  zero for all correlations 
less than 1 They propose instead a t copula that they suggest is consistent with asset 
returns being multivariate t distributed Their analysis suggests nine as the maximum  
likelihood degrees o f  freedom They demonstrate that the impact on a first-to-default 
credit derivative is to reduce the price by betw een 5% and 10% compared to the 
Gaussian copula H owever, the impact farther out in the tail is quite dramatic they 
calculate that second-to-default protection w ill be under-estimated by as much as 58% 
by using a Gaussian copula
W hile the copula-based approach to credit correlation m odelling has becom e the market 
standard for portfolios o f  debt extended to firms for w hich there is a liquid CDS market, 
the approach has limited applicability to the vast m ajonty o f  firms in order to obtain 
nsk-neutral probabilities o f  default for a particular company, a precise yield curve 
specific to Company X  debt (or a precise yield curve for debt o f  other companies that 
are deem ed to be o f  similar credit risk) is required “Thus it w ill be difficult to apply 
reduced form m odels to middle market companies or illiquid markets 55 Smithson (2003, 
p215) concludes
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3.6 Pricing Credit Risk
M erton’s version o f  the structural approach automatically prices credit risk but it 
assumes that LGD is endogenous Other variations on this approach assume that default 
probability only is determined by the asset value process and that recovery is 
exogenously specified thereby taking account o f  the fact that the absolute pn on ty  rule is 
frequently violated m practice
Smithson (2003, p209), suggests a ‘fam ily tree’ o f  m odels for pricing default-risky 
claims as shown m Figure 3 11
No Arbitrage/Contingent Claims Analysis
Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1973)
1st Generation Structural Models
Merton (1974)
1st Generation Reduced Form Models
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995)
2nd Generation Structural Models
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)
2nd Generation Reduced Form Models
Duffie and Smgleton(1994)
Madan and Unal (1996)
Das and Tufano (1996)
Figure 3 11 A Family Tree of Pricing Models for Default-Risky Claims (after
Smithson)
Smithson remarks that at the n sk  o f  oversim plifying, credit derivatives and traditional 
derivatives can all be valued as the present value o f  their nsk-adjusted expected future 
cash flow s He qualifies this remark, however “The bad news is that credit m odels are 
much more difficult to implement ” He lists three separate areas that cause difficulty
Default definition “Default is an imprecise concept subject to various legal and 
econom ic definitions ” (p209) He adds that a pricing m odel w ill necessarily have to 
sim plify the econom ics o f  default or very carefully define the precise conditions being  
m odelled
LGD Pricing m odels for credit must address the uncertainty m LGD or assume that loss  
given default is known, he comments
Data on w hich to parametense m odels Data on credit losses are “notoriously lim ited” 
and credit spread data are available only for the largest and m ost liquid markets, he 
opm es (p209)
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3 6 1 Pricing Credit Derivatives
This im precision regarding default definition is evident in the lack o f  standardisation as 
regards credit events m credit derivative documentation D espite the improvements in 
the 2003 ISDA master agreement over its 1999 predecessor, the market remains split
M odified Restructuring (M od-Re) standard w hile the European market has adopted the 
M odified-M odified Restructuring (M od-M od-re) convention W hile Duffie (1999) 
comments that credit default swaps involve som e n sk  o f  disagreement about whether 
the event has, in fact, occurred, m his discussion o f  valuing the credit swap, he ignores 
issues surrounding documentation and enforceability
Structural m odels are seldom  used to p nce credit default swaps instead, structural 
m odels are generally used to say at what spread corporate bonds should trade based on 
the internal structure o f  the company, according to O ’Kane et al (2003, p5) They state 
that they require information about the balance sheet o f  the company and can be used to 
establish a link between pricing m the equity and debt markets They add that they are 
limited in a number o f  ways including the fact that they generally lack the flexibility to 
fit exactly a given term structure o f  spreads, and “they cannot be easily extended to 
price com plex credit derivatives ” (p5)
The reduced form approach o f  Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is the basis for what has 
becom e the market standard method o f  valuing CDS They characterise a credit event as 
the first event o f  a Poisson counting process that occurs at time t with a probability 
defined as
Thus, the probability o f  defaulting in the time interval +  conditional on
between an U  S and a non-U S standard In the U S ,  the market has adopted the
Equation 3-76
surviving to time t is proportional to X( i) , w hich they call the hazard rate and the length  
o f  the time interval, dt Thus, the survival probability is
Equation 3-77
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where the expectation is taken under the risk-neutral measure, Q. The standard market 
assumption is that the hazard rate process is deterministic, and, therefore, independent 
o f  interest rates and recovery rates.
In this framework, the spread is set so that the present values o f  the premium and 
protection legs o f  the CDS contract are equal. I f  the hazard rate and risk-free rate term 
structures are flat, and R is the recovery rate, the present value o f  the protection leg  is:
If the spread, S, on the premium leg is paid continuously, the present value o f  the 
premium leg is:
Setting the value o f  the premium leg equal to that o f  the protection leg, the value o f  the 
spread is extracted:
S = A(l -  R) Equation 3-80
and the risky PV01, or RPV01 as it is known in the market, is:
In reality, the interest rate and hazard rate term structures are not flat and it becom es 
necessary to build a full term structure using bootstrapping techniques.
floating-rate note. He proceeds to calculate the at-market annuity premium rate for 
which the market value o f  the credit swap is zero at the outset.
3.7 Measuring Probability of Default
There are numerous approaches to the measurement o f  PD in use in the marketplace. 
These range from the multivariate approach pioneered by Altman thirty years ago to 
neural networks. For our purposes, it suffices to exam ine in greater detail the two 
m ethodologies w hich are m ost w idely used in the market and w hich are also
Equation 3-78
Equation 3-79
Equation 3-81
Duffie (1999) remarks that the term ‘sw ap’ applies to credit swaps because they can be 
view ed under certain ideal conditions as a swap o f  a default-free note for a defaultable
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representative o f  the two approaches w hich underpin the m odels which w ill be 
compared later in this thesis The KM V approach is the m ost w idely used default 
probability measure com m ercially available while the M oody’s rating is the standard on  
w hich many market participants still rely These two approaches w ill be examined in 
turn
37 1 KMV
According to the Merton approach, the PD is a function o f  (1) the value o f  the firm’s 
assets, (11) the volatility o f  this value, and (111) the amount o f  debt m the firm’s capital 
structure KM V have adopted this approach but have adapted it to empirical data to 
convert the outputs into practical results by developing a measure o f  risk they call 
‘ distance-to-default’
Crosbie (2002) discusses K M V ’s understanding o f  ‘default point’ He notes that m  
K M V ’s studies o f  defaults, they have found that in general firms do not default when  
their asset value reaches the book value o f  their total liabilities He acknowledges that 
w hile som e firms certainly default at this point, many continue to trade and service their 
debts The long-term nature o f  som e o f  their liabilities provides these firms with some 
breathing space, he surmises KM V found that the default point, the asset value at which  
the firm w ill default, lies “som ewhere between total liabilities and current, or short­
term, liabilities ” The relevant net worth o f  the firm is the market value o f  the firm ’s 
assets minus the firm’s default point A  firm w ill default “when its market net worth 
reaches zero”, he notes (p3)
He explains that asset value, business risk and leverage can be combined into a single  
measure o f  default risk w hich compares the market net worth to the size o f  a one 
standard deviation m ove in the asset value KM V refer to this ratio as the distance-to- 
default and it is calculated as
Market V alue o f  A ssets - Default PointDistance to Default = [Market Value o f  A ssetsjA sset Volatility]
“The default probability can be computed directly from the distance-to-default i f  the 
default rate for a given level o f  distance-to-default is known ” (p6)
KM V have com piled a very large database o f  defaults and have computed the distance- 
to-default metric for these firms for the years prior to their defaulting A  default 
database is used to denve an empirical distribution relating the distance-to-default to a
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default probability. “In this way, the relationship between asset value and liabilities can 
be captured without resorting to a substantially more com plex m odel characterising a 
firm’s liability process.” (p7) They call the resulting PD, the expected default 
frequency, EDF. They have implemented this process in their software product, Credit 
Edge, and deliver annualised EDF values over 1 to 5 years on a daily basis over the 
internet on over 35,000 companies. A  schematic representation o f  EDF measurement is 
shown in Figure 3.12 below:
Distribution of Asset Value at Horizon
-4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0
ln(A sset Value at Horizon)
2.0 3.0 4.0
Figure 3.12 Schematic for Estimation of Expected Default Frequency
If the future distribution o f  the distance-to-default were known, the default probability, 
EDF, would be the likelihood that the final asset value was below  the default point. 
However, in practice, Crosbie says that the distribution o f  the distance-to-default is 
difficult to measure. He states that the usual assumptions o f  normal or lognormal 
distributions cannot be used. For default measurement, the likelihood o f  large adverse 
changes in the relationship o f  asset value to the firm’s default point is critical to the 
accurate determination o f  the default probability, he suggests. These changes m ay com e  
about from changes in asset value or changes in the firm’s leverage. In fact, changes in 
asset value and changes in leverage m ay be highly correlated. Consequently, KM V first 
measures the distance-to-default as the number o f  standard deviations the asset value is 
away from default and then uses empirical data to determine the corresponding default
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probability They obtain the relationship betw een distance-to-default and default
probability from data on historical default and bankruptcy frequencies Their database 
includes over 250,000 company-years and over 4 ,700 incidents o f  default or 
bankruptcy From this data, a lookup or frequency table is created which generates the 
likelihood o f  default to various levels o f  distance-to-default Thus, i f  they are interested 
in determining the default probability over the next year for a firm that is seven standard 
deviations away from default, they query the default history for the proportion o f  the 
firms, seven standard deviations away from default that defaulted over the next year 
The answer, he says, is about 5bp, 0 05%, or an equivalent rating o f  A A
The PD by time Ty p T, is the probability that the market value o f  the firm’s assets, VA , 
w ill be less than the book value o f  the firm’s liabilities due by time T, X T, where the 
asset volatility is a  A In the Merton framework, the PD is
In order to calculate these EDF values, KM V must calculate the asset value and asset 
volatility o f  the firm from the market value and volatility o f  equity and the book value 
o f  the liabilities They have extended the Merton m odel into what they call the Vasicek- 
Kealhofer m odel to incorporate more com plex capital structures including long- and 
short-term debt, convertible debt and the perpetuity nature o f  equity Thus, they solve  
the follow ing two relationships sim ultaneously
pT - Pr[ln(K  ^) + ( / / -  j <y\ )r + aA +Jt  £*J< ln(Xr ) Equation 3-82
Rearranging,
p T =Pr > s Equation 3-83
g a 4 t
A ssum ing the asset returns are normally distnbuted, this probability is
P t = N (-  DD) Equation 3-84a A4 f
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IEquity V alu e= /  (Asset Value, A sset Volatility, Capital Structure, Interest Rate) 
Equity V olatility= /  (Asset Value, A sset Volatility, Capital Structure, Interest Rate)
Asset value and volatility are the only unknown quantities m these relationships and 
thus the two equations can be solved to determine the values im plied by the current 
equity value, volatility and capital structure
KM V start with the Merton relationship
v e = v a n
In -rT
4 f
f  r  
In
I e ' r( N
V.
X e -rT - ± c r l T
Equation 3-85
They then recognise that equity is a leveraged interest m the underlying assets and that 
its volatility is higher than that o f  the underlying assets as follow s
VA
<j a  = — A where
In
d,=- X e
-rT
Equation 3-86
■Vr
where A is the delta o f  the equity option on the assets
Once again, they need to m odify the Merton m odel to denve meaningful results They  
adjust the distance-to-default to include not only the increases m asset value given by  
the rate but also adjust for any cash outflows to service debt, dividends, and so on In 
addition, they state that the Normal distribution is a very poor choice to define the PD 
The m ost important reason they give is the fact that the default point is in reality also a 
random variable Thus, while they have assumed that the firm’s default point is 
described by the firm ’s liabilities and amortisation schedule, they acknowledge that this 
is not true and recognise that firms w ill often adjust their liabilities as they near default 
They note that it is com m on to observe the liabilities o f  commercial and industnal firms 
increase as they near default while the liabilities o f  financial institutions often decrease 
as they approach default The difference, they suggest, is usually just a reflection o f  the 
liquidity m the firm’s assets and thus their ability to adjust their leverage as they  
encounter difficulties H owever, KM V have found them selves unable to specify  ex ante
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the behaviour o f  the liabilities and thus they must capture the uncertainty in the 
adjustments in the liabilities elsewhere. They choose to include this uncertainty in the 
mapping o f  distance-to-default to the EDF credit measure. They observe that the 
resulting empirical distribution o f  default rates has much wider tails than the Normal 
distribution. “For example, a distance to default o f  four, four standard deviations, maps 
to a default rate o f  lOObp. The equivalent probability from the Normal distribution is 
essentially zero.” Crosbie (2000, p i 7)
KM V determine the PD o f  a firm by reference to its distance-to-default. A ll the firms in 
its database over m any years are categorised based on their distance-to-default and the 
subsequently realised default rates over one-, two-, three-, four- and five-year periods 
thereafter. Thus, KM V can extract not just a one-year PD for a firm but the term 
structure o f  a firm’s PD out to five years.
3.7.2 Rating Agencies
The rating agencies, and indeed, m ost financial institutions, assign ratings to borrowers 
based on a variety o f  financial and non-financial measures. These ratings are m erely  
ordinal rankings and the descriptions o f  what the ratings mean are extremely general.
In recent years, the rating agencies have responded to market demand for more 
quantitative risk measures by publishing historical default statistics. Two types o f  
statistics in particular are quoted: (i) historical default rates over various time periods, 
and (ii) transition matrices which report not just on the frequency o f  transition from a 
given grade to default but also on the frequency o f  transition from a given grade to other 
non-default grades.
However, two criticisms are frequently levelled at these statistics. The first criticism is 
that default rates are sim ply historical and these rates vary significantly from one period 
to the next. The second is that transition matrices are unconditional averages whereas 
what the market really needs is a transition matrix that is conditioned to the current state 
o f  the credit market.
Despite the criticisms and the many rating errors that the agencies have made -  
especially notable is their slow  reaction to credit deterioration -  their rating is still the 
market benchmark for many companies and debt issues.
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3.8 Modelling Credit Portfolios
Crouhy et al (2000), cite two additional difficulties in calculating credit VaR compared 
to market VaR The first difficulty cited is that the portfolio distribution is far from  
being normal, and the second is that measuring the portfolio effect due to credit 
diversification is much more com plex than for market risk W hile it was legitim ate to 
assume normality o f  the portfolio changes due to market risk, they suggest, it is not 
feasible for credit returns w hich are by nature highly skewed and fat-tailed There is 
limited upside to be expected from any improvement m credit quality, they state, w hile  
there is substantial downside consecutive to downgrading and default “The percentile 
levels o f  the distribution cannot be any longer estimated from the mean and variance 
only The calculation o f  VaR for credit risk requires simulating the full distribution o f  
the changes in portfolio value ” (p320)
Gupton et al (1997) concur with this v iew  M odelling portfolio n sk  in credit portfolios 
is neither analytically nor practically easy, they note Fundamental differences between  
credit risks and equity price risks “make equity portfolio theory problematic when  
applied to credit portfolios ” (p7) They expand on this point by identifying two 
fundamental problems which credit portfolio m odelling presents which are absent when  
m odelling equities The first problem to w hich they refer is that oft-cited problem that 
equity returns are relatively symmetric and are w ell approximated by normal or 
Gaussian distributions whereas credit returns are highly skewed and fat-tailed Thus, 
more than just the mean and standard deviation is required fully to understand a credit 
portfolio’s distribution The second problem they cite is the difficulty o f  m odelling  
correlations For equities, they note, the correlations can be directly estimated by  
observing high-frequency liquid market prices “For credit quality, the lack o f  data 
makes it difficult to estimate any type o f  credit correlation from history ” (p8)
Another important difference between equity portfolio management and credit portfolio 
management to w hich they refer is m relation to firm -specific n sk  W hereas market 
nsks can be diversified with a relatively small portfolio or hedged using liquid 
instruments, credit nsks, they suggest, are more problematic For credit portfolios, 
sim ply having many obligors’ names represented within a portfolio does not assure 
good diversification (e g  they may all be large banks m one country) they state They  
conclude that when diversification is possible, it is typically achieved by “much larger 
numbers o f  exposures than for market portfolios ” (p81)
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3 8 1 Credit Portfolio Models used in the Market
According to the 2002 Survey o f Credit Portfolio Management Practices undertaken by  
the International A ssociation o f  Credit Portfolio Managers (IACPM), the International 
Swaps and D envatives A ssociation (ISD A ) and the Risk M anagement A ssociation  
(RM A) as reported by  Rutter (2003, p i 61), 85% o f  the 41 large financial institutions 
which responded stated they used a portfolio management m odel O f these, 69% stated 
they used K M V ’s Portfolio Manager while the CreditM etncs product, CreditManager, 
was em ployed by 20% In addition, 17% used an internally developed m odel (Rutter 
notes that the responses sum to more than 100% as som e respondents used more than 
one m o d e l) Neither M cK m sey’s CreditPortfohoView nor C SFB’s CreditRisk+ was 
used by any o f  the respondents However, the author is aware that many German 
mortgage banks use CreditRisk+ so the results may reflect the survey emphasis on 
commercial and investment banks rather than mortgage/retail banks
Therefore, it is considered appropriate to exam ine the two credit portfolio m odels that 
are m ost frequently used m industry, nam ely, CreditM etncs’ CreditManager and 
K M V ’s Portfolio Manager
3 8 11 CreditMetncs
In A pnl 1997, J P Morgan, m conjunction with six bank sponsors and KM V, launched 
CreditM etncs It follow ed the successful launch four years earlier o f  R iskM etncs, a 
product for m odelling market nsk
W hile the products were similar, the challenge they faced in creating CreditM etncs was 
substantially greater A s they acknowledged m their technical document, (Gupton et al, 
1994), one major difference in the m odels was dnven by  the difference in available 
data In R iskM etncs, there was an abundance o f  available daily liquid pncing data on 
w hich to construct a model o f  conditional volatility “In CreditM etncs, we have 
relatively sparse and infrequently pnced data on w hich to construct a m odel o f  
unconditional volatility ” (p 111)
N or was there any market agreement on the con ect m odelling approach U nlike market 
nsks where daily liquid p nce observations allow a direct calculation o f  VaR, they state 
that CreditM etncs seeks to construct what it cannot directly observe, the volatility o f  
value due to credit quality changes This constructive approach, they claim, makes
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CreditM etncs less an exercise in fitting distributions to observed price data, and more 
an exercise in proposing m odels which explain the changes in credit related instruments
Furthermore, the nature o f  credit returns presented special challenges the m odels that 
best describe credit risk “do not rely on the assumption that returns are normally 
distributed, marking a significant departure from the R iskM etncs framework ”(p iv)
CreditM etncs’ goal, they state, was to estimate the volatility o f  value due to changes in 
credit quality, not just the expected loss In their view , as important as default likelihood  
estimation is, it is only one link in the long chain o f  m odelling and estimation that is 
necessary fully to assess credit risk withm a portfolio “CreditM etncs is a tool for 
assessing portfolio n sk  due to changes in debt value caused by changes in obligor credit 
quality ” (p5) They assess risk withm the full context o f  a portfolio, addressing the 
correlation o f  credit quality m oves across obligors
Their outline o f  their valuation framework is shown m Figure 3 13
Exposures_________ Value at Risk due to Credit_________ Correlations
User
Portfolio Credit Rating Seniority Credit Spreads
Ratings senes, 
Equity senes
1 r 1 1  1
Market
volatilities
Rating migration 
likelihoods
Recovery rate 
m Default
Present Value 
Bond 
Revaluation
Models (e g , 
correlations)
i l l . f J rExposure
distributions
Standard Deviation of value due to credit quality 
changes for a single exposure
Joint credit 
rating changes
| Portfolio Value at Risk due to Credit |
Figure 3 13 CreditMetncs Schematic
Figure 3 13 shows the two mam building blocks, nam ely ‘value at risk due to credit’ for 
a single financial instrument and ‘portfolio value at risk due to credit’ w hich accounts 
for portfolio diversification effects ‘C onelations’ derive the asset return correlations 
that are used to generate the joint migration probabilities and ‘Exposures’ produce 
future exposures o f  denvatives
CreditM etncs, they state, looks to a honzon and constructs a distnbution o f  h istoncally  
estimated credit outcom es including rating migrations and, potentially, default Each
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credit quality migration is weighted by its likelihood using transition matrix analysis 
Each outcom e has an estimate o f  change in value, given by either credit spreads or 
studies o f  recovery rates m default They then aggregate volatilities across the portfolio, 
applying estimates o f  correlation CreditM etncs accepts any discrete classification o f  
credit quality and an associated credit migration probability matrix
Gupton et al (p6) suggest that the primary reason to have a quantitative portfolio 
approach to credit risk management is so that “w e can more system atically address 
concentration risk ” In particular, they suggest that intuitive -  but arbitrary -  exposure- 
based credit limits fail to recognise the relationship between risk and return They  
suggest that their approach allow s a portfolio manager to state credit lines and limits in 
units o f  marginal portfolio volatility
The decision to take on ever higher exposure to an obligor w ill meet ever higher 
marginal risk as risk that grows geom etrically with the concentration on that name, they  
claim They also note how their approach differs markedly from that mandated by the 
BIS “The BIS risk-based capital guidelines do not distinguish high quality and w ell- 
diversified portfolios from low  quality and concentrated portfolios ” (p6) However, they 
acknowledge the difficulty in estimating credit correlation because o f  a lack o f  data
They state their goal is to estimate portfolio risk due to credit events, the uncertainty in 
the forward value o f  the portfolio at the risk horizon caused by  the possibility o f  obligor 
credit quality changes (p8)
The CreditMetncs Credit Modelling Approach
The starting point for the CreditM etncs m odel is the transition m atnx The 
CreditMetncs approach is “based on credit migration analysis i e estimating the 
probability o f  m oving from one credit quality to another, including default, within a 
given time horizon, w hich is often taken arbitrarily as one year ” Crouhy et al (2000, 
p316) CreditM etncs m odels the full distnbution o f  the values o f  any bond or loan 
portfolio, say one year forward, with the changes in values being related to credit 
migration only, w hile interest rates are assumed to evolve m a deterministic fashion  
Credit-VaR o f  a portfolio is then denved in a similar fashion as for market nsk  It is 
sim ply the percentile o f  the distnbution corresponding to the desired confidence level
CreditM etncs assumes that future migration probabilities are equal to histoncal rating 
transition expenence They further assume that the value o f  the facility at the m odelling
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horizon may be obtained by discounting the cash flow s using the borrower’s forward 
zero curve, a “curve that is different for each rating category.” (plO) Additionally, their 
framework accommodates variable loss rates assuming a beta distribution based on a 
mean loss rate and a standard deviation specified by the user based on the seniority o f  
the debt issue.
To measure the effect o f  portfolio diversification, CreditMetrics need to estimate the 
correlations in credit quality changes for all pairs o f  obligors. But these correlations are 
not directly observable. They base their evaluation on the joint probability o f  asset 
returns, “w hich itself results from strong sim plifying assumptions on the capital 
structure o f  the obligor, and on the generating process for equity returns.” Crouhy et al 
(2000, p321)
CreditMetrics suggest a m odel o f  firm value that has the log o f  each firm’s value at 
horizon described by a normal distribution. The distribution is divided into discrete 
areas such that the probability o f  being in a given area corresponds with the 
probabilities in the transition matrix. Furthermore, all firms m ay be m odelled jointly  as 
multivariate normal based.
Further discussion o f  the CreditMetrics approach is presented in the Appendix.
Critique of the CreditMetrics Credit Modelling Approach
CreditMetrics make many assumptions that m ay invalidate their results. They assume 
(i) that each obligor w ill migrate to a credit rating at the horizon date based on its senior, 
unsecured credit rating and the transition matrix o f  historical migrations, (ii) that all 
obligors in a given rating category w ill face the same forward zero curve at the horizon  
date -  in other words, that interest rates w ill evolve to the forward rates in a 
deterministic fashion and that the forward credit spreads w ill be realised at the horizon, 
(iii) that credit rating distributions are multivariate normal and (iv) that asset correlation 
m ay be approximated by equity correlation.
Crouhy et al (2000) state that the CreditMetrics approach to measuring credit risk is 
rather appealing as a m ethodology, but that “unfortunately it has a major weakness: 
reliance on ratings transition probabilities that are based on average historical 
frequencies o f  default and credit migration.” (p357) A s a result, they suggest, the 
accuracy o f  CreditMetrics calculation depends upon two critical assumptions, namely, 
that all firms within the same rating class have the same default rate and the same
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spread curve even when recovery rates differ among obligors, and that the actual default 
rate is equal to the historical average default rate But this cannot be true because default 
rates evolve continuously whereas ratings are adjusted in a discrete fashion
3 8 1 2  KMV Portfolio Manager
K M V ’s approach to m odelling debt portfolios is embedded in their software offering, 
Portfolio Manager This product is based on the same structural model underlying their 
default probability software, Credit Edge, and the default probability, their so-called  
expected default frequency (EDF), is a key input to the portfolio m odel Furthermore, 
the asset value time senes imputed for each com pany forms the basis for creating asset 
value indices by  country and industry, from w hich they extract their factors for the 
m odel underlying their correlation estimates
KM V are less transparent about their m ethodology and their data than CreditM etncs 
They make their EDF data and their factor sensitivity data available to clients They also 
explain in high-level terms the approach they adopt H owever, they avoid explaining 
their m ethodology m detail and m ost o f  the key steps m the simulation and revaluation 
elements o f  the program are not transparent
The CDO m odel that is developed m this thesis relies on KM V data for its default 
probabilities and its correlation data In building the m odel, therefore, the first task was 
to check that the KM V results could be reproduced to confirm that the data was being  
interpreted m the appropriate manner A  com plete description o f  the tasks undertaken in 
achieving this goal is given in Chapter 4 and w ill not, therefore, be repeated here
3 8 13 Comparison of the CreditMetncs and KMV Approaches
The m ost fundamental difference between the CreditM etncs and KM V approaches 
relates to their default probability estimation m ethodology W hereas KM V develop an 
estimate o f  expected default frequency for each bonow er, CreditM etncs rely upon the 
average histoncal transition frequencies produced by the rating agencies for each credit 
class
Another key difference relates to the manner m w hich they measure correlation 
CreditM etncs relies on equity values and equity indices for vanous mdustry-country 
combinations m order to im ply asset correlation KM V, on the other hand, create asset
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return series based on all the firms in their database and use pnncipal component 
analysis to extract orthogonal factors which are then used to drive future asset values
Both approaches rely on the asset value m odel originally proposed by  Merton (1974), 
but they differ quite substantially m the sim plifying assumptions they require in order to 
facilitate its implementation “H ow  damaging are, in practice, these compromises to a 
satisfactory capture o f  the com plexity o f  credit measurement stays an open issue ” 
Crouhy et al, (2000, p357)
3 8 1 4  Other Portfolio Models
Credit Suisse Financial Products released CreditRisk+ in 1997 It is a ‘default on ly’ 
m odel that assumes default for individual loans or bonds fo llow s a Poisson process
M cK insey also has a portfolio m odel offenng w hich is focused on default risk only It is 
a discrete time multi-period m odel, where default probabilities are a function o f  macro- 
vanables like unemployment, the level o f  interest rates, and the growth rate in the 
econom y, government expenses and foreign exchange rates, which drive credit cycles
3.9 Moody's Binomial Expansion Technique
Cifuentes and O ’Connor (1996) outline M oody’s Binom ial Expansion Technique (BET) 
as applied to CDO analysis “M oody’s ratings o f  CBOs and CLOs are ultimately based 
on the expected loss concept ” (p i)  They suggest that a number o f  methods can be used 
to estimate the expected loss, ranging from M onte Carlo simulation techniques to rather 
sim ple single-event m odels H owever, they propose an alternative to simulation or 
single-event m odels, the so-called BET They suggest it captures the effects o f  ‘tail 
events’, by accounting for all possible default scenarios (p i)
3 9 1 Overview of the BET
The BET is based on the diversity score concept “The idea is to use the diversity score 
to build a hypothetical pool o f  uncorrelated and homogeneous assets that w ill m im ic the 
default behaviour o f  the original pool ” (p2) If D  is the diversity score o f  the collateral 
portfolio, they suggest the behaviour o f  the original pool can be m odelled using a 
fictitious portfolio consisting o f  D  bonds, each o f  w hich has the same par value (total 
collateral par value divided by  D) They assume that these bonds have the same 
probability o f  default (determined by the weighted average probability o f  default o f  the
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onginal pool) They further assume that the behaviour o f  this hom ogeneous pool o f  D  
assets can be fully descnbed in terms o f  D  possible scenarios one default, two defaults 
and so on up to D  defaults The probability P that scenario j  (/ defaults) could happen
can be computed using the binomial formula where P  represents the weighted average
probability o f  default o f  the pool Ej is the term they assign to the loss for the note to
be rated under scenario j  They calculate the total expected loss, considering all possible  
loss scenarios, as
D
Expected Loss = ^ P tE  l Equation 3-87
i
3 9 11 Weighted Average Rating Factor
Each rating is mapped to a rating factor and the credit quality o f  the asset pool is 
determined by the weighted-average rating factor, W ARF This is calculated as the par 
value-weighted average The W ARF score measures, in basis points, the M oody’s 
idealised cumulative default rate over ten years The rating factor equivalents from that 
paper are reproduced m Figure 3 14
APPENDIX D
Tabled
Rating Factor Equivalents
Rating oiDebtSecumy jRatung factor
Aaa 1
Aal 10
Aa2 20
Aa3 40
A1 70
A2 120
A3 180
Baal 260
Baa2 360
Baa3 S10
Ba1 940
Ba2 1,350
Ba3 1,780
B1 2,220
B2 2,720
B3 3,490
Caá 6,500
Ca 10,000
C 10X300
Figure 3 14 Moody’s Rating Factor Equivalents
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The other key attnbute o f  the asset pool is the level o f  diversification that exists within  
it To measure this, M oody’s have developed the concept o f  diversity score They look  
at both the number o f  firms in the collateral pool and their distribution among industry 
groups
Diversity Score penalises the structure for having issuers m the same industry For 
example, Table 4 o f  their paper, reproduced below  as Figure 3 15, shows that the first 
firm m a particular industry earns the transaction a D iversity Score o f  1 The second  
name m the same industry increases the Diversity Score m that particular industry to 
1 5 Subsequent additions from the same industry earn a still lesser addition to diversity  
score The transaction’s total Diversity Score is computed by summing the Diversity  
Scores o f  all industries represented in the portfolio
3 9 12 Diversity Score
Table 4
Number of Firms in Diversity
Same Industry Score
1 IjOO
2 150
3 200
4 233
5 2S7
6 300
7 3 25
8 350
9 375
10 400
>10 Evaluated on a 
case- by-case 
basis
Figure 3 15 Moody’s Diversity Score Measurement Methodology
M oody’s 32-industry classification system  used to measure mtra-industry correlation is 
descnbed by  Backman and O ’Connor (1995, p i 1) Appendix B o f  that paper is 
reproduced as Figure 3 16 Since the paper was published, an additional industry, 
“Broadcasting and Entertainment”, has been added to the list
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APPENDIX B
Table 6
Moody's Industry Classifications
1 Aerospace and Defense: Major Contractor Subsystems Research Aircraft Manufacturing, Arms Ammunition
2 Automo&Be Automotive Equipment Auto-Manufacturing Auto Parts Manufactunng, Personal-Use Trailers Motor Homes Dealers
3 Banking Bank Holding. Savings and Loans Consumer Credit Small Loan Agency Factonng Receivables
A Beverage, Food and Tobacco; Seer and Ale. Distillers, Wines and Uquors Distributors Soft DrinK Syrup Bottlers Bakery Mill Sugar
Canned Foods Corn Refiners Dairy ftoducts Meat Products Poultry Products Snacks, Packaged Foods Candy Gum Seafood 
Frozen Food Cigarettes Cigars Leaf/Snuff Vegetable Oil
5 Buildings and Real Estate Brick Cement Climate Controls Contracting, Engmeenng Construction Hardware, Forest Products 
(building-related only), Plumbing Roofing, Waliboard Real Estate Real Estate Development REITs», Land Development
6 Clumictis, Plastics» and Rubber Chemicals (nonagncultune), Industrial Gases Sulphur, Plastics Plastic Products, Abrasives 
Coating Paints Varnish, Fabncatmg
7 Containers, Packaging, andGbss. Glass, Fiberglass Containers made of Glass Metal Paper Plastic, Wood or Fiberglass
& Personal and Nondurable Consumer Product» (Manufacturing Only) Soa ps, Perfumes, Cosmetics, Toiletries Cleaning Supplies 
School Supplies
9 DTVfrsjftad/COTgjom&rato Manufactunng
10 Dworsifidd/ConglofTMrat© Service
11 Diversified Natural Resources, Precious Metals, and Men ora Is. Fabncating, Distribution Mining and Sales
12. Ecotogccat: Pollution Control Waste Ftemoval Waste Treamerit Waste Disposal
13 Electronics Computer Hardware, Electnc Equipment Components Controllers Motors Household Appliances Information Service 
Communication Systems Radios TVs Tape Machines Speakers FYinters Dnvers, Technology
14 Finance Investment Brokerage, Leasing, Syndication Sec unties
15 Fanning and Agriculture Livestock Grams Produce Agricultural Chemicals Agricultural Equipment Fertilizers
16 Grocery Grocery Stores Convenience Food Stores
17 Healthcare, Education and Childcare: Ethical Drugs Proprietary Drugs Research, Health Care Centers Nursing Homes HMOs 
Hospitals Hospital Supplies Medical Equipment
18 Home and Office Furnishings, Housewares* and Durable Consumer Products. Carpets Floor Coverings Furniture, Cooking, Ranges
19 Hotels, Motels, Inns, and Gaming
20 Insurance Life, Property and Casualty Broker Agent Surety
21 Leisure Amusement, Motion Pictures, Entertainment. Boating, Bowling, Billiards Musical Instruments, Fishing Photo Equipment 
Records Tapes Sports Outdoor Equipment (Camping), Tourism Resorts, Games Toy Manufactunng Motion Picture FVoduction 
Theaters Motion Picture Distnbution
22 Machinery (Vonagnculture, Nonconstructioiv Nonelectronic) Industnai Machine Tools, Steam Generators
23 Mining Steel Iron and Nonpreaous Metals Coal Copperhead Uranium Zinc Aluminum, Stainless Steel Integated Steel Ore 
Production Refractories, Steel Mill Machinery Mini Mills Fabricating, Distnbution and Sales
24 Oil and Gas Crude Producer Retailer We/I&jppiy Service and DnIJing
25 Personal Food and Miscellaneous Services
26 Pnntmg, Publishing and Broadcasting Graphic Arts Paper Paper Products Business Forms Magazires Books Periodicals 
Newspapers Textbooks Radio, TV Cable Broadcasting Equipment
27 Cargo Transport Rail Shipping Rat toads Raiicar Builders Ship Builders Containers Container Builders Parts Overnight Mail 
Trucking Truck Manufactunng Trailer Manufactunng Air Cargos Transport
28 Retail Stores Apparel Toy, Vanety Drug Department Mail Order Catalog Showroom
29 Telecommunications. Local Long Distance Independent Telephone Telegraph Satellite Equipment Research Cellular
30 Textiles and Leather Producer, Synthetic Fiber Apparel Manufacturer Leather Shoes
31 Personal Transportation: Air Bus Rail Car Rental
32 UtiBtios Electric, Water Hydro Porter Gas Diversified
Figure 3 16 Moody’s Industry Classifications
3 9 2 Applying the BET
The BET attempts to replicate the behaviour o f  an actual portfolio by m odelling an 
idealised portfolio o f  assets These idealised assets are all assumed to have the same 
default probability based on their weighted-average rating factor The diversity score o f  
the asset pool determines the number o f  idealised assets
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3 9 21 The BET Approach to Rating Senior Notes
A s discussed previously, the BET rating approach was first outlined in Cifuentes and 
O ’Connor (1996) The portfolio they use to demonstrate the approach is shown in 
Figure 3 17
Chart 1
Hypothetical CBO Structure
$100 (80
c=11% Senior Piece
p=25% c=6%
D=20 -----
Ree rate=30%
Mat=6 years $20
c=12%
Equity
Figure 3 17 Moody’s Hypothetical CBO Structure
They consider the sim ple two-tier structure depicted in Figure 3 17 They assume that 
the collateral pool has a diversity score o f  20, an average probability o f  default o f  25%  
(after factoring in the stressing factor), a recovery rate o f  30%, a six-year time to 
maturity, and pays an average coupon o f  11% They also assume that all bonds have 
bullet repayments, that there are no overcollateralisation or interest rate tnggers, and 
that the excess cash is reinvested at 11 % per year
The author built a m odel to confirm M oody’s results A n exam ple o f  the output is 
shown in Table 3-6 below  when the number o f  defaults is set at 10 In these 
circumstances, the senior note receives {2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 2 4, 
78 86} The final payment is 78 86 instead o f  82 4 yielding a loss o f  3 1%
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Collateral 100
Coupon 11%
p 25%
D 20
Number of Defaults 10
Recovery 30%
Maturity 6 yrs
Senior 80
Senior coupon 6%
Equity 20
Equity coupon 12%
Year 0 05 1 1 5 2 25 3 35 4 45 5 55 6
Percentage of Defaults 
Default Distribution 0
50%
5 0
10%
1 0
10%
1 0
10%
1 0
10%
1 0
10%
1
100%
10
Cumulative Defaults 0 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10
Defaulted Collateral 0 25 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 50
Cum Def Collateral 0 25 25 30 30 35 35 40 40 45 45 50
Recovenes 00 7 5 00 1 5 00 1 5 00 1 5 00 1 5 00 1 5 15
Collateral Outstanding 100 100 0 82 5 82 5 79 0 79 0 75 5 75 5 72 0 72 0 68 5 68 5 65 0
Col lateral Coupon 55 45 45 43 43 42 42 40 40 38 38 36
Surplus Account 00 20 1 1 43 13 64 Z i 83 91 10 0 10 7 11 5
Cash Available 55 65 76 86 96 10 5 11 4 12 2 13 1 13 8 14 5 15 1 Loss
Payment to Senior 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 78 86 3 10%
Interest to Equity 1 2 1 2 1 2 12 12 1 2 1 2 12 12 12 1 2 1 2
Principal to Equity 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Surplus in year 1 9 29 40 50 60 69 78 86 95 10 2 10 9| 00
Table 3-6 Moody’s Cash Flow Model
Repeating the analysis for varying numbers o f  defaults and collating confirms the 
output in Table 1 o f  their paper M oody’s assume that the portfolio comprises a number 
o f  assets equal to the diversity score that default independently Hence the distribution 
o f  losses is given by the binomial probability distribution The results are reproduced as 
Table 3-7 below
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Probability # Defaults Loss %
0.3171% 0 0.0000%
2.1141% 1 0.0000%
6.6948% 2 0.0000%
13.3896% 3 0.0000%
18.9685% 4 0.0000%
20.2331% 5 0.0000%
16.8609% 6 0.0000%
11.2406% 7 0.0000%
6.0887% 8 0.0000%
2.7061% 9 0.0000%
0.9922% 10 3.1026%
0.3007% 11 7.8958%
0.0752% 12 12.6890%
0.0154% 13 17.4822%
0.0026% 14 22.2754%
0.0003% 15 27.0686%
0.0000% 16 31.5621%
0.0000% 17 34.7819%
0.0000% 18 38.0531%
0.0000% 19 41.6080%
0.0000% 20 45.1629%
Table 3-7 Scenario Default Probability and Senior Tranche Loss Percentage
Repeating the analysis for varying diversity scores confirms the results Cifuentes and 
O ’Connor have graphed in Chart 2 o f their paper. Chart 2 is re-created here as Figure 
3.18:
Figure 3.18 Expected Loss for Senior Tranche as a Function of Diversity
106
Table 3-8 Moody’s Idealised Expected Loss Rates by Rating and Debt Maturity
Rating 1 2
Moody's"
3
Table 2
Idealized" Cumulative Expected Loss Rates (%) 
Year
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Aaa 0000028 0 00011 000039 000099 000160 000220 0 00286 0 00363 0 00451 0 00550
Aa1 0 000314 000165 0 00550 001155 001705 0 02310 0 02970 0 03685 0 04510 0 05500
Aa2 0000748 0 00440 001430 0 02585 0 03740 0 04895 006105 0 07425 0 09020 0 11000
Aa3 0 001661 001045 0 03245 0 05555 0 07810 010065 0 1 2485 0 14960 0 1 7985 0 22000
A1 0003196 0 02035 006435 010395 014355 018150 0 22330 0 26400 031515 0 38500
A 2 0 005979 003850 012210 0 1 8975 0 25685 0 32065 0 39050 0 45595 0 54010 0 66000
A3 0 021368 0 08250 0 1 9800 0 29700 0 40150 0 50050 0 61050 0 71500 0 83600 0 99000
Baal 0049500 015400 0 30800 0 45650 060500 0 75350 091850 1 08350 1 24850 1 43000
Baa2 0093500 0 25850 0 45650 0 66000 0 86900 1 08350 1 32550 1 56750 1 78200 1 98000
Baa3 0 231000 0 57750 0 94050 1 30900 1 67750 2 03500 2 38150 2 73350 3 06350 3 35500
Ba1 0 478500 1 11100 1 72150 2 31000 2 90400 3 43750 3 88300 4 33950 4 77950 517000
Ba2 0858000 1 90850 2 84900 3 74000 4 62550 5 37350 5 88500 641300 6 95750 7 42500
Ba3 1 545500 303050 4 32850 5 38450 6 52300 7 41950 8 04100 8 64050 919050 9 71300
B1 2 574000 4 60900 6 36900 7 61750 886600 9 83950 10 52150 11 12650 11 68200 12 21000
B2 3 938000 641850 8 55250 9 97150 11 39050 12 45750 13 20550 13 83250 14 42100 14 96000
E3 6 391000 9 1 3550 11 56650 13 22200 14 87750 16 06000 17 05000 17 91900 18 57900 19 19500
Caa 14 300000 17 87500 21 45000 24 13400 26 81250 28 60000 30 38750 32 17500 33 96250 35 75000
The expected loss suffered by the senior note is 0.067% . Referring to M oody’s Idealised  
Cumulative Expected Loss Rates in Table 2 o f  that paper, reproduced aboveas Table 
3-8, the senior note w ould be rated Aa3 (the cut-off value is 0.10065%  for the Aa3).
3.9.2.2 The BET Approach to Rating Senior/Subordinate Structures
Anderson (1997) describes how  diversification o f  a securitised pool affects M oody’s 
ratings o f  senior/subordinated structures. The author built a m odel to replicate the 
structure he described. The m odel results are shown in Table 3-9. These concur exactly  
with the results he reports in this paper.
Diversity 30 Pool 100 Pool Senior Mezz. Junior
PD 10% Senior 60 Probability of Loss 95.8% 0.0% 17.5% 95.8%
LGD 70% Mezzanine 30 Expected Loss 7.00% 0.00% 1.83% 64.52%
Junior 10 Loss Given Default 7.31% 3.62% 10.40% 67.38%
# of Cash Flow Cash Flow to Cash Flow to Cash Flow Pool Loss Senior Mezz. Junior
Defaults Probability from Pool Senior Mezz. to Junior % Loss % Loss % Loss %
0 4.2% 100.00 60.00 30.00 10.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1 14.1% 97.67 60.00 30.00 7.67 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 23.3%
2 22.8% 95.33 60.00 30.00 5.33 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 46.7%
3 23.6% 93.00 60.00 30.00 3.00 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 70.0%
4 17.7% 90.67 60.00 30.00 0.67 9.3% 0.0% 0.0% 93.3%
5 10.2% 88.33 60.00 28.33 0.00 11.7% 0.0% 5.6% 100.0%
6 4.7% 86.00 60.00 26.00 0.00 14.0% 0.0% 13.3% 100.0%
7 1.8% 83.67 60.00 23.67 0.00 16.3% 0.0% 21.1% 100.0%
8 0.6% 81.33 60.00 21.33 0.00 18.7% 0.0% 28.9% 100.0%
9 0.2% 79.00 60.00 19.00 0.00 21.0% 0.0% 36.7% 100.0%
10 0.0% 76.67 60.00 16.67 0.00 23.3% 0.0% 44.4% 100.0%
11 0.0% 74.33 60.00 14.33 0.00 25.7% 0.0% 52.2% 100.0%
12 0.0% 72.00 60.00 12.00 0.00 28.0% 0.0% 60.0% 100.0%
13 0.0% 69.67 60.00 9.67 0.00 30.3% 0.0% 67.8% 100.0%
14 0.0% 67.33 60.00 7.33 0.00 32.7% 0.0% 75.6% 100.0%
15 0.0% 65.00 60.00 5.00 0.00 35.0% 0.0% 83.3% 100.0%
16 0.0% 62.67 60.00 2.67 0.00 37.3% 0.0% 91.1% 100.0%
17 0.0% 60.33 60.00 0.33 0.00 39.7% 0.0% 98.9% 100.0%
18 0.0% 58.00 58.00 0.00 0.00 42.0% 3.3% 100.0% 100.0%
19 0.0% 55.67 55.67 0.00 0.00 44.3% 7.2% 100.0% 100.0%
20 0.0% 53.33 53.33 0.00 0.00 46.7% 11.1% 100.0% 100.0%
21 0.0% 51.00 51.00 0.00 0.00 49.0% 15.0% 100.0% 100.0%
22 0.0% 48.67 48.67 0.00 0.00 51.3% 18.9% 100.0% 100.0%
23 0.0% 46.33 46.33 0.00 0.00 53.7% 22.8% 100.0% 100.0%
24 0.0% 44.00 44.00 0.00 0.00 56.0% 26.7% 100.0% 100.0%
25 0.0% 41.67 41.67 0.00 0.00 58.3% 30.6% 100.0% 100.0%
26 0.0% 39.33 39.33 0.00 0.00 60.7% 34.4% 100.0% 100.0%
27 0.0% 37.00 37.00 0.00 0.00 63.0% 38.3% 100.0% 100.0%
28 0.0% 34.67 34.67 0.00 0.00 65.3% 42.2% 100.0% 100.0%
29 0.0% 32.33 32.33 0.00 0.00 67.7% 46.1% 100.0% 100.0%
30 0.0% 30.00 30.00 0.00 0.00 70.0% 50.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 3-9 Probability of Loss, LGD and EL for Pool and CDO Tranches
The effectiveness o f  diversification and subordination in protecting the senior notes at 
the expense o f  the junior notes is observed by varying the diversity score. Anderson’s 
results, as summarised in Table 1 o f  his paper, agree exactly with Table 3-10 below . 
The impact o f  diversity is best appreciated by graphing these results. Figure 3.19 below
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plots the m odel results. Again, these agree exactly with the results depicted in Chart 1 o f  
Anderson’s paper: it shows how  the expected loss o f  the pool is increasingly  
concentrated in the subordinated tranches as diversity increases. Similarly, Figure 3.20  
shows how  the probability o f  the senior tranche suffering a loss declines to zero as 
diversity increases w hile the probability o f  the junior notes incurring a loss goes to 
100%. Finally, Figure 3.21 plots the m odel results which agree exactly with Anderson’s 
results shown in Chart 3 o f  the paper: it shows, as might be expected, that the 
probability distribution o f  losses narrows as diversity increases.
Expected Loss Probability of Loss
Diversity Pool Senior Mezz. Junior Pool Senior Mezz. Junior
1 7.000% 5.000% 10.000% 10.000% 10.000% 10.000% 10.000% 10.000%
2 7.000% 0.500% 16.000% 19.000% 19.000% 1.000% 19.000% 19.000%
3 7.000% 0.350% 13.600% 27.100% 27.100% 2.800% 27.100% 27.100%
5 7.000% 0.039% 9.604% 40.951% 40.951% 0.856% 40.951% 40.951%
10 7.000% 0.001% 5.496% 53.510% 65.132% 0.015% 26.390% 65.132%
20 7.000% 0.000% 2.758% 61.726% 87.842% 0.000% 32.307% 87.842%
30 7.000% 0.000% 1.826% 64.523% 95.761% 0.000% 17.549% 95.761%
50 7.000% 0.000% 0.938% 67.185% 99.485% 0.000% 12.215% 99.485%
100 7.000% 0.000% 0.304% 69.089% 99.997% 0.000% 7.257% 99.997%
Table 3-10 Expected Loss and Probability of Loss as a Function of Diversity
Expected Loss vs Diversity
Diversity
Figure 3.19 Expected Loss vs Diversity for Pool and CDO Tranches
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Figure 3.20 Probability of Loss vs Diversity for Pool and CDO Tranches
Figure 3.21 Probability Distribution of Pool Losses as a Function of Diversity
3.9.3 Critique of the Moody’s Approach
The M oody’s approach is extremely heuristic and some would suggest it doesn’t merit 
citing as a portfolio model. The simplistic manner in which the diversity score is
1 1 0
calculated is scorned. Likewise, the distillation o f  a range o f  credit ratings into a 
weighted average has been criticised. This latter criticism has prompted them to develop  
a Double Binom ial Method to accommodate portfolios where two groups o f  assets have 
distinctly different default probabilities.
Am ong other criticisms, the role played by the diversity score is often questioned. 
Greater diversification w ill always lead to a higher quality senior tranche or w ill enable 
the sponsor to achieve a higher percentage o f  AAA-rated debt. However, in practice, 
greater diversity has been blamed for som e o f  the problems that have been encountered 
in the CDO market.
Typical o f  these comments is that o f  Goodman and Fabozzi (2001, p34). They claim  
that a very high diversity score can limit flexibility by requiring an asset manager with 
broad expertise to invest in an industry he does not like. They suggest that too much 
diversification is even more o f  a problem for a smaller asset manager, where the 
portfolio may have selective strengths in fewer industries. They conclude: “Investors 
should certainly be wary o f  deals in which very high diversity scores are achieved by  
managers straying from their fields o f  expertise.” (p34)
3.10 Modelling Credit Portfolios over Multiple Time Periods
The KM V portfolio model developed in Chapter 4, in com m on with other major m odels 
in the market -  CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+ and CreditPortfolioView -  are single time 
period models. The m odels describe for a specific risk horizon, whether each asset o f  
interest defaults within the horizon. The timing o f  defaults within the risk horizon is not 
considered, nor is the possibility o f  defaults beyond the horizon. “This is not a flaw  o f  
the current m odels, but rather an indication o f  their genesis as approaches to risk 
management and capital allocation for a fixed portfolio.” Finger (2000, p49)
However, this framework is incapable o f  dealing with the m odelling o f  CDOs. Finger 
comments that the performance o f  a CDO structure depends on the default behaviour o f  
a pool o f  assets. He notes that the dependence o f  is not just on whether the assets default 
over the life o f  the structure, but also on when the defaults occur. Thus, he concludes 
that while an “application o f  the existing m odels can give a cursory v iew  o f  the 
structure, a more rigorous analysis requires a model o f  the timing o f  defaults.” (p49)
In the paper, he compares the performance o f  four m odels -  a discrete CreditMetrics 
extension, a diffusion-driven CreditMetrics extension, a copula approach and the
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stochastic default intensity approach o f  Duffie and Garleanu (2001) Each m odel is 
calibrated to the same one-year default rate and single penod correlation parameter He 
m odelled a portfolio o f  100 obligors under low  and high correlation assumptions on the 
assumption o f  40% recovery He then tranched the liabilities into a 10% first loss, a 
20% second loss and a senior piece
The discrepancies between the m odels were not too large for the first loss tranche -  the 
cost o f  first loss protection was approximately 20% higher for the m ost expensive  
compared to the least expensive Likewise, under the high correlation assumption, the 
variation m the cost o f  second loss protection was o f  a similar magnitude H owever, 
under the low  correlation assumption, the m ost expensive second loss protection was 
almost tw ice that o f  the least expensive and, for the senior tranche, the subordination 
necessary to achieve a target rating varied by  a factor greater than two At the 30%  
subordination level, the senior notes were rated Aaa in the m ost benign m odel compared 
to A3 in the m ost severe
He notes that m the single penod case, a number o f  studies have concluded that the 
vanous m odels do not produce vastly different conclusions when calibrated to the same 
first and second order information H owever, m the case o f  CDOs, “the issue o f  model 
choice is much more important, and any analysis o f  structures over multiple horizons 
should heed this potential m odel error ” (p64)
However, the actual problem is even greater than Fmger suggests, the disparities he has 
identified remain even after the m odels have been calibrated to the same input data In 
fact, the input data is, m m ost cases, unavailable “Currently the weakest link in the 
chain o f  CDO analysis is the limited availability o f  empirical data bearing on the 
correlation o f  default risk ” Duffie and Singleton (2003, p252)
3.11 Choosing a Modelling Paradigm
The two market-leading portfolio m odels -  those o f  CreditMetrics and KM V - have 
been examined m this chapter D espite the fact that they are both structural m odels, they 
adopt very different approaches to the solution o f  the credit portfolio m odelling  
problem
CreditMetrics relies on credit ratings and rating transition matrices Its m ost obvious 
application is to portfolios o f  publicly rated names for w hich there is a substantial 
volum e o f  data on which to build transition matrices W hile it is possible for any
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financial institution to build its own transition m atnces based on its own internal rating 
system, few  w ould have a sufficient number o f  names m the various ratings to enable 
the extraction o f  reliable transition probabilities
In contrast, the approach adopted by KM V enables them generate probabilities o f  
default for all publicly quoted firms -  som e 35,000 at the time o f  writing - and update 
these estimates on a daily basis The agency-rated universe, by comparison, is 
substantially less, numbering less than 5,000 This is a particular problem in Europe 
where m ost debt is privately issued and only the largest companies aiming to sell their 
debt worldwide seek a rating from (predominantly U S )  rating agencies Adopting a 
framework which naturally provides the key input, namely, default probability, greatly 
expands the universe o f  firms w hich are amenable to analysis M any o f  the so-called  
‘arbitrage5 CDOs purchase the debt o f  firms w hich w ould not normally seek an agency  
rating because o f  their smaller size and their lesser creditworthiness, having a ready 
measure o f  default probability is critical m these circumstances
The rating agencies’ own research has identified the issue o f  autocorrelation in 
downgrades CreditM etncs, i f  it were expanded to a m ulti-penod framework, w ould  
ignore this autocorrelation m its Markov m odelling framework that assumes grading 
transition is a Markov process This w ould system atically under-estimate the tendency  
for serial downgrades, an issue that is critical to the performance o f  CDO tranches In 
contrast, KM V offer a term structure o f  default probability for each borrower that can 
inform the evolution o f  borrower creditworthiness over successive time periods
The transition m atnx m ost frequently used is an average o f  transitions over a long time 
period However, the realised transition and default probabilities vary quite substantially 
over the years depending on whether the econom y is in recession or expending “When 
implementing a m odel that relies on transition probabilities, one m ay have to adjust the 
average historical values to be consistent with one’s assessm ent o f  the current econom ic  
environm ent” Crouhy et al (2001, p325) There is little published in the literature to 
help inform the user how  to condition the transition m atnx on the state o f  the econom y  
N ot having a m echanism  for conditioning the transition m atnx on the stage in the 
econom ic cycle is a cntical issue militating against using CreditM etncs m a multi- 
penod setting
The grading system s developed by rating agencies and b y  m ost financial institutions are 
long-term ratings That is, they take a ‘through-the-cycle’ v iew  o f  credit compared to
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the KM V view  that is characterised as 4point-in-tim e’. “A  strong assumption made by 
CreditMetrics is that all issuers are credit-hom ogeneous within the same rating class, 
with the same transition probabilities and the same default probabilities.” Crouhy et al 
(2000, p27) In K M V ’s approach, in contrast, each issuer is specific and is characterised 
by its own returns distribution, its own capital structure, and, consequently, its ow n  
default probability term structure.
W hile som e agency ratings apply to the issuer, m ost agency ratings attach to the debt 
issue. “Bond-rating system s are supposed to rate an individual loan (including its 
covenants and collateral backing), whereas loan-rating system s are more oriented to 
rating the overall borrower.” Saunders et a l  (2002, p i 8) In M oody’s words, a rating is, 
“an opinion on the future ability and legal obligation o f  an issuer to make tim ely  
payments o f  principal and interest on a specific fixed-incom e security.” M oody’s (1998, 
p4). The follow ing year, they elaborate as follows: “M oody’s ratings o f  industrial and 
financial companies have primarily reflected default probability, w hile expected  
severity o f  loss in the event o f  default has played an important secondary role. In the 
speculative-grade portion o f  the market, w hich has been developing into a distinct 
sector, M oody’s ratings place more emphasis on expected loss than on relative default 
risk.”
For these reasons, it was decided to choose the KM V m odelling paradigm instead o f  
that adopted by CreditMetrics. Throughout what follow s, the default probability 
estimates used w ill be K M V ’s expected default frequencies. Likewise, K M V ’s asset 
correlation estimates w ill be embedded in the portfolio m odel through the use o f  the 
factor sensitivities in their factor m odel framework. Furthermore, it was decided to 
adopt M oody’s BET approach to CDO tranche rating in preference to those o f  other 
rating agencies because o f  its more widespread usage and acceptance.
3.12 Conclusion
This chapter presented an overview  o f  the principal research strands that are relevant to 
an analysis o f  a portfolio o f  debt securities.
The m ost fundamental issue in debt valuation is an assessm ent o f  the PD o f  the 
individual obligors so the chapter began by assessing various approaches to the 
measurement o f  default probability proposed in the literature.
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The next section undertakes an examination o f  the literature concerning the interaction 
o f  equity securities in a portfolio W hile portfolios o f  equities behave in a 
fundamentally different w ay from portfolios o f  debt securities, it is m the area o f  equity  
portfolio m odelling that the research is m ost advanced and it is to these approaches 
those who are faced with m odelling debt securities have turned in the first instance
The unique challenges that confront researchers in the area o f  debt portfolio m odelling  
are explored m the next section Few closed form solutions are available because o f  the 
particularly com plex nature o f  the interaction among the securities One formulaic 
solution to the portfolio value distribution problem for a portfolio o f  infinite granularity 
allows us to examine the main attributes o f  debt portfolios and gives guidance on the 
challenges facing those who need to m odel actual portfolios in a more realistic manner
The approach to valuing credit default swaps was then introduced The valuation  
method o f  choice for structured products, the copula approach, was also summarised 
Structured products referencing credits for w hich a liquid CDS exist are successfully  
accommodated withm this framework
The credit portfolio m odels w hich are m ost used in the market -  those o f  CreditMetrics 
and KM V - are examined next These m odels were contrasted and critically assessed  
The KM V m odel proved to be particularly suited to the m odelling o f  exposures to sub- 
investment grade names w hich are not traded m the market A lso, the approach adopted 
by M oody’s to rate CDO tranches, BET, was summarised and critiqued
There is an obvious disconnect between (1) the rating agency approach to CDO tranche 
grading which takes explicit account o f  the CDO indenture and the m ulti-penod  
dim ension to the tranche-rating issue but largely ignores the work o f  academic 
researchers, and (11) the more theoretically rigorous academic approaches which have 
been adopted by  the software vendors but w hich are fundamentally single penod  
m odels and ignore the CDO indenture w hich is central to tranche rating and valuation
The challenge that is being taken up in this thesis is to apply the intellectual ngour o f  
the academic approach embedded in one vendor offering to a multi-period framework 
which takes explicit account o f  the CDO indenture In undertaking that challenge, the 
decision w as m ade to adopt the KM V approach in preference to the com peting market 
offenngs because o f  its more robust theoretical foundations and its greater data 
coverage
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A s a first step to achieving this goal, the current state-of-the-art -  as represented by 
K M V ’s credit portfolio m odelling approach -  w ill be re-created next in Chapter 4 On 
completion o f  the single penod m odel, w e w ill then be ready to take on the challenge o f  
developing a multi-period version This m odel w ill incorporate the best features o f  the 
single penod credit portfolio m odel and the rating agency m odel It w ill m odel the asset 
migration over time in an academ ically ngorous nsk-neutral pncm g framework and 
incorporate all the features specified m the CDO indenture in channelling the cash flow s 
to the liabilities The developm ent o f  this m odel is the subject o f  Chapter 5
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Chapter 4. Developing a Single Period Credit Portfolio 
Model
4.1 Chapter Overview
In Chapter 3, the market-leading m odels were overviewed and the fundamentally 
different approaches taken by  the rating agencies and the portfolio m odel vendors were 
noted The differences betw een the two approaches are such that it is not possible to 
make meaningful comparison between them
The portfolio m odels are framed on a single period and are incapable o f  analysing CDO  
tranches w hose values are fundamentally dependent on the performance o f  the portfolio 
over multiple time penods It is only by m odelling the underlying debt portfolio over 
the life o f  the transaction that the cash flow s available to the tranches can be calculated  
and hence valued Single period m odels can give the value o f  the debt portfolio at the 
period end but are incapable o f  saying how  that value is divided am ong the different 
tranches
The rating agency m odel takes full account o f  the CDO indenture and explicitly m odels 
the cash flow  waterfall H owever, it adopts a heuristic approach to the m odelling o f  
correlation and default probability Ignoring all the m odelling advances o f  the past 
decade is clearly undesirable
The goal o f  this thesis is to develop a new m odel that incorporates the best features o f  
the rating agency approach into a m ulti-penod version o f  the market-leading credit 
portfolio m odel A  further goal is to compare the rating im plied by this new m odel - 
which is potentially more rigorous than the current rating agency m odel -  with that 
assigned by the rating agency m odel to the various different CDO tranches
In order to achieve these goals, three tasks must be undertaken
1 The KM V approach to m odelling credit portfolios m a single period time frame is 
re-created from public data sources
2 This single period m odel is expanded into a multi-period setting in order to be 
capable of valuing CDOs.
3 M oody’s BET is replicated, once again by reference to published articles 
The com pletion o f  the first o f  these tasks is the subject o f  this chapter
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4.2 The KMV Modelling Paradigm
Traditionally, credit n sk  in a portfolio context was managed qualitatively with stringent 
underwriting standards, lim it enforcement and counterparty monitoring H owever, such  
an approach fails because o f  its inability to measure the correlated nature o f  credit 
defaults Furthermore, it fails to inform a bank’s efforts to build portfolios with superior 
retum -to-nsk characteristics
KM V attempts to replace this qualitative approach with a quantitative one Rather than 
measure portfolio n sk  as an exposure-based amount, they focus instead on the amount 
o f  econom ic capital needed to maintain a particular level o f  n sk  in the debt issued by  
the institution holding the portfolio Portfolio performance is based on a com panson  
between the portfolio’s promised return and the capital required to support the portfolio 
Individual facilities are allocated capital on the basis o f  their contribution to portfolio 
vanance and individual facility performance can then be measured based on the ratio o f  
the facility’s return to this capital
K M V ’s portfolio management software product, Portfolio Manager, is designed to
•  Produce a mark-to-model p nce for credit-nsky exposures,
•  Charactense the return and n sk  o f  exposures m the context o f  a credit portfolio, 
and the return and n sk  o f  the portfolio as a w hole,
•  Compute the distnbution o f  portfolio values at a specified honzon date and use 
this distnbution to calculate required econom ic capital today,
•  Determine optimal transactions -  buy or sell -  for a given set o f  trading or 
ongm ation opportunities, and
•  Calculate optimal portfolios by  rearranging the w eights o f  existing holdings
Whereas performance was traditionally measured in terms o f  earnings per share or 
return on equity, the focus within the KM V m odelling paradigm is on return on nsk- 
adjusted capital (RORAC) whereby the portfolio return is measured against the capital 
required to support the portfolio and return per unit o f  portfolio unexpected loss, the 
portfolio Sharpe ratio
The key building blocks o f  the KM V approach are a m ethodology for m easunng default 
probability and default correlation
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The m ethodology em ployed by  KM V to calculate the term structure o f  default 
probabilities has been described in detail m 3 7 1 above The value o f  the firm’s assets 
is imputed from the value o f  the firm ’s equity, the volatility o f  equity and the amount o f  
the firm ’s debt
4 2 12 Measuring Correlation
KM V apply the Markowitz vanance-covanance approach to determine portfolio value 
variance They have constructed a factor m odel to explain the correlation in the 
underlying asset values o f  the obligors The asset returns are assumed to be multivariate 
normally distributed B y  isolating the system atic variation m asset returns, they create a 
framework within w hich future asset values, and, hence, future credit exposure values 
can be m odelled
4.3 Re-creating KMV’s Portfolio Modelling Approach
Before building a multi-period m odel to value a CDO using KM V EDF and correlation 
data, it is necessary to build a single time penod m odel using these data D eveloping a 
m odel which re-creates the results w hich KM V produce in their current portfolio 
m odelling product, Portfolio Manager, w ill serve the further purpose o f  confirming the 
theoretical validity o f  the KM V m odelling paradigm Such independent validation has 
not previously been available and KM V, presumably for commercial reasons, have been  
unwilling to disclose their m ethodology
W hile KM V have not published their m ethodology in detail, they have outlined their 
m odelling approach in various articles m academic and practitioner journals See for 
example, Kealhofer (2003, 2003a), Bohn (2000) and Crosbie (2002) Furthermore, their 
approach has been analysed by various commentators U sing these outlines and 
commentaries and an understanding o f  the simulation process, the Portfolio Manager 
m odelling approach is successfully re-created -  for the first time, to the author’s 
know ledge - as confirmed by the m odel outputs that replicate almost exactly those from  
Portfolio Manager
The task o f  replicating comprised the follow ing stages
• Each asset in the portfolio is valued at the outset using a nsk-neutral valuation 
approach
4 21 1  Measuring Default Probability
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• The asset correlation structure is denved using the K M V  factor m odel
•  The asset migration process is m odelled
•  The portfolio value at the honzon date is simulated repeatedly
•  The portfolio distribution is derived, and the portfolio parameters -  standard
deviation, called unexpected loss by KM V, and capital -  are calculated
•  The capital and unexpected loss are allocated to the component assets and 
individual asset performance -  both Sharpe Ratio and RORAC -  are calculated
Each o f  these stages w ill now  be described in detail A  schematic outlining the various 
tasks undertaken is shown in Figure 4 1 below
4 31 Asset Valuation at the Outset
The method that KM V em ploy for asset valuation was outlined in Bohn (2000) 
Technical details regarding the manner m which they undertake interpolation o f  interest 
rates and cumulative default probabilities are further described in K M V ’s Portfolio 
Manager product manual, Modelling Portfolio Risk (2003) These latter details are o f  no 
theoretical importance but it w as necessary to account for them correctly i f  results 
matching K M V ’s were to be obtained
A s Bohn describes, the KM V so-called risk-comparable valuation method begins by  
calculating the nsk-adjusted PD by adjusting the actual PD to account for the market 
price o f  n sk  m the standard risk-neutral approach outlined m Hull (2003, p203)
4 3 11 Calculating Cash Flows
The expected cash flow s for an exposure are denved from the reference rate term 
structure It is assumed that the future spot rate w ill equal the forward rate Hence, all 
the expected cash flow s are assumed known at the outset There is no m odelling o f  
interest rate volatility
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Figure 4 1 Portfolio Manager Outline 
4 3 12 Cumulative Quasi-Default Probability
The actual cumulative probability o f  default from 0 to time t, CEDFt , is given by the 
Merton formula
CEDF. = m -  ln^ °^ + ^ ~ ^ ^ ~ ln^ -^ |  Equation 4-1
where
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A0 = market value o f the firm ’s assets at time 0 
DPT  = default point
a  = volatility o f return on the firm ’s assets, and 
|u = drift rate, or expected return, on the firm ’s assets
However, for valuation purposes, it is the nsk-adjusted PD - quasi-probability o f  default 
in KMV terminology - that is required The actual drift rate is replaced by r, the 
continuously compounded nsk-free rate to obtain the cumulative quasi-probability o f 
default, CQDFt
which specifies the cumulative quasi-default probability, CQDFt, as a function o f the
actual cumulative probability o f default, CEDFt and the Sharpe ratio o f the asset KMV
(2003, p 5 1) suggest that the expected excess return on the asset is a function o f its 
sensitivity to systematic market risk factors
where
R = the correlation between the asset return and the market return, and 
a m = the volatility o f the market return
This enables the individual asset’s Sharpe ratio to be expressed as a function o f the 
m arket’s Sharpe ratio, X The market’s Sharpe ratio is the market price o f risk,
CQDFt =N-f ln(4)) + (r-^CT2)i-ln(PP:r)|
1 a4~t J
Equation 4-2
Re-arranging this equation, we get
Equation 4-3
P 71 = jj, -  r Equation 4-4
where p is the asset’s beta to the market and n  is the market risk premium, (jum -  r) 
The asset’s beta to the market, p , m ay be re-stated as
„ coviasset .market) „ c  ^P =------\ L=R—  Equation 4-5<y„ <ym
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;t = {?* - r) Equation 4-6
linking the amount o f  one year’s excess return to annual return volatility
KM V (2003, p51) suggest that the market price o f  risk w ill vary with the square root o f  
time since the excess return w ill be a linear function o f  time while volatility w ill 
increase with the square root o f  time Furthermore,
— — ~=RA  Equation 4-7a
Hence,
CQDFt = n {n ~ 1 {CEDF,)+R/,-ft\ Equation 4-8
KM V suggest an appropriate proxy for the market is the custom index based on the 
country and industry (or industries) within w hich the firm operates (U sing a multi- 
factor m odel, described in detail later, they create asset value indices for m dustnes and 
countries) They regress the firm ’s asset return series on the custom index to determine 
the percentage o f  the asset return variability that is explained by the custom index, R2 
The square root o f  R2 is a measure o f  the asset correlation with the market, they suggest 
based on the assumption that the custom index proxies for the market
The market n sk  premium, called the market Sharpe ratio, measures the required return 
over and above the nsk-free rate for holding a unit o f  n sk  at the aggregate level 
Research performed at KM V on the n sk  premium im plicit in credit spreads for U  S 
corporate bonds “reveals that the market Sharpe Ratio parameter is relatively stable over 
time and typically around 0 4 ” KM V (2003, p i 9) They continue “N ote that this is the 
nsk premium associated with the market value o f  firm assets and not the value o f  the 
firm’s equity The risk premium for equities fluctuates more than that for assets because 
o f  the dynamic nature o f  firm leverage ” ( p i9) The value o f  0 4 w ill be used throughout 
the rest o f  this study
4 3 13 Valuation
A  n sk y  exposure w ill pay (1-LG D) i f  it defaults and 1 otherwise KM V decom pose this 
exposure into two separate cash flow s The first w ill pay the recovery amount (1-LGD) 
whether it defaults or not The second pays 0 in the event o f  default and LGD otherwise
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The first cash flow  has no default risk and can be discounted at the nsk-free rate The 
second cash flow  contains credit risk, valuation o f  this component must include a 
discount for nsk
K M V ’s risk-comparable valuation (RCV) m ethodology embeds their risk-neutral 
pricing technique The RCV value at the m odelling date, time 0, is
V0RCV =  (l -  LGD)RFV0 + LGD RYV0 Equation 4-9
where
V*cv = Risk-comparable value at time 0
RFV0 =  Risk-free value at time 0 and
RYV0 = Risk comparable risky value at time 0
The nsk-free value at t0 discounts each cash flow  at the nsk-free rate
M
r f v^ Y c .d f ?' Equation 4-10
/>0
where
M  =  time to maturity 
t = time to payment o f  a given cash flow  
Ct ~ amount o f  cash flow  at time t
DFt f =  nsk-free discount factor to time t
The nsky value calculation adjusts each cash flow  by the quasi-probability and then 
uses the nsk-free discount factor for discounting
M
RYV*cv = Y J ¿ - CQDFt ) C>DFtR'  Equation 4-11
i>0
KM V give the term structure o f  EDF values annually from one to five years U sing  
these values, the cumulative probabilities o f  default are calculated as follow s
CEDF, = 1 -  (l -  EDF,)  Equation 4-12
Interpolation and extrapolation are based on the follow ing formulae
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CEDFt = 1 -  [(l -  CEDFX )' ] for t < 1
for  1 < Tt < t < T2 < 5
CEDFt = 1 -  (l -  CEDFi fs fo r t >5
Equation 4-13
A s shown earlier, the CQDF value m ay be written m terms o f  the actual probability o f  
default to time t, the market’s Sharpe ratio, X , and the asset’s correlation with the 
market, R
This enables the asset to be valued at time 0 
4 3 2  Asset Correlation
The key reason for adopting the KM V-based approach to m odelling is the opportunity 
this affords to use their correlation framework KM V have a substantial database o f  
public companies -  approximately 35,000 at the time o f  writing -  for w hich they have 
equity price time series over many years and from w hich they have calculated asset 
price time series
They aggregate these individual time series to create 61 industry time series and 45 
country time series They then use principal components analysis to extract orthogonal 
factors -  two global, five regional and seven sectoral -  w hich may be used to calculate 
asset correlation between all pairs o f  obligors The resulting factor sensitivities may be 
used to m odel asset migration and hence value a debt portfolio at the m odelling horizon  
KM V update these factor sensitivities on an annual basis and include the file with their 
m onthly updates to obligor EDF values
4 3 21 The KMV Factor Structure
The correlation between the market value o f  a firm ’s assets and the market em bodies the 
extent to w hich systematic risk factors m the econom y drive the value o f  the firm ’s 
assets W hile the market, in theory, comprises all available assets, KM V make the 
assumption that the market becom es “what w e can observe that reasonably proxies for
Equation 4-14
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the theoretical market ” KM V (2003, p61) They define the market as the custom index 
comprised o f  the country and industry indexes within w hich the firm operates
K M V ’s factor m odel im poses a structure on the correlation o f  asset returns, which  
im plies that the correlation between the asset returns o f  any pair o f  firms can be 
explained by the firm s’ relationships to a set o f  com m on factors There are three levels  
used m K M V ’s factor structure, KM V (2003, p i 17) (i) A  com posite com pany-specific  
factor, (11) country and industry factors, and (in) global, regional and industrial sector 
factors
The first level o f  the structure differentiates between firm -specific and system atic risk 
Systematic risk is captured by a single com m on factor This factor is unique to each  
firm and is a weighted sum o f  country and industry factors to which the firm has 
exposure
The country and industry factors at the second level o f  the factor structure are correlated 
with each other Therefore, their risk can also be decom posed into system atic and 
idiosyncratic components The system atic component o f  the risk is captured by the basic 
econom ic factors in the third level o f  the structure The idiosyncratic risk components o f  
countries and industries are retained as country- and industry-specific factors
KM V em phasise (2003, p i 18) that the third level o f  factors is only needed for 
interpreting the drivers o f  correlation The actual correlation estimate depends only on 
the division between the system atic and idiosyncratic parts o f  the country and industry 
risks This is shown m schematic format below , adapted from KM V (2003, p i 18)
Firm Risk
Systematic Risk
Industry Risk
Firm-specific Risk
Industry-specific 
Risk
Country Risk
Global Economic Risk ■
Country-specific
Risk
Industrial Sector Risk
Regional Risk
Figure 4 2 KMV’s Factor Model Structure
The global, regional and sector factors capture all the com m on risk betw een countries 
and m dustnes That is, they capture all o f  the correlation between the country and
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industry factors Likewise, these basic factors also explain all o f  the com m on risk 
between firms in different countries and m dustnes Firms with exposure to the same 
country or industry also share country- or industry-specific nsks
4 3 2 2 Estimating the KMV Factor Model
KM V (2003, p i 19-122) describe the process whereby they estimate the relevant 
parameters for their factor m odel
They construct 14 orthogonal factors from the 106 -  45 countries and 61 industries -  
indices They regress the 106 country and industry return indices on the 14 orthogonal 
factors to obtain the country and industry betas on these 14 factors They also obtain the 
country- and industry-specific risks They regress each firm’s return series on its 
com posite index returns to obtain the firm -specific beta and the R
Each index is regressed in sequence on the residual o f  the previous regression so that, 
by construction, each o f  the factors is orthogonal This means that the Interest 
Sensitivity factor, for example, is not the total effect o f  interest rates but only the 
portion o f  that effect that cannot be explained b y  the global and regional factors
Countries
(45)
Industries
(61)
Global
Economic
Factors
(2)
+
Regional
Economic
Factors
(5)
+ +
Country-
Specific
Factors
(45)
Industry-
Specific
Factors
(61)
Figure 4 3 KMV’s Correlation Schematic
Country or industry risk is decom posed into systematic risk arising from either global, 
regional or sector effects and specific, or idiosyncratic, n sk
Global Regional Sector Country-
= Economic + Factor + Factor + Specific
etum Effect Effect Effect Effect
Global Regional Sector Industry-
= Economic + Factor + Factor + Specific
etum Effect Effect Effect Effect
The regression m odel can be written as
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2 7
rc - Y jP c G rG +X PcRrR +TjPcSrS +
G-\ R=1 5=1
2 5 7 Equation 4-15
R=1
where
rc = return for country c
r, = return for industry i
rc = return for global market G
rR = return for region R
rs = return for sector S
PcG = effect o f  global market G on country c
p tG = effect o f  global market G on industry i
PcR = effect o f  region R on country c
PlR ~ effect o f  region R on industry i
PcS = effect o f  sector S on country c
PlS -  effect o f  sector S on industry I
sc =  country-specific effect for country c
£l = industry-specific effect for industry i
The variance o f  the industry and sector returns is, therefore
2 5 7
G=1 
2 Equation 4-167
where
<j 2g = variance o f  global market factor G ’s return 
a \  -  variance o f  region factor K  s return 
a 2s = vanance o f  sector factor S' s return
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The firm risk is decom posed into system atic and idiosyncratic components The 
com posite factor is constructed individually for each firm based on the countries and 
industries to which it is exposed These country and industry classifications are 
determined from the firm ’s reported sales and asset levels in a particular country or 
industry
The com posite factor can be written as
45 61
<t>k = X  w kcr c +  X  w k‘r > Equation 4-17
C=1 1=1
where
(j)k =  com posite factor for firm k 
wkc = weight o f  firm k m  country c 
wh =  w eight o f  firm k in industry /  
rc = return for country c 
rt = return for industry I  
and
45 61
Yjwkc = Z  wh = 1 Equation 4-18
c = \  ¡=1
KM V run a regression o f  each firm ’s w eekly returns against the returns o f  its com posite 
factor
rk Equation 4-19
where
rk ~ return for firm k
Pk = beta for firm k
sk =  firm -specific effect for firm k
KM V (2003, p l2 6 )  call the com posite factor coefficient J3k, “the firm’s beta”, noting
that it differs from the firm ’s stock beta w hich is against the market index whereas in 
their m odel, each firm has its own unique index KM V publish the R2 for the regression
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for each firm in their database These values range from 0 1  to 0 65 with the lower  
values typical o f  smaller firms and higher values for larger firms
For private firms, the appropriate industry and country w eights are used as for public 
companies and an estimate is made o f  the firm ’s beta This latter value is calculated  
using an estimate o f  R2 for the firm that is based on the value o f  R2 for public firms o f  
similar size m the same country and industries With this estimate, the firm’s beta is 
calculated using
Pk = 'sIr ^ E q u a t i o n  4-20
We can re-state the firm’s returns as follow s
rk ~ Pk^k ^H Y 1 ° k  
(  45
2 V .  + I X r<V c=1 1=1 j
45 f  2
=  A :
Y j P cC/g +Y.PcRrR
c—1 \G = \
61 f 2
R=1 
5
5=1
7 \
1=] \  G=1
(  2 45 5 45
5=1 J
> + £*.
7 45 45
Z Z A g^ ^ + Z Z # * wfcr* + Z Z ^ wfc^ + }\G=1 c=l
f  2 61
/i=l c=l 
5 61
5=1 c=\  
7 61 61
  k c c
c =i y
\ZZ +ZZ^w*/i +ZZa ^/, +Zw^VG-l i=l 
2 f  45
= A
tf=l i=l 
61
5=1 /=1 i=l /
Z Z^owfc+ZAowfa
G=1 v  C=1 1=1
5 / 45 61Z ZA*wfc+ZA*w*,J?=l v c=l (=1
7 / 45 61 sZ Z ^ wfc+ZAiwfc5=1 v c=1 1=1
45 61
Z wfc£c + Z w*<^
rG +
rR +
rs +
> + £,
Equation 4-21
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2 /  45 61
= Z A  'EficGWkc+'EP-GWb
G=1 v C=1
7 / 45
»=1 /  
61
Trz +
61
Z a  Z A * wfc + Z A i wfa^=1 V c=l (=1 /
61 '/?  1/1> £» -i-'N 45+ Z A  E A i wt e + Z A wfc
5=1 v  c = l J=1 )  C=1 1=1
2  5 7 45 61
= E  A c 'b  + Z / v *  + Z P k wkc£c +<£■,G=1
2
/?=1
5
5=1
7
c=l
45
;=1
- Z t e  A/?r/? + Z ^A 5 r5 +^ A / c
G=1 /?=1 5=1 c=l i= l
Equation 4-22
where
Pic = P t wfc
A , = A w*,
Equation 4-23
The total n sk  o f  the firm can thus be expressed as follow s
45
°\ = E A g ^ g  +E / ?« cr« + Z ^ CTv + l A ^ t2 + Z A V ,2 +** Equation 4-24
<7=1 /?=1 5=1 c=l /=1
The covariance in the asset returns o f  two firms can be calculated by sum m ing their 
joint sensitivity to the com m on factors
45 61
a Jk > P  ¡G P kG( J  G +  ^ , P  !RPkR<J R +  ^ , P  i.sPkS&S + ^ j P JCPkcG ec +  ^ \ P  nPkiG 'e,
G=1 J?=l 5=1 i= \
Equation 4-25
and the return correlation is obtained using the standard formula
a
Pjt = J k° j ° k
Equation 4-26
4 3 3 Simulating Asset Migration
The asset migration process is m odelled using a M onte Carlo simulation approach The 
approach proceeds as follow s
1 Draw a set o f  factor realisations, one for each factor The factors are independent 
and identically distributed (l l d ) standard normal variables
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2 Draw a specific risk random variable for each firm These draws are also 11  d 
standard normal random variables
3 Compute the random component o f  each firm ’s asset return as the weighted sum  
o f  the specific and system atic nsks
4 I f  the random value drawn is below  the default threshold set by the firm ’s default 
probability to the m odelling horizon, CEDFH , the firm has defaulted The loss 
incurred on defaulted securities is obtained by  making a random drawing from a 
beta distribution, characterised by  the average loss rate expected for the facility as 
w ell as its standard deviation
5 Compute the value o f  each exposure at the horizon from its asset value realisation 
This is calculated using the RCV m ethodology previously descnbed The value 
w ill be a function o f  each exposure’s LGD, EDF value, R 2 and the random  
realisation o f  asset value at the honzon
6 The value o f  the portfolio at the honzon is obtained by sum m ing the values o f  the 
individual exposures m the portfolio
7 Repeat steps 1 to 6 sufficiently often to achieve the requisite resolution in the 
extreme tail o f  the distnbution The number o f  iterations typically required for this 
o f  the order o f  100,000
In the KM V framework, sampling in the M onte Carlo simulation takes place over the
asset values o f  the individual obligors The asset value at the honzon for an obligor, AH ,
is calculated as
where
A0 = the borrower’s underlying asset value at t0
ja =  expected return on the underlying assets
a  =  volatility o f  the return on the underlying assets
£h =  the random component o f  the asset return
This allow s the process o f  simulating asset migration to be com pleted
Equation 4-27
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The s H are assumed to be drawn from a m ulti-vanate normal distribution Thus, the 
simulation must draw a value o f  eH for each obligor to embed this correlation structure 
The factor m odel, described already, provides the structure necessary to embed the 
matrix o f  correlations among asset returns The independent draws for the 120 factors - 
two global macroeconom ic, five regional, seven sectoral, 45 country-specific and 61 
industry-specific effects -  are combined as follow s
The Aj are the 120 system atic risk factors, w hile u is the firm -specific factor, and, as
mentioned already, all are independent draws o f  standard normally distnbuted random  
variables The random component o f  asset return, s H, is obtained by first calculating 
the weighted sum o f  the firm -specific return, u , and the 120 systematic nsk  factors, X ,
the weights being the coefficients in the last equation, and then scaling the sum by  
dividing by the standard deviation o f  the firm’s asset return Thus, by construction, the 
random component o f  the firm’s asset return, eH, is standard normally distnbuted and 
has a correlation structure consistent with the factor m odel o f  correlation
4 3 4  LGD
KM V, m com m on with many others in the industry -  m ost notably, CreditMetrics - use 
the beta distnbution to m odel the recovery rate The beta distnbution has desirable 
charactenstics for a recovery function First, it can be bounded at whatever level is 
chosen clearly, the desired upper and lower bounds for the recovery rate are 0 and 1 
Furthermore, it can accommodate many different distnbutional shapes, w hich offers the 
flexibility to represent the lender’s v iew  on recovery uncertainty
The Beta function is charactensed by two parameters
1 120 +cr„w Equation 4-28
r  \ a+b)
where r  is the gamma function, defined as
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r(a)= je~yy*"1 dy Equation 4-30
o
00
A Beta distribution density function is given by
B(a,b)
The mean o f the beta distribution is given by
ju(a,b)= a Equation 4-32a + b
and its variance is given by
cib<j2(a,b)= ----------- Equation 4-33V '  a + b + 1 H
Clearly, the mean o f the distribution must be LGD, so, by definition
L G D - —- — Equation 4-34a + b
The relationship between a and b , which determines the shape o f the Beta distribution 
for a given LGD  is determined by their relationship m the variance o f the distribution
2 l g d (i - l g d )<j =-------    Equation 4-35a + ¿> + 1
KMV (2003, p i 03) suggest that this shape be controlled through the use o f a single 
parameter, k, which they define as
k  = a + b + 1 Equation 4-36
Hence, the shape parameters, a and Z>, can be determined from LGD  and k
a = ( k - \ ) L G D  
b = ( k - l ) ( \ - L G D ) Equation 4-37
and the variance can be expressed as
j _  LGD(l -  LGD)  
k Equation 4-38
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The reason the beta distribution has becom e the distribution o f  choice for LGD in the 
market is the flexibility it offers. If nothing is known about the distributional 
characteristics o f  LGD, a &-value o f  3 might be chosen; this w ill result in a uniform  
distribution. Higher k values w ill result in a distribution resembling the normal. If, 
however, as is som etim es observed, LGD is either 0% or 100% with very low  
probabilities o f  intermediate outcom es, a k-parameter o f  2 or less w ill give a U-shaped  
distribution which captures these features. These distributions are shown in Figure 4.4:
B eta  Distribution : LGD
LG D
Figure 4.4 Beta Distribution with Average LGD = 50%
Thus, as k becom es large, the variance o f  the distribution goes to 0, im plying little 
uncertainty about the estimate o f  mean LGD, w hile lesser values o f  k are appropriate 
where the lender has less confidence in the LGD estimate. KM V suggest a value o f  4 as 
being appropriate for many lenders.
The beta distribution is plotted in Figure 4.5 below  for various values o f  k when the 
average LGD is 45%:
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LGD
Figure 4.5 Beta Distribution with Average LGD = 40%
The fractional loss o f  the exposure, LGD , is a random variable drawn from a Beta
distribution with mean LGD and variance — LGD) w ju be m odelled usingk
a k value o f  4 throughout this thesis. This sees LGD values close to the average much o f  
the time but allows full recovery and com plete loss occur also.
4.3.5 Asset Revaluation at the Horizon
Once the borrower’s asset value realisation at horizon is determined, exposures to the 
borrower at the horizon can be evaluated. The value o f  a given exposure is determined 
as the sum o f  two exposures, a riskless portion, which pays (l -  LGD\RFVh ) whether 
the exposure defaults or not, and a risky portion, which pays LGDRFYh when the 
exposure is in default and zero otherwise:
VH = ( l - LGD)RFVh +LGDRFYh Equation 4-39
where RFVH is the risk-free value o f  the exposure from horizon to maturity which  
includes the risk-free value at H  o f  any cash flow s received from 0 to H. RYVH is the 
value o f  the risky portion o f  the exposure from horizon to maturity, and LGD is the
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expected LGD. RYVH also includes coupons from time 0 to H. According to KM V  
(2003, p i 61), the coupons or cash flow s received before horizon are assumed to be risk­
free and enter into the LGD calculation.
If the exposure defaults before the horizon, then the value o f  the risky portion o f  the 
exposure, RYVH, is equal to zero and the obligor is assumed to lose an amount based  
on the parameterised LGD distribution. Since LGD is assumed to be random, a random  
draw is made to determine the fractional loss for each defaulted exposure, as discussed  
next.
4.3.5.1 Exposure Value in the Default State
If the asset value at the m odelling horizon, l n ( ^ ) ,  falls below  the default point, 
In (DPTh ), then the obligor w ill default. In other words, the obligor w ill default i f  the 
realisation o f  the random component o f  the obligor’s asset return, eH, is larger (in 
absolute terms) than the //-period  distance to default (D D ) at time 0, which is the 
normal inverse o f  the //-period  EDF:
where
DPTh -  standardised default point at the horizon  
CEDFh = cumulative probability o f  default to the horizon
In the event o f  default, the risky value o f  the exposure, RYVH , is set to zero. A  random  
draw from the beta distribution determines the loss incurred as explained previously.
4.3.5.2 Exposure Value in the Non-Default State
In order to determine the risk w hich a portfolio o f  loans presents, the portfolio value 
distribution at horizon must be calculated. A s described above, the portfolio must be 
simulated under the true risk measure to determine whether default has occurred for 
each individual loan. This w ill depend on whether the realised eH for an obligor causes 
the borrower to fall below  its default threshold.
= N  1 (CEDFh ) E quation  4-40
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I f the obligor does not default, the facility must be revalued at the m odelling horizon  
The facility value w ill be a function o f  the realised EDF term structure The m odelling  
requires that the realised value distribution for each facility should be consistent with  
the EDF term structure as observed at the outset This, in turn, requires that the 
distribution o f  distance to default for an obligor at the m odelling horizon be explicitly  
linked to the term structure o f  D D  observed at the outset
In order to undertake valuation in the non-default state at the m odelling honzon, the 
nsk-com parable approach is adopted once again The cumulative quasi-EDF values 
from the m odelling honzon to the cash flow  date must be calculated as a function o f  the 
asset return at honzon, s H Thus, the challenge is to calculate the value for CQDFH M,
the cumulative quasi-EDF from the m odelling honzon to matunty, in a manner that 
incorporates the information about the borrower’s D D  at the outset
CQDFh m = n ( -  DDh m\Nd) Equation 4-41
where DDH M is the nsk-neutral D D  from honzon, H, to matunty, M, in the non-default 
(ND) state at the m odelling honzon, H
This DD can be expressed as a function o f  the realised asset value at honzon, AH, and 
the default point at matunty, DPM
In
DDhm = \D P m j
r - (m - h )
g A m - h
In f A W  o
kDPm j
H + cTA4 H s
r _ 2 a
Equation 4-42
H (M - H )
a A4 M - H
B y adding and subtracting (// -  r \ M  -  II ) m the numerator, this sim plifies as follow s
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DDhm =
In ♦ i , - f H  + e A4 H e H +
/  T \cr
v 2 /
A A
In a 2  ^M— z
a j M - H  
M  + u A 4 h  s h -  {j i -  r \ M  -  H )
a  , 4 m  -  H
In A ' f ”> \ cr:+ L I --------\DPm ) r M
o j M - H  4 m - h <J
Equation 4-43
The Brownian processes at the m odelling horizon, Bn , and at maturity, B 
correlated BM m ay be re-written as
Equation 4-44
The correlation betw een BH and BM m ay be expressed as follow s  
Cov(B„, Bm )
P b, O" D O" o
Cov(Bh , B H) + Cov(Bh , BM_H )
(J  o (7  aon  a.
Equation 4-45
H H
Since p = J —  , w e get M
Furthermore,
4 h 4 m  1 m
= V w > ‘
H  I M - H  2
M
In(  A o ^ ( A+ u ------------
I  V P m j M 2 y
M
a a4m Equation 4-46
and
- H )
, are
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— — — =RA  Equation 4-47
Hence, we can re-w nte /)/),, u  as follows
_ D D o m 4 H  „  (,( i - r y i M - H
HM 4 m ^ £h ~
Equation 4-48
= Dl3" '' +  p - er - r x ^ m - h
1 -/>’ vr?
This gives us an expression that connects the DD at maturity to the realised return to the 
modelling horizon
Default can occur at any time However, we can approximate this by replacing the 
continuous barrier with a situation m which default can occur only at the horizon 
modelling date or at facility maturity The DD from the outset to the modelling horizon 
is given by the obligor’s default probability
D D q h = -  TV"1 (CEDFl}) Equation 4-49
In these circumstances, the modelled DD from the outset to maturity, Z)Z)0 M , must be
consistent with the known probability o f default from the outset to facility maturity, 
CEDFm Given our assumption that default can occur only at the modelling honzon or 
at maturity, the probability o f default may be calculated as the combined probability o f 
default occurring before maturity or honzon
The two Brownian motion processes - to the modelling honzon and m atunty, 
respectively -  are bivanate normally distributed with a correlation coefficient o f p as
descnbed above Thus, we know that the probability o f defaulting between the start o f 
the modelling penod and facility m atunty is com pnsed o f the volume under the 
bivanate surface to the left o f - D D QH and below - D D QM As shown m  Figure 4 6,
the probability o f surviving is the volume under the bivanate above and to the nght o f 
the default thresholds given by -  DD0 H and -  DD0 M
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Calculating Distance to Default from the Outset to Maturity
3
DD0M = -1.4
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Figure 4.6 Calculating DD from the Outset to Maturity
B y symmetry, this can be calculated as the volum e to the left and below  DDQH and 
DDo m . Hence,
N2 ( -  AT1 (CEDFh ), DDom , p )=  1 -  CEDFm Equation 4-50
If the borrower does not default at the horizon, then its new cumulative quasi-EDF term 
structure must be derived conditional on its realised distance-to-default at the horizon. 
Only when this is calculated can all the cash flow s from / / t o  M b e  valued.
W e interpolate to calculate all values CQDF(H,t), the cumulative quasi-EDF to date t 
between H  and M:
CQDFH t =1 -  (l — CQDFH M )M~H Equation 4-51
All values CQDF(H} t), the cumulative quasi-EDF to date t between H  and M  m ay be  
obtained using this interpolation. The facility values at the horizon date can then be 
calculated and hence the portfolio value. Repeated simulation yields the portfolio value 
distribution.
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4.4 Checking the Successful Replication of the KMV 
Modelling Framework
The m odel described above w as im plemented in a Matlab environment using a portfolio 
o f  ninety loans o f  $5m  each to ninety different B-rated obligors with maturities varying 
between five and ten years each offering a 1 5% spread The m odelling honzon was set 
to one year and the portfolio value distribution at the honzon date was obtained by  
using M onte Carlo simulation with 100,000 tnals The same portfolio was m odelled in 
Portfolio Manager and, once again, the portfolio value distnbution at the honzon date 
was denved
The summary output from Portfolio Manager is presented m Figure 4 7 below  It shows 
that the portfolio o f  loans with a par value o f  $450m  has a market value o f  $447 9m  
This value is obtained from the analytic calculation shown earlier This exact same 
value is obtained within the new ly constructed m odel
The portfolio yields a total spread o f  203bp w hich is eroded by an expected loss o f  98bp 
to yield an expected spread o f  105bp over the one-year honzon The standard deviation  
o f  loss, the unexpected loss, is 239bp and, hence, the Sharpe ratio, which equals the 
expected spread divided by unexpected loss, is 105/239 =  0 438
An item o f  particular importance to portfolio managers and regulators a lik e'is  the 
econom ic capital required to support the portfolio Econom ic capital is typically set at a 
level such that the debt w hich ranks ahead o f  the econom ic capital can achieve a 
particular rating, or, equivalently, a probability o f  default at the honzon o f  a given level 
In this instance, a default probability o f  lObp at the one-year honzon is chosen as the 
target default probability for the debt Thus, the 99 9th percentile on the portfolio loss
thdistribution is measured The difference between the mean portfolio value and the 99 9 
percentile is the loss from w hich the debt must be protected at the honzon The present 
value o f  this amount represents the econom ic capital, w hich is the amount w hich w e  
must set aside now  to absorb portfolio losses over the m odelling honzon
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f Portfo lio  Overview  - C :\Personal\Thesis\KMV\KMV Targe t f... [~H
*a) Copy k )  Save to file Hrint |  Close
.
No. Exposures 90
No. Expired Exposures 0
No Borrowers 90
Commitments 450.000,000
Exposure 450,000,000
MTM Exposure| 447,902,425
Book Value Drawn 450,000,000
Market Value Drawn 447,902,425
Total Spread Revenue, Annualized..... 9,090,968
Expected Loss, Annualized 4,407,690
Expected Spread Revenue, Annualized 4,683,278
Unexpected Loss (Simulated) 10,685,779
Capital (10 .00  bp in excess of Expected Loss) 47,689,875
Current
Non-Zero Records 90
Total Spread, Annualized 0.02030
Expected Loss, Annualized 0.00984
Expected Spread, Annualized 0.01046
Unexpected Loss (Simulated) 0.02386
Capital (10.00 bp in excess of Expected Loss) 0.10647
Sharpe Ratio 0.43827
RORAC, Annualized 0.12092
Figure 4.7 Portfolio Manager Summary Output
The capital required to support the portfolio equals 10.65% o f  the market value o f  the 
portfolio. Furthermore, the return on risk-adjusted capital (RORAC) w hich equals 
expected spread divided by the capital plus the risk-free rate equals 1.05% /10.65%  +  
2.27% = 12.09%.
The two portfolio distributions are shown in Figure 4.8 below:
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Figure 4.8 Portfolio Manager and M odelled  D istributions C om pared
It is clear from the above that the m odel captures the portfolio dynamic embedded in the 
KM V m odelling m ethodology and that the differences between the distributions are 
attributable to simulation error.
This portfolio capital is, in turn, allocated to the individual facilities that comprise the 
portfolio. The capital allocation m ethodology adopted by KM V is the standard 
contribution to variance m ethodology applied in m ost VaR contexts.
R C  = dUL
Ÿ uwjPlp L iULj
P 7=1
ÔW; UL.
PipULiUL}
UL„ = p ipULi E quation  4-52
where
RC1 is the risk contribution o f  facility z, the fraction o f  portfolio capital w hich is 
attributed to facility z,
wt is the weight o f  the facility in the portfolio,
ULi , ULj and ULp are the standard deviations o f  the facility values z, j  and the 
portfolio, respectively,
and p. is the correlation between the value o f  facility i and the value o f  the portfolio.
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The sum o f  all the capital attributed to the facilities equals the capital for the portfolio:
n n
Y Y w . w p U L U L .I j r y  I j n n w n U L U I  « «
<*> = ^ j r r «<•
Equation 4-53
Risk contribution can be interpreted as the portion o f  the individual facility’s risk that 
remains after diversification. This is the key focus o f  managerial attention.
Therefore, in addition to checking that the portfolio distribution is calculated in a 
manner consistent with that em ployed by KM V, a check on capital attribution is
necessary to ensure that individual facilities are being m odelled with similar
consistency. To that end, the capital attributed to individual facilities under the m odel 
and that attributed by KM V in Portfolio Manager are compared. The results o f  that
comparison are plotted in Figure 4.9:
Figure 4.9 Comparison of Capital Allocation under New Model and Portfolio
Manager
Again, the results confirm consistency between the two m odels at the facility level. This 
is a necessary pre-requisite to extending the m odelling approach into a multi-period 
framework. This confirms the successful replication o f  the KM V m odelling framework.
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4.5 Using the Model to Address Key Credit Portfolio Issues
The primary concern o f  this thesis is CDO tranche valuation This requires that a single  
period credit portfolio m odel be created as a first step towards the building o f  the m ulti­
period m odel necessary for CDO tranche valuation
However, the availability o f  this single period m odel affords insights into other areas o f  
interest in the credit portfolio management field In particular, having such a portfolio 
m odel enables us answer four questions that have long challenged academe and industry 
alike
•  How can a new facility be assessed m the context o f  the portfolio to w hich it w ill 
be added7
•  What capital attribution m ethodology is m ost appropriate m the context o f  a bank
credit portfolio w hich is financed largely with debt9
•  What is the optimal amount o f  a new syndicated loan for which a bank should
subscribe given its portfolio com position7 Or, equivalently, and o f  more relevance 
to the bank’s biggest customers, what penalty is being incurred by holding a 
facility w hich is larger than the optimal size7
• What framework should a bank use to set limits on the amount o f  exposure it
should be w illing to accept to different borrowers, sectors and geographies 
consistent with its risk appetite7
4 5 1 Determining the Marginal Impact of a Loan on a Debt Portfolio
Standard portfolio management software is run centrally and m isolation from the 
business line Those who com pete for business have little appreciation o f  the impact o f  
the new facilities which they consider writing on the portfolio The best that can be 
achieved m such circumstances is to g ive the business line general instructions about the 
concentrations w hich exist m the portfolio to guide their market positioning and loan 
pricing decisions
However, with the m odel that has just been built, all the inputs necessary to guide the 
pricing decision are available The value o f  the new loan at the outset can be calculated 
using the formula outlined at 4 3 1 above The new loan value distribution at the 
m odelling horizon can be obtained by  using the stored realisations for the 120 random  
variables for the 100,000 iterations
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Thus, the value distribution for the new loan and for the portfolio including the
proposed new loan m ay be calculated using the stored portfolio values This provides all
the inputs required for the calculation o f  Risk Contribution and facility capital as
described m 4 4 above This, m turn, enables the facility Sharpe ratio,
Expected Spread ? ^  {acM y  rq R A C , Expected Spread + Rlsk _ free m te , t0 be 
Risk Contribution Capitalisation Rate
calculated Finally, having facility capital allows us calculate the facility Econom ic  
Value Added (EVA)
N one o f  these measures is available to the business line from Portfolio Manager or 
other credit portfolio software offerings at present H aving these values available before 
the decision to provide the loan has to be made allow s all new loan-granting decisions 
to be made m the full know ledge o f  their portfolio impact This can turn the portfolio 
management function from its current reactive stance o f  trying to mitigate the worst 
effects o f  low  RORAC facilities after they have been w ntten to identifying them in 
advance and avoiding taking them into the portfolio
In summary, portfolio management is primarily about identifying the capital required to 
support individual facilities According as the concentration o f  a facility in a portfolio 
increases, the capitalisation rate for that facility increases and the facility becom es less 
desirable K nowing the capital required to support a putative new facility ex ante has the 
potential to transform the loan portfolio management business
4 5 2 An Alternative Capital Attribution Framework
Capital is fundamentally a portfolio concept A llocating capital to a facility requires an 
attnbution m ethodology The challenge o f  devising a logical attribution m ethodology  
has been faced in a trading room environment for m any years The m ethodology o f  
choice for distributing limits across desks, for example, has been to use the covariance 
o f  the desk returns with the trading room returns
KM V and m any others m the credit marketplace have adopted this m ethodology But, is 
this appropriate7 The instruments dealt in a trading room context are all liquid and the 
trading honzon is short In these circumstances, the distribution o f  returns is 
approximately normal This differs significantly from the situation with bank loan 
portfolios A  typical bank portfolio comprises very illiquid loans - indeed, som e would  
venture to suggest that the role o f  banks is liquidity intermediation -  so the m odelling
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horizon is much longer than that considered by trading desks In fact, the primary 
justification offered for the one-year m odelling horizon w hich is the standard used in 
the marketplace is that one year is a period long enough to allow the bank to be 
recapitalised i f  its loan portfolio declines significantly in value
Loan portfolio distributions are skew ed and fat-tailed over the one year m odelling  
horizon A  bank is a highly leveraged institution It is concerned not only about standard 
deviation, it is also concerned about becom ing decapitalised Capital is fundamentally 
about insulating the bank from extreme losses But the nsk contnbution m ethodology  
penalises facilities based on their contnbution to vanance and not on their contnbution  
to those scenanos for w hich capital is actually required
A  further consideration relates to the nature o f  capital, while capital is set by reference 
to an extreme loss percentile, such as 99 9% or 99 95% depending on the bank’s target 
debt rating, the bank w ill be econom ically bankrupt at much lower loss levels Thus, 
while the amount o f  capital is set by reference to an extreme percentile, a less extreme 
percentile is a more relevant threshold for a bank w hich concerned about its econom ic  
independence
4 5 2 1 Capital Allocation Based on Contribution to ETL
An alternative is suggested adopt an expected tail loss (ETL) approach which allocates 
capital to facilities based on their contnbution to portfolio outcom es below  a chosen  
portfolio threshold
ETLP -  e [ l  | L > Threshold ] Equation 4-54
In other words, the expected tail loss is the average o f  the portfolio losses, L, for those 
scenanos where the portfolio loss is beyond the chosen threshold
Portfolio capital, Cp , is then allocated to facilities, Ci , based on the extent to which the
average facility value in the scenanos w hich give n se  to a portfolio loss greater than the 
portfolio loss threshold is below  the facility’s unconditional average
EC .= - L >Threshold\ C Equation 4-55ETLp
Once again, this measure satisfies the requirement that C, = C ,
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This proposed capital allocation m ethodology has two desirable properties. Firstly, it 
satisfies the sub-additivity, hom ogeneity and m onotonicity requirements for a coherent 
risk measure specified by Artzner et al (1997, 1999). Secondly, it is more sensitive to 
exposure concentrations. A  criticism that is often levelled at the contribution to variance 
m ethodology is that concentrations have to increase significantly before a noticeable 
increase in allocated capital is observed.
There is no published work o f  which the author is aware which suggests how  sensitive a 
portfolio should be to exposure size. However, industry practice is that single-nam e 
exposures greater than four times the average exposure size are seldom  held voluntarily. 
This rule o f  thumb is based on the view  that exposures o f  this size w ill w ipe out the net 
incom e contribution o f  over 300 exposures, assuming a 40% LGD and 0.4% net 
income. However, this rule assumes a portfolio with thousands o f  exposures; in a 
portfolio o f  just 90 exposures, the four tim es multiplier would certainly be reduced.
This point is borne out in Figure 4.10 below:
Figure 4.10 Capital Allocation: ETL and Risk Contribution methodologies
compared
W hen a €5m  facility is added to a €450m  portfolio o f  90 loans o f  €5m  each, the 
capitalisation rate for the facility is 6.9% under the ETL allocation approach and 8.3%
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under the Risk Contribution approach However, as the facility size increases, the ETL- 
based capitalisation rate increases faster and by  the time the facility has increased to 
€50m  representing 10% o f  the total portfolio, the capitalisation rate has increased to 
37 9% compared to 21 7% under the Risk Contribution approach W hile the exam ple is 
stylised m the sense that corporate banking portfolios are much more diversified with, 
typically, thousands or tens o f  thousands o f  facilities, the same pattern is repeated when  
tested on a typical bank portfolio o f  corporate loans This alternative allocation  
m ethodology ensures that taking on exposures significantly larger than the average size  
within the portfolio w ill exhibit low  RORAC and consequently w ill not be undertaken 
This accords with typical bank policy whereby larger exposures are only extended to 
high-grade borrowers or to low-grade borrowers on a secured basis
4 5 3 Determining the Optimal Hold Level and the Concentration Penalty
The m odel outlined at 4 5 2 1 above determines the capital required to support a 
putative new facility to be added to a loan portfolio H owever, in many instances, it is 
the amount o f  the loan that is at issue, and not whether or not to grant the loan For 
example, when participating m a syndicated loan, w e need to determine the optimal 
level o f  participation Likewise, when extending facilities to a relationship customer, w e  
need to understand what costs are incurred by  making credit available w hich exceeds 
the optimal hold level What is required is a framework for determining both these 
quantities
The credit portfolio m odel provides just such a framework Typically, loans w ill be 
issued at a spread in excess o f  their true value given by the formula at 4 3 1 above 
However, according as the facility size increases, it becom es a source o f  concentration 
m the portfolio and the capital increases at an increasing rate as shown in Figure 4 11 
below  for the same € 4 50m  portfolio described above
The average capitalisation rate increases and the marginal capitalisation rate increases at 
an even faster rate, as demonstrated m Figure 4 12 below  The increased capitalisation 
rate translates into an increased cost o f  writing incremental exposure Figure 4 13 
demonstrates that the increased capitalisation requirements translate into higher costs 
for the bank as exposure increases, the marginal cost o f  assum ing additional exposure 
increases until it exceeds the spread, and, at still higher exposure levels, the average cost 
exceeds the spread
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Figure 4.11 Capital as a function of Exposure
Capitalisation Rate vs Exposure
Exposure
Figure 4.12 Marginal and Average Capitalisation Rates as a function of Exposure
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Margin and Costs vs Exposure
Exposure
Figure 4.13 Marginal and Average Cost as a function of Exposure
EVA is the primary measure o f  value in m ost banks. It is calculated by subtracting the 
cost o f  capital tim es the amount o f  capital from the expected spread. It is a measure o f  
annualised value added. The EVA in Figure 4.14 rises at first before peaking where the 
expected spread equals the cost o f  capital tim es the marginal capitalisation rate. Beyond  
that exposure level, the net revenue turns negative as the marginal cost o f  capital 
exceeds the expected spread. Clearly, the optimal exposure is that at which the EVA per 
unit o f  regulatory capital consumed is above the threshold set by management. If Tier 1 
equity- and hence, regulatory capital - is not constrained, then the optimal exposure is 
that which m axim ises EVA.
In the €450m  portfolio under consideration, EVA is at a maximum for a particular 
facility at an exposure size o f  € 5 .9m. But, the maximum desirable exposure size scales 
with portfolio size and with the number and diversity o f  exposures. Thus, larger 
institutions can comfortably accommodate m uch larger exposures before detracting 
from EVA. Likewise, better diversified portfolios w ill reduce the correlation between  
the value o f  a new facility and that o f  the portfolio.
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Figure 4.14 Economic Value Added vs Exposure
However, according as the facility becom es a larger fraction o f  the total portfolio, the 
benefits o f  diversification are eroded and that facility’s marginal EVA w ill decline and 
eventually turn negative. This approach enables a bank to determine two important 
facts:
•  The optimal amount o f  a syndicated loan to assume is that which m axim ises EVA  
or which ensures the marginal EVA per unit o f  exposure just exceeds the 
threshold set by management.
•  The cost o f  exceeding the optimal hold level for a relationship customer is the 
EVA destroyed on the exposure beyond the optimal.
B y implementing a loan pricing m odel linked to the marginal capitalisation rates, the 
business line w ill have an incentive to buy credit protection against the names where the 
exposure exceeds the optimal. It also creates an alignment o f  interest between the 
portfolio management function and the business line.
4.5.4 Limit-Setting in Debt Portfolios
The measure o f  risk o f  relevance to a bank is econom ic capital. Thus, econom ic capital, 
it is suggested, provides an obvious basis for setting lim its to borrowers, sectors and
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geographies. N o further exposure m ay be assumed i f  the econom ic capital required to 
support the exposure to the obligor exceeds the agreed capital threshold. Such a 
framework would provide a far more coherent basis for lim it setting than the exposure- 
based limits currently in use which are linked to customer grade based on rather vague  
qualitative factors.
4.6 Implications for Bank Regulation
The framework created in this chapter demonstrates the impact o f  portfolio com position  
on capital. Under Basel II, regulatory capital depends on the obligor PD and on the 
LGD, exposure at default (EAD) and maturity (M) o f  the facility. This chapter 
highlights that facility capital is dependent not just on these variables but, crucially, on  
the com position o f  the portfolio also. Poorly diversified portfolios w ill require 
significantly more capital than w ell diversified ones. W hile this has been understood in 
regulatory circles for a long time, this framework enables the debate to m ove from  
being purely qualitative in nature to quantitative. The regulators, understandably, are 
reluctant to commit to a quantitative approach until they are satisfied about data quality, 
m odelling and backtesting. However, it is suggested that this approach could be 
em ployed as the basis for setting capital in the future.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a single period credit portfolio m odel was developed which replicated 
the current state-of-the-art model.
The KM V approach to the m odelling o f  a portfolio o f  debt securities over a single time 
period was replicated based on outline descriptions o f  their approach in the literature. 
The success o f  this m odelling effort is confirmed by comparing the loan value 
distributions at maturity and the value, expected loss, unexpected loss and risk 
contribution o f  each loan in the portfolio produced by running the portfolio through 
K M V ’s Portfolio Manager software.
This m odel was then used to propose a m odification to current market practice and two 
significant extensions to the state-of-the-art. The capital attribution m ethodology  
adopted by industry and embedded in K M V ’s portfolio m odel allocates capital in 
accordance with contribution to variance. This m odel, the standard in market risk
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environments, im plicitly assumes that variability o f  value around the mean is the 
investor’s main concern.
However, this author argues that for leveraged portfolios, contribution to extreme 
outcom es is o f  much more concern and proposes an allocation schem e based on  
expected tail loss. This has the effect o f  penalising concentrations more severely than 
the market standard framework and offers a concentration sensitivity that is more 
consistent with intuition and market practice.
The single period m odel w hich KM V offers m odels portfolios ex post. Unfortunately, 
this tells the portfolio manager the effect o f  individual facilities on the portfolio after 
they have already been added to the portfolio and the manager has no opportunity to 
influence the decision. This thesis creates a framework in which the impact o f  a facility  
on the portfolio can be measured ex ante giving the portfolio manager the ability to 
influence the decision on whether to add the facility before the fact.
In reality, however, the decision to extend a facility to a customer is seldom  a Y es/N o. 
Particularly in syndicated lending, the key concern is “H ow  much?” not “Whether or 
not”; the issue is one o f  deciding what size o f  facility should be made available. 
Likewise, a bank’s best relationship customers w ill require facilities that exceed those 
which can be econom ically accommodated within the bank’s portfolio. The bank’s 
appetite w ill vary depending on the size and com position o f  its book.
This thesis proposes a m odel that enables the portfolio manager to determine the impact 
o f  a loan increment on the portfolio. A s the capitalisation rate increases, the cost o f  the 
incremental capital drives the total cost o f  holding the facility on balance sheet higher 
than the spread on offer.
This provides the line with a signal as to what the optimal hold amount is. This accords 
with intuition that suggests that limits not be set as absolute amounts: rather, they 
should ensure that the return per unit o f  risk o f  the last increment o f  exposure is greater 
than the minimum threshold. A  larger hold amount is warranted i f  the spread on offer is 
wider.
Likewise, it measures the cost o f  holding an excessive exposure to a given obligor. This 
‘concentration penalty’ can be levied on the relationship manager. The penalty provides 
the portfolio manager with adequate incom e to spend on the purchase o f  protection on  
that name should a CDS market exist.
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Finally, it provides the basis for setting borrower lim its, an issue with which the market 
has long struggled Typically such limits have been set as absolute amounts o f  exposure 
This thesis suggests that a single capital amount can be used to set limits regardless o f  
the borrower grade
H aving replicated the KM V m odelling approach m a single time period framework, the 
next step is to extend this approach in two ways (1) First, m odel the assets that comprise 
the portfolio To achieve this, the portfolio m odel must be converted from a single- to a 
m ulti-penod framework This w ill enable the cash flow ing from the portfolio over time 
to be determined (11) Then, m odel the liabilities Build a cash flow  model to disburse 
the cash from the assets to the CDO tranches in accordance with the cash flow  waterfall 
specified in the CDO indenture
The developm ent o f  this new m odel is the subject o f  the next chapter
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Chapter 5. Developing a Multi-Period Credit Portfolio 
Model to Value CDO Tranches
5.1 Chapter Overview
In this chapter, a new  m odel is developed w hich w ill enable the valuation o f  CDO  
tranches using a m ulti-time step M onte Carlo m odelling approach in a nsk-neutral 
framework
5.2 Motivation for Building a New Model
This thesis grew from dissatisfaction with the process that the rating agencies applied to 
rating CDO tranches
•  The m odels they em ploy rely heavily on the rating o f  the assets contained in the 
SPV That asset rating process was already seen to be overly heuristic and had 
failed to identify on a tim ely basis many assets w hose quality had materially 
changed
•  The assumptions regarding asset correlation, the manner in which the portfolio 
characteristics are distilled into their binomial framework -  described more fully 
in Chapter 6 -  and the use o f  the expected loss measure to assign grade seem ed to 
the author to be overly sim plistic
It seem ed unlikely that a process that relied on such asset ratings and a rather arbitrary 
approach to the assessm ent o f  portfolio interactions could successfully grade as 
com plex a structured debt product as a CDO tranche
Nor does the market seem  much more enlightened The analysis undertaken by many o f  
the system s most com m only used in the market -  Intex, ICDO and CDO Vantage, for 
exam ple - amounts to nothing more than scenario analysis supported by a cash flow  
m odel M ost purchasers o f  semor tranches settle for an assessm ent that suggests full 
repayment as long as the number o f  defaults in the first three years is less than a given  
multiple o f  historical loss levels for collateral o f  that quality N o  attempt is made to 
analyse the portfolio interactions, it is hoped that the rating agency requirements 
regarding industry lim its w ill avoid losses due to concentration that w ill penetrate the 
semor tranche
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The author was attracted to the structural approach that potentially offered a more 
rigorous alternative to the rating agency approach The adoption o f  this approach 
required appropriate data and it was decided to use KM V data because o f  its widespread  
acceptance in the market and its potential to offer a more ngorous approach to 
m odelling the correlation o f  credit risks
5.3 Outline of Task of Extending the Single Period Model to a 
Multi-Period Framework
The single period credit portfolio m odel developed in Chapter 4 used KM V estimates o f  
probability o f  default -  its EDF measure -  and o f  asset correlation The steps taken in 
developing that m odel can be summarised as follow s
♦> The assets are valued at the outset using the nsk-comparable approach This 
involved the discounting o f  expected cash flow s using a nsk-neutral approach that 
increased the probability o f  default to account for the systematic n sk  that they 
contained
❖ The evolution o f  each obligor’s credit term structure was simulated under the true 
risk measure -  that is under the Cumulative Expected Default Frequency measure, 
CEDFh , to the m odelling horizon
>  If the obligor defaulted -  m other words, i f  the random obligor return was
more negative than the negative o f  the obligor’s DD - recovery was 
m odelled as a drawing from a beta distribution with the mean and standard 
deviation specified
^  I f the obligor survived, the term structure o f  the obligor’s credit n sk  was re­
computed based on the realised random return over the m odelling penod  
W ith this new credit term structure, the value o f  the debt instrument is re­
computed using the same nsk-neutral approach as was applied at the outset
The simulation applied a factor m odel approach to embed the KM V asset 
correlation measures
❖ The frequency distnbution o f  facility values and portfolio values at the m odelling  
honzon is calculated An analysis o f  these distnbutions produces a number o f  key  
performance measures
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>  Calculating the portfolio average and the average for each o f  the individual 
facilities enables the expected portfolio return and expected return for each 
facility to be calculated in a mark-to-model framework
>  The standard deviation o f  the facility and portfolio values -  called  
unexpected loss - m ay be computed The expected return and unexpected  
loss measures can be combined to obtain the Sharpe ratio The Sharpe ratio 
is a measure o f  portfolio performance and o f  facility performance This is a 
key m etnc for investors in unleveraged debt portfolios
>  Where investment in debt portfolios is financed largely by debt -  as is the 
case m the banking sector -  the Sharpe ratio alone is insufficient to inform  
the investor about the desirability o f  a given investment since it is focused
on value volatility In these circumstances, portfolio capital is set by
reference to the present value o f  the difference between the expected 
portfolio value and som e extreme percentile o f  the distribution Investment 
performance is then measured by RORAC
Logic would suggest that a similar approach could be applied to the valuation o f  a CDO  
tranche and to the measurement o f  its risk characteristics H owever, a number o f  issues 
complicate this approach
❖ The value o f  a tranche at the start o f  the m odelling period can no longer be
calculated in the formulaic manner applied to the valuation o f  loans
>  It is no longer possible to determine the amount and the timing o f  cash
flow s ex ante The cash flow s w ill derive from the evolution o f  the portfolio 
over many time periods m the future Thus, rather than m odelling over one 
period as previously, the portfolio must be m odelled over every period at 
which cash is disbursed to the tranches until all the underlying portfolio 
assets have matured or defaulted
>  The m odelling must occur under the nsk-neutral measure and not the true 
measure as previously since the focus for now  is on valuation and not on 
risk
❖ M easuring the risk o f  a tranche is more complicated still
>  A s for the single period m odel, the probability distribution o f  security 
values at the horizon must be calculated
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♦ This requires that the portfolio o f  underlying securities be simulated  
under the true measure out to the investor’s risk horizon
❖ At the horizon, each tranche must be revalued H owever, this task is a repeat o f  
that undertaken at the start o f  the m odelling period described above Hence, 
valuation at horizon demands that a M onte Carlo simulation be undertaken for 
each point on the probability distribution Thus, the calculation o f  a tranche 
Sharpe ratio is a ‘M onte Carlo squared’ problem Obtaining a Sharpe ratio 
estimate for a CDO tranche with the same precision as was obtained for an 
individual facility m the single penod m odel w ould require 100,0002= 10,000  
m illion m ulti-penod simulations I f  the underlying portfolio contains ten-year 
maturity assets and the CDO tranches receive quarterly payments, a total o f  400  
billion simulations are necessary It is clear that lesser accuracy must be accepted 
or a good approximation m ethodology developed
This thesis is focused on the valuation o f  CDO tranches and therefore concentrates on 
the first o f  these challenges The latter w ill be addressed in subsequent research
5.4 Modelling to Horizon in a Risk-Neutral Framework
In the single penod credit portfolio m odel, simulation took place in actual default space 
Such m odelling is descnbed m the literature as occum ng under the true measure, to 
distinguish it from m odelling under the nsk-neutral w hich is undertaken when value, 
and not nsk, is the focus o f  concern The focus o f  this m odel is the valuation o f  CDO  
tranches and thus, all the m odelling m this chapter w ill occur under the nsk-neutral 
measure The first task, therefore, is to adapt the m odelling paradigm o f  Chapter 4 for 
use in a nsk-neutral framework
As was done previously m the single penod m odel, the portfolio value distnbution at 
honzon must be calculated H owever, unlike previously, the portfolio must be simulated 
under the nsk-neutral measure to determine whether default has occurred for each 
individual loan since our interest is in portfolio valuation, and later, tranche valuation  
This w ill depend on whether the realised s H for an obligor causes the borrower to fall 
below  its nsk-neutral default threshold Clearly, the probability o f  default w ill be higher 
in the nsk-neutral framework since CQDF w ill be greater than CEDF
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The value o f  the facility m default is obtained in exactly the same w ay as descnbed  
previously in 4 3 5 1 M aking a drawing from a beta distribution simulates the LGD
5 4 2 Forward CQDF in the Non-Default State
Once again, the value o f  the facility at the m odelling horizon is a function o f  the shape 
o f  the credit curve and the simulated asset return, s H, over the period
H owever, in Equation 4-50 above, m odelling occurred under the true measure, so w e  
had
N 2( - N~l(CEDFh ),DD0M,p )= 1 - CEDFm Equation 5-1
where CEDFH and CEDFM are the true cumulative default probability to the horizon  
and facility maturity, respectively, DD0 M is the DD over the period to facility maturity, 
and p is the correlation between the Brownian processes at honzon and maturity, 
respectively
N ow , when m odelling under the nsk-neutral measure, w e have
N 2 (-  N-' (CQDFh ),DD°m , p)= 1 -  CQDFm  Equation 5-2
where the variables are as m Equation 5-1 except they are now  measured under the nsk- 
neutral measure The relationship between the nsk-neutral and true cumulative default 
probability measures was given m Equation 4-8 above as
CQDF, = n {n ~' (CEDF, ) + My f t )  Equation 5-3
B y the same token, under the true measure, the impact o f  s H on the D D  was captured in 
Equation 4-48 above as
DD„ M = DD°m  + P sH - RJ>jM - H  Equation 5-4 
V i-P1 V i- p 1
Under the nsk-neutral measure, this formula is m odified to
D D qh m  + T ^ = T  Equation 5-5
V i-p2 VI- p
5 41 Exposure Value in the Default State
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since no additional adjustment needs to be made for system atic risk 
Hence,
CQDF°m = n ( -  DDqh m ) Equation 5-6
5.5 Modelling to Subsequent Horizons
From 5 4 2, w e have the cumulative quasi-default probability from the first m odelling  
horizon to maturity H owever, w e are no longer interested in valuing the potential future 
cash flow s at the first horizon instead, w e w ish to m odel the portfolio over the next 
time period Thus, w e w ish to determine the probability o f  default under the nsk-neutral 
measure from one honzon to the next For CDO valuation purposes, the m odelling  
honzons correspond to the dates on w hich cash is paid to the tranches, this typically  
occurs quarterly or semi-annually
W e determine the cumulative quasi probability o f  default from H  to 2H  by interpolating 
between H  and M u sin g  the same interpolation schem e as w e used previously in 4 3 5 2
/ \1H-HCQDF°2H =1 -  (l -  CQDF°M Equation 5-7
This allows us to repeat the m odelling procedure at the second and subsequent 
m odelling honzons
5.6 Modelling the Liabilities
The procedure outlined above allows the cash flow s from the assets to be m odelled The 
next stage is to distnbute the available cash to the vanous tranches in accordance with 
the CDO indenture
The m ost important factors to incorporate are the O/C and the I/C tests Breaching these 
tests w ill cause the cash available from the assets to be diverted to more senior tranches 
Breaching the m ezzanine O/C test w ill see the residual cash flow  used to repay the m ost 
senior outstanding pnncipal or outstanding interest should there be any Likewise, 
breaching the senior O/C test causes all cash beyond that required to pay senior interest 
to be used to repay senior pnncipal
The overall result is that all the cash flow ing from the assets is disbursed to the 
liabilities
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5.7 Implementing the Model
This new m odel is now applied to the valuation o f  the portfolio m odelled above in 4.4. 
This portfolio comprises ninety loans o f  $5m  each, rated B1 to B3 by M oody’s, paying  
Libor + 250bp. The loans have maturities between 4.5 and 10 years. The portfolio is 
financed by $360m  o f  Aaa-rated senior notes paying Libor +  50bp and $40m  o f  
m ezzanine paying Libor + 150bp. The senior O/C test is 1.2 w hile the corresponding 
m ezzanine test is 1.05. The senior I/C test is 1.8 and m ezzanine I/C is 1.2.
The m odel which has been developed can cater for any combination o f  asset 
characteristics and securitisation structures. However, the portfolio chosen has the 
characteristics o f  a typical arbitrage cash flow  CDO. These comprise 80-100 loans to 
sub-investment grade names with maturities in the five- to ten-year bracket. L ikew ise  
the O/C and I/C tests are set at levels typically seen in the market. The results which  
follow  should therefore be representative o f  those for the securitisation class.
5.7.1 Tranche Cash Flows
An exam ple o f  the cash flow  waterfall is shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 below . The 
two figures give the key cash flow s, balance sheet values and O/C and I/C test values 
from five simulations semi-annually over the ten year period:
The cash inflow  to the structure com es from three sources: (i) Interest from the assets, 
(ii) principal from maturing assets; and (iii) principal recovered from defaulting assets.
On the cash outflow side o f  the structure, the cash is distributed to the tranches in 
priority: (i) Senior tranche interest is paid first, (ii) Subject to passing all relevant tests, 
mezzanine tranche interest is paid, (iii) Outstanding interest, i f  any, is paid, (iv) 
Principal -  both recovered and maturing - is channelled to the tranches in priority order, 
and (v) should all relevant tests be passed and there not be any interest outstanding on 
any tranche, equity is entitled to the residual.
Interest from A ssets gives the amount o f  interest flow ing from the underlying loans. It 
declines over time as assets default or mature. N o assets mature during the first five  
years. W hen assets default, a random draw is made to determine the recovery amount.
If the senior tranche O/C or I/C tests are breached, no cash is paid to the m ezzanine or 
equity tranches. Instead, that cash is diverted to pay down the senior tranche principal. 
The amount o f  interest due to the m ezzanine tranche accrues in the outstanding interest
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account which is repaid as soon as interest payments can be resumed Only i f  all tests 
are in com pliance w ill any cash be paid to the equity tranche
A ll recoveries and maturing principal amounts are applied to the senior tranche first 
Only when the senior is fully repaid is any cash paid to the m ezzanine tranche Finally, 
i f  all the notes are repaid, all remaimng interest and principal flow ing from the assets is 
applied to equity
5 7 2 Tranche Valuation
Since all the cash flow s are m odelled in nsk-neutral space, their present value m ay be 
obtained by discounting at the nsk-free interest rate
The average present value o f  the cash flow  from the assets equals the value o f  the assets 
calculated using the method outlined m 4 3 1 3 above The sum o f  the tranche values 
w ill clearly equal the value o f  the assets since all the cash flow s from the assets are 
distributed to the tranches
Thus, w e are able to value each o f  the tranches across all the simulations
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Period 0 Syrs 1 Oyrs 1 5yrs 2 Oyrs 2 5yrs 3 Oyrs 3 5yrs 4 Oyrs 4 5yrs 5 Oyrs
Interest from Assets
5 360 445 8 217371 9 150 238 9 318 501 10 189 465 10 528 497 11 119619 10911 098 11 495 779 U 527019
5 645 787 8 703 104 10 308 438 10 649 715 11 678 524 12 052 359 12 906 533 12 274 985 12 776 047 12 500 832
5 579 902 8 605 070 10 192 049 10 649 715 11 808 587 12 190 892 12 906 553 13 184 244 13 890 651 13 636 946
5 663 769 8 704 915 10 312587 10 770 735 11 946 718 12 190 892 12 906 553 12 881 158 13 572 974 13 636 946
5 496 975 8 413 919 9 502 834 9 560 540 9 667 720 9 558 767 10 239 300 10 304 926 10 862 032 10877 810
Maturing Principal
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 000
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 000 000
Recovered Principal
17 505 843 10 907 881 5 320 132 4 117917 0 1 591 939 9 537 496 0 1 071 235 0
2 809 588 0 1 904 981 2 103 797 0 0 17376 312 3 782 068 10 828 924 0
4 916 840 0 0 0 0 3 208 881 0 0 7445 723 0
1 582 635 0 0 0 2 677 941 3 640 746 6 461 381 0 3 783 681 1 488 952
7 904 989 13 800 046 8 463 083 17 457 026 8181557 0 3 487 667 0 3 627 266 9 482 618
Senior Tranche Interest
4 396 851 5 154 578 6 331 848 6 174 989 7 213 624 7 213 624 7 920 588 7 596 588 8 246 847 8 127 541
4 396 851 5 375 759 6 884 364 6 847 648 8 055 596 8 055 596 8 984 469 8 542 439 9 169215 8 770 555
4 396 851 5 344 044 6 843 750 6 843 750 8 098 967 8 098 967 8 951 212 8 951 212 9717425 9 511 802
4 396 851 5 394 225 6 908 012 6 908 012 8 175 016 8 113 935 8 956 920 8 792 551 9 545 183 9 440 692
4 396 851 5 299 072 6 520 180 6,299 579 6 982 440 6 734 582 7 439 288 7 279 338 7 818 886 7 634 675
Mezzanine Tranche Interest
628 539 0 0 2 618 824 1 052 346 0 0 3 314510 0 2 685 606
628 539 742 005 910 946 910 946 1 052 346 1 052 346 1 157 547 1 157 547 0 2 528 023
628 539 742 005 910 946 910 946 1 052 346 1 052 346 1 157 547 1 157 547 1 244 647 1 244 647
628 539 742 005 910 946 910 946 1 052 346 1 052 346 1 157 547 1 157 547 1 244 647 1 244 647
628 539 742 005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 243 136
Cash to Equity
335 055 0 0 524 688 1 923 495 0 0 0 0 713 872
620 398 2 585 340 2 513 127 2891 121 2 570 582 2 944 417 2 764 538 2 575 000 0 1 202 254
554 513 2519 021 2 437 353 2 895 019 2 657 275 3 039 579 2 797 795 3 075 485 2 928 579 2 880497
638 380 2 568 685 2 493 629 2 951 777 2 719 357 3 024 610 2 792 087 2 931 060 2 783 144 2 951 607
471 585 2 372 842 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Initially Senior Tranche Principal Outstanding
360 000 000 342 494 137 328 523 483 320 384 962 316 267 044 316 267 044 311 360 232 298 623 706 298 623 706 294 303 539 289 303 539
360 000 000 357 190 412 357 190412 355 285 431 353 181 634 353 181 634 353 181 634 335 805 322 332 023 254 317 587 498 312 587498
360 000 000 355 083 160 355 083 160 355 083 160 355 083 160 355 083 160 351 874 280 351 874 280 351 874 280 344 428 556 339 428 556
360 000 000 358 417 365 358 417 365 358 417 365 358 417 365 355 739 424 352 098 678 345 637 297 345 637 297 341 853 616 335 364 664
360 000 000 352 095 011 338 294 965 326 849 228 306 131 241 295 264 403 292 440 218 286 152 540 283 126 952 276 456 539 261 973 921
Initially Mezzanine Tranche Principal Outstanding
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40000 000 40 000 000
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
Sem o rTrancheOC Matrix
1 226 1 191 1 191 1 202 1 202 1 192 1 193 1 206 1 193 1 210
1 246 1 246 1 238 1 232 1 232 1 232 1 206 1 205 1 199 1 216
1 239 1 239 1 239 1 239 1 239 1 236 1 236 1 236 1 219 1 223
1 242 1 242 1 242 1 242 1 237 1 235 1 230 1 230 1 229 1 223
1 221 1 212 1 198 1 164 1 158 1 168 1 177 1 188 1 199 1 202
MezzTranchelnterestOutstandingMatrix
0 742 005 1 669 849 0 0 1 052 346 2 240 346 148 215 1 397 474 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 244 647 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 910 946 1 842 638 2 943 461 4 073 245 5 348 666 6 660 996 8 112 908 6 366 863
SemorTranchelnterestOutstandingMatrix
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MezzTranchelCMatrix
1 939 0 000 0 000 1 588 1 508 0 000 0 000 1 457 0 000 1 426
1 981 1 822 1 660 1 650 1 567 1 567 1 480 1 476 0 000 1 447
1 968 1 811 1 661 1 661 1 577 1 572 I 525 1 525 1 469 1470
1 975 1 817 1 666 1 666 1 575 1 571 I 514 1 514 1 479 1 468
Figure 5 1 Key Variable Values for Five Random Asset Paths
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Period 5 5yrs 6 Oyrs 6 5yrs 7 Oyrs 7 5yrs 8 Oyrs 8 5yrs 9 Oyrs 9 5yrs 10 Oyrs
Interest from Assets
9 925 ¡03 8 734 004 7 535 300 6 072 407 4 936 487 4213410 3 499 155 2 390 046 1 374 962 1 213 990
10 780 393 9 270 099 7 867 179 6 362 710 5 096 092 3 953 406 2 955 799 1 836 975 799 500 883 709
11791 020 10209925 8 826 709 7 028 960 5 938 235 5 036 970 4 155 855 3 053 599 1 878 547 1 213 990
11 688 002 9 666 739 7 806 713 6 205 657 5 272 230 4 478 250 4 015 243 2 920 349 1 668 343 1 070 756
8 918 014 7 407 288 6 542 246 3 287 962 4 285 793 3 830 932 2 906 728 2 233 019 1 240 472 740 862
Maturing Principal
20 000 000 40 000 000 55 000 000 35 000 000 25 000 000 30 000 000 40 000 000 35 000 000 10 000 000 40 000 000
35 000 000 45 000 000 45 000 000 40 000 000 30 000 000 30 000 000 35 000 000 35 000 000 0 30 000 000
35 000 000 55 000 000 60 000 000 40 000 000 35 000 000 35 000 000 40 000 000 45 000 000 20 000 000 40 000 000
30 000 000 50 000 000 60 000 000 35 000 000 30 000 000 20 000 000 40 000 000 45 000 000 25 000 000 30 000 000
25 000 000 30 000 000 50 000 000 35 000 000 20 000 000 30 000 000 25 000 000 35 000 000 20 000 000 25 000 000
Recovered Principal
3 940 454 I 353 330 0 2 063 424 3 236 287 0 0 0 0 0
0 6 470 920 9 467 020 2 095 703 13 448 111 8 622 853 1 717 668 0 0 0
0 0 3 726 301 0 0 0 0 0 4 061 107 0
13 911 077 9 974 849 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 930 540
11 066 558 0 0 0 0 3 160 143 0 0 0 0
Senior Tranche Interest
6 289 945 5 769 439 4 870 349 3 674 556 2 868 735 2 254 831 Ì 602 580 732 913 0 0
6 796 178 6 035 219 4916 154 3 731 950 2816719 1 872 084 1 032 358 234 054 0 0
7 379 747 6 618 788 5 422 996 4 037 479 3 167 812 2 406 853 I 645 894 776 227 0 0
7291 391 6336691 5 032 737 3 728 236 2 967 277 2 315 027 1 880 193 1 010 526 32 150 0
5 695 753 4 911606 4 259 355 3 172 271 2411 312 1 976 479 1 255 522 711 980 0 0
Mezzanine Tranche Interest
1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 977 107 724 690
1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 397 941 397 941
I 009 667 1 009 667 I 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 774 977 167634
1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 415951
3 222 261 2 495 682 2 282 891 2 115 691 1 703 431 1 009 667 1 009 667 1 009 667 952 803 447 970
Cash to Equity
2 625 491 1 954 897 1 655 285 1 388 184 1 058 085 948 912 886 908 647 466 397 856 11 779 256
2 974 550 2 225 213 1 941 357 1 621 093 1 269 707 1 071 655 913 774 593 254 401 359 14 720 545
3 401 606 2 581 469 2 394 046 1 981 814 1 760 756 1 620 450 1 500 294 1 267 705 1 103 571 34 405 208
3 386 944 2 320 381 1 764 309 1 467 754 1 295 286 1 153 556 1 125 382 900 136 626 525 19 106 607
0 0 0 0 171 050 844 786 641 539 511 373 287 668 7 545 672
Initially
360 000 000
Senior Tranche Principal Outstanding
265 363 086 224 009 755 169 009 755 131 946 332 103 710 044 73 710 044 33 710 044 0 0 0
360 000 000 277 587 498 226 116 578 171 649 558 129 553 855 86 105 744 47 482 891 10 765 223 0 0 0
360 000 000 304 428 556 249 428 556 185 702 256 143 702 256 110 702 256 75 702 256 35 702 256 0 0 0
360 000 000 291 453 587 231 478 738 171 478 738 136 478 738 106 478 738 86 478 738 46 478 738 1 478 738 0 0
360 000 000 225 907 364 195 907 364 145 907 364 1 10 907 364 90 907 364 57 747 221 32 747 221 0 0 0
Initially
40 000 000
Mezzanine Tranche Principal
40 000 000 40 000 000
Outstanding
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 38 710 044 28 710044 0
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 15 765 223 15 765 223 0
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 30 702 256 6 641 148 0
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 16 478 738 0
40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 37 747 221 17 747 221 0
SemorT rancheOCMatnx
1 225 1 250 1 331 1 402 1 495 1 696 2 522 NaN NaN NaN
1 243 1 283 1 369 1 467 1 684 2 211 6 038 NaN NaN NaN
1 248 1 303 1 400 1 510 1 671 1 981 3 081 NaN NaN NaN
1 235 1 253 1 341 1 429 1 350 1 677 2 259 40 575 NaN NaN
1217 1231 1 336 1 443 1 340 1 818 2 443 NaN NaN NaN
MezzTranchelnterestOutstandmgMatnx
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 314 979 2 937 882 1 738 816 676 683 0 0 0 0 0 0
SemorT ranchelnterestOutstandingMatnx
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MezzT ranchelCMatnx
1 522 1 512 1 525 1 514 1 507 1 319 1 548 1 624 1 752 NaN
1 554 1 553 1 573 1 576 1 597 1 632 1 659 2 393 2 393 NaN
1 581 1 604 1 635 1 672 1 719 1 793 1 955 2 662 7 574 NaN
1 555 1 523 1 541 1 556 1 575 1 593 1 650 1 828 2 671 NaN
Figure 5 2 Key Variable Values for Five Random Asset Paths (contd)
5.8 Comparison with Alternative CDO Valuation Approaches
The best-selling CDO valuation software in the market is CDO Manager  from 
RiskM etncs This model applies a copula approach to determine the time o f default for
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each asset in the portfolio This approach is decidely easier to implement since each 
simulation produces a time at which each asset defaults This obviates the need for 
multi-period simulation If the asset defaults beyond its maturity date, it repays the full 
pnncipal amount K nowing when the assets default or mature, all the cash flow s can be  
derived Equity correlation is used in place o f  asset correlation to generate the correlated 
random variables w hich simulate the default time R iskM etncs then apply a cash flow  
waterfall m a similar manner to that described above M ore frequently, however, CDO 
Manager is used to value synthetic CDOs -  this sim plifies matters still further since 
only the premium payments and payments on default need to be recorded
This method has becom e the market standard Its sim plicity is its attraction H owever, it 
needs CDS spreads in order to provide the nsk-neutral default probability term structure 
measure necessary to inform the m odel For the names which are included in synthetic 
securitisation structures, these are spreads readily available But for the sub-investment 
grade names w hich comprise arbitrage securitisation structures, this information is 
absent Banks are obliged to rely on their internal ratings to determine the default 
probability and to make som e -  presumably heuristic -  adjustments to these to make 
them nsk-neutral
The author is unaware o f  any other CDO valuation m odel, details o f  w hich have been  
published in the literature It is clear that many banks, particularly investment banks, 
have bespoke m odels, these are presumably deemed to be propnetary and have not been  
published
5.9 Model Results
The graphs that follow show the distnbutions o f the relevant vanables
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5.9.1 Asset and Tranche Value Distributions
A sset Value Probability Distribution
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Figure 5.3 Asset Value Probability Distribution
Figure 5.3 above shows the probability distribution o f  asset values. This variability in 
asset values translates into variability o f  tranche values as shown in Figure 5.4, Figure 
5.6 and Figure 5.7 below:
Senior Tranche Value Probability Distribution
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Senior Tranche Value
Figure 5.4 Senior Tranche Value Probability Distribution
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The variability in senior tranche value arises from the variability in the tim ing o f  
principal repayment: the higher the incidence o f  asset default early in the life o f  the 
structure, the earlier the senior repayments and the lower the value o f  the asset as the 
senior tranche earns the spread for a shorter period. This m ay be seen clearly by plotting 
the value o f  the senior tranche against average life: the value increases m onotonically  
with average life in Figure 5.5 below:
Average Life of Senior Tranche vs Senior Tranche Value
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Figure 5.5 Average Life vs Value of Senior Tranche
The m ezzanine tranche value distribution is shown in Figure 5.6:
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Figure 5.6 Mezzanine Tranche Value Probability Distribution
The equity tranche value is extrem ely volatile as evidenced in Figure 5.7:
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Figure 5.7 Equity Tranche Value Probability Distribution
The variability in the value o f  the underlying assets is transmitted to the tranches but not 
in a uniform manner as shown in Table 5-1:
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Assets Senior Mezzanine Equity
Mean 
St Dev
Coefficient o f Variation
453,162,648 370,252,103 43,288,550 39,621,940
18,098,251 476,154 2,876,867 16,384,908
3 99% 0 13% 6 65% 4135%
Table 5-1 Variability of Asset and Tranche Values
The senior tranche is insulated from the volatility in the value o f  the underlying assets 
by the subordinated tranches The equity and m ezzanine tranches that are providing this 
protection to the semor tranche experience significantly higher value volatility than the 
underlying assets
This is seen more clearly m Figure 5 8 below  W hen the underlying assets are arranged 
m value order, the average senior tranche value m the low est five percent range is 
99 57% o f  the average senior tranche value in the highest five percent range In contrast, 
the corresponding figure for the m ezzanine is 76 63% and for equity, it’s a mere 7 53%  
The structure has functioned as intended the senior tranche remains immune to the 
losses m the underlying collateral
B y the same token, the equity tranche absorbs the losses until the collateral starts to 
default at a very high rate The m ezzanine value m the second low est 5% bucket has a 
value o f  99 22% o f  the highest 5% bucket losses only penetrate the m ezzanine tranche 
when the equity has effectively  been decimated
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Distribution of Asset Value across Tranches
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Figure 5.8 Tranche Values vs Asset Value
This value redistribution from the junior tranches to the senior tranche is highlighted  
again in Figure 5.9 below: whereas the senior receives only 77% o f  the value in the 
highest 5% o f  asset value outcom es, it receives 90.5% in the low est 5%. The equity 
share declines from 13.9% to 1.2% over the same range.
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Distribution of Asset Value Across Tranches
Asset Value Percentile
Figure 5.9 Tranche Value Distribution vs Asset Value 
5.9.2 The Nature of the Risk in CDO Tranches
The senior debt never experienced loss o f  principal in any o f  the simulations. However, 
as alluded to already, there is som e uncertainty regarding tim ing o f  receipt o f  principal.
The average principal profile is shown in Figure 5.10 below:
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Figure 5.10 Senior Tranche Principal Profile
However, there is som e variation around this average that causes the variation 
average life shown in Figure 5.11 below:
Figure 5.11 Probability Distribution of Senior Tranche Average Life
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The average cash received by the senior tranche varies w idely dictated by the pattern o f  
defaults among the assets. The cash flow  pattern is that o f  an amortising loan with an 
uncertain amortisation schedule.
Senior Tranche Cash Flows
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Figure 5.12 Senior Tranche Cash Flow Profile
Figure 5.6 shows that the m ezzanine tranche trades in a tight value range much o f  the 
time. However, when losses occur, they can be substantial as evidenced in Figure 5.13 
below:
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Mezzanine Loss Given Default Distribution
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Figure 5.13 Probability Distribution of LGD for Mezzanine Tranche
W hile the average LGD is only 36.9% , in som e cases the entire principal is lost. It is 
this latter feature o f  m ezzanine tranches that so concerns the regulator.
The cash flow s to the m ezzanine tranche resem ble those o f  a bullet maturity bond as 
shown in Figure 5.14 below. However, m ezzanine debt can be PIKed, that is, paid in 
kind: this occurs when interest is capitalised and the cash that was available to pay the 
interest is used to pay down senior tranche principal. This means there is potential for 
significant variation around this average cash flow , a major source o f  worry for 
m ezzanine debt purchasers.
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Mezzanine Tranche Cash Flows
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Figure 5.14 Average Mezzanine Tranche Cash Flow Profile
The uncertainty regarding timing o f  receipt o f  cash flow s is a risk dim ension unlike that 
associated with typical corporate loans. This is shown in Figure 5.15 below  which  
graphs average interest outstanding over time:
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Figure 5.15 Profile of Average Mezzanine Interest Outstanding
An appreciation o f  the variation around this average can be gained by graphing the 
distribution o f  the number o f  periods in which the m ezzanine tranche was PIKed.
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Mezzanine PIK Frequency Distribution
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Figure 5.16 Frequency Distribution of Mezzanine Tranche PIKing
Over 62% o f  the time, the m ezzanine tranche w ill experience at least one occasion when  
it does not receive interest due. In som e cases, it becom es a zero-coupon bond for a 
period o f  up to five years. This type o f  behaviour renders it unsuitable as an investment 
product for many investors despite its relatively low  loss experience.
5.10 The Expected Loss on Rated Tranches
M oody’s assign ratings to CDO tranches based on the expected loss o f  the tranche over 
its life. This new m odel produces an expected loss value for the tranches also. W e can 
use the output to compare the M oody’s rating, derived in Chapter 6, with the 
comparable rating implied by this model.
The expected loss for the senior debt across all simulations is 0%. This is not unusual 
and it suggests a M oody’s Aaa rating.
The expected loss for the m ezzanine debt is 1.28%. This can be seen to be the product 
o f  the frequency o f  ‘default’ -  though the term is nebulous for tranches -  and LGD. In 
6.05% o f  the simulations, there was a shortfall to som e extent on the repayment o f  
principal and/or interest. The average loss in the event o f  default was 36.9%, though 
that varied w idely as indicated in Figure 5.13. This is the key output for comparing this 
model with M oody’s.
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This chapter presents a new ly created multi-period CDO m odel in a structural 
framework The m odel takes the existing state-of-the-art and adapts it to incorporate an 
analysis o f  CDO tranches In so doing, it presents an alternative perspective on the CDO  
rating question
❖ It enables the M oody’s CDO tranche rating m ethodology to be compared with a 
new alternative
❖ It also provides a richer framework for thinking about the risk w hich CDO  
tranches present
It concludes that the uni-dimensional v iew  o f  risk -  that o f  expected loss only -  which  
guides the agency rating process fails to m eet the needs o f  the regulator for a basis on 
which to assign capital In fact, expected loss m banking is sim ply regarded as a cost o f  
doing business and risk is measured by loss variability It is suggested that M oody’s 
CDO ratings framework is flawed since it does not measure n sk  at all In particular, the 
rating m ethodology fails to meet the regulator’s need for a measure on which to base its 
requirement for bank capital
In Chapter 6, the M oody’s rating framework w ill be developed and m Chapter 7, the 
results o f  the two m odelling approaches w ill be compared
5.11 Conclusion
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Chapter 6. Re-constructing Moody’s CDO Tranche 
Rating Approach
6.1 Chapter Overview
M oody’s assign ratings to CDO tranches using their BET This approach was outlined  
by Cifuentes and O ’Connor (1996) and re-created m 3 9 above But, the outline, while  
giving the basic M oody’s rating philosophy, is insufficient to enable their tranche 
ratings to be replicated Neither have they issued a m odel that embeds their CDO  
tranche rating m ethodology
However, a m odel that is capable o f  replicating M oody’s approach is a requirement in 
order to enable comparison with the alternative m ethodology that has been developed in 
this thesis In this chapter, the author builds a fully-functional BET m odel which can 
accommodate the com plete details w hich their papers do not specifically address
M oody’s further requirements - not specified in the literature but gleaned by the author 
from conversations with M oody’s personnel, investment banks and other market 
participants - were noted These requirements, together with M oody’s published  
guidelines, were incorporated into a new cash flow  m odel designed to replicate the 
M oody’s rating process
The success o f  the m odel m replicating their rating approach is then confirmed by  
testing the m odel on new ly issued deals The m odel-derived ratings are very closely  
aligned to the actual ratings granted by M oody’s to the rated tranches o f  the deals
6.2 Creating a Moody's BET Model
The results shown m 3 9 1 1 prove that the m odels the author constructed produce the 
same results as those quoted by M oody’s in their publications However, the structures 
addressed by M oody’s in those three papers is very stylised and it ignores many o f  the 
details that M oody’s take into account in practice
The tasks to be undertaken m constructing a full-blow n BET m odel are sketched in 
Figure 6 1 below
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Figure 6 1 Schematic for BET Replication
In developing the m odel, details o f  the idealised portfolio -  the number o f  binomial 
bonds, the default rate, the recovery rate on defaulted assets, the weighted average 
maturity and the weighted average coupon -  as discussed already must be combined  
with details o f  the actual portfolio, including the value o f  the portfolio, the price paid 
and the timing o f  the acquisition, the so-called ‘ramp-up’ period Other factors that are 
also considered include (1) interest rate stresses, (11) expenses -  management, rating 
agency, accounting and trustee fees, (111) hedging ( if  any), (iv) liquidity requirements, 
and (v) tax
The m odel that was built tracks the various cash flow s from the idealised portfolio as 
described below
6 2 1 Principal Cash Flows
Principal derives from three separate sources (i) redemption o f  collateral, (11) 
recovenes, and (111) excess spread On the other hand, principal amounts m ay be applied 
to pay down note pnncipal or to reinvest m new assets during the reinvestment penod
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In the BET framework, there are five sources o f  revenue (1) collateral interest incom e, 
(11) reinvestment incom e, (111) revenue from hedging, (iv )  drawings on the liquidity 
reserve, and (v) release o f  the liquidity reserve at maturity
Revenue is used to (1) pay senior expenses, (11) pay note interest liabilities, (m ) 
replenish the liquidity reserve, and (iv) pay surplus to the holder o f  the equity Excess 
spread m ay be diverted to the principal ledger in particular circumstances
6 2 3 Other Cash Flow Modelling Stresses
M oody’s require that the default timing be varied The standard test has 50% o f  total 
defaults occurring in the first year with 10% occum ng annually thereafter for the next 
five years W hile this proves to be the most severe timing for m ost tranches, M oody’s 
oblige that back-end loaded defaults and mid-loaded defaults be undertaken in addition 
to the standard front-loading and the m ost conservative rating outcom e is applied to the 
tranche The com plete list o f  default scenarios w hich must be examined are outlined in 
Table 6-1 below
6 2 2 Revenue Cash Flows
Scenario Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
1 50% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%
2 10% 50% 10% 10% 10% 10%
3 10% 10% 50% 10% 10% 10%
4 10% 10% 10% 50% 10% 10%
5 10% 10% 10% 10% 50% 10%
6 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 50%
Table 6-1 Default Timing Scenarios
6.3 Replicating Moody's Rating Results
The m odel tracks the cash flow s from the assets to the various tranches over time Each 
scenario assumes a different number o f  defaults The cash flow s received by  each 
tranche are discounted at Libor plus the promised tranche spread, i f  no losses occur, the 
tranche value w ill equal par The loss incurred by  each tranche weighted by the 
binom ial probability o f  the loss occum ng w ill equal the tranche expected loss This 
expected loss is compared to the average loss incurred by  debt o f  similar maturity in
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M oody’s loss database The rating whose loss matches the expected loss o f  the tranche 
is the rating that is assigned to the tranche
A  sample o f  the intermediate calculations follow s to indicate how these calculations 
were undertaken
6.4 Discussion of Modelling Details
The figures w hich follow  summarise the results for a single scenario The diversity  
score is 47 based on the industry and country com position o f  the 90-loan portfolio, the 
weighted average rating is B2 and the weighted average life is 7 25 years, or 29  
quarters The scenario shown involves front-loaded defaults -  50% m the first year and 
10% per annum in the five subsequent years -  and six o f  the 47 idealised loans 
defaulting
Figure 6 2 shows a high default rate over the first four quarters follow ed by a lower 
default rate over the remaining quarters until the end o f  year 6 The assets w hich have 
not defaulted are assumed to be redeemed as bullet payments at the end o f  the weighted  
average life The LGD is assumed to be 45% and occurs after a one-year delay
The Class A  notes are the senior notes m the structure and the Class B are the 
m ezzanine If the senior O/C or I/C test is breached -  as happens in Quarters 4, 5 and 6 - 
the m ezzanine tranche is not paid interest and any cash beyond that required to pay the 
senior interest is diverted to pay down senior principal until the test is corrected If the 
senior O/C and I/C tests are passed but the m ezzanine tests are not, no cash is paid to 
equity and the residual is diverted to pay down the senior principal The senior expenses 
include rating agency costs, trustee fees and management fees
The last rows o f  Figure 6 6 and Figure 6 7 give the total cash -  comprising interest and 
principal -  received quaterly over the 29 quarters o f  the structure’s life The present 
value o f  each cash flow  stream, discounted at the promised yield, gives the value o f  the 
senior and m ezzanine notes The shortfall from par, expressed as a percentage o f  par 
gives the loss rate incurred
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6 41 Account Ledgers
iQuarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 8 9 10 11 12l 13 14 , ' ,15|
Assets
Opening Balancc 450 000 000 442 819 149 435 638 298 428 457 447 421 276 596 419 840 426 418 404 255 416 968 085 415 531 915 414 095 745 412 659 574 411 223 404 409 787 234 408 351 064 406 914 894
Start Defaults 7 180 851 7 180 851 7 180 851 7 180 851 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Closing Balance 442 819 149 435 638 298 428 457 447 421 276 596 419 840 426 418 404 255 416 968 085 415 531 915 414 095 745 412 659 574 411 223 404 409 787 234 408 351 064 406 914,894 405 478 723
Class A Notes
Opening Balance 360 000 000 360 000,000 360 000 000 360 000 000 358 004,648 352 181 510 346 284 534 342 335 066 338 385 598 337 595 705 336 805 811 336015 917 335 226 024 334 436 130 333 646 236
Redemptions 0 0 0 1 995 352 5 823 137 5 896 976 3,949 468 3 949 468 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894
Closing Balance 360 000 000 360 000 000 360 000 000 358 004 648 352 181 510 346 284 534 342 335 066 338 385 598 337 595 705 336 805 811 336015 917 335 226 024 334 436 130 333 646 236 332 856 343
Class B Notes
Opening Balance 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Closing Balance 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
Seller Equity
Opening Balance 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000,000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Closing Balance 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000
Figure 6 2 The Securitisation Balance Sheet
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{Quarter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24| 25 26 27 28 29)
Assets
Opening Balance 406 914 894 405 478 723 404 042 553 402 606 383 401 170 213 399 734 043 398 297 872 396 861 702 395 425 532 393 989 362 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191
Start Defaults 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 1 436 170 0 0 0 0 0
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 392 553 191
Closing Balance 405 478 723 404 042 553 402 606 383 401 170213 399 734 043 398 297 872 396 861 702 395 425 532 393 989 362 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191 392 553 191 0
Class A Notes
Opening Balance 333 646 236 332 856 343 332 066 449 331 276 556 330 486 662 329 696 768 328 906 875 328 116 981 327 327 088 326 537 194 325 747 300 324 957 407 324 167 513 323 377 619 322 587 726
Redemptions 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 322 587 726
Closing Balance 332 856 343 332 066 449 331 276 556 330 486 662 329 696 768 328 906 875 328 116 981 327 327 088 326 537 194 325 747 300 324 957 407 324 167 513 323 377 619 322 587 726 0
Class B Notes
Opening Balance 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 000 000
Closing Balance 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 40 000 000 0
Seller Equity
Opening Balance 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 965 466
Closing Balance 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 50 000 000 20 034 534
Figure 6 3 The Securitisation Balance Sheet (contd )
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6 4 2 Cash Flow Waterfall
[Q uarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15|
PR IN C IPA L
Source
Opening Balance I ol 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Redemptions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Recoveries 0 0 0 0 3 949 468 3 949 468 3 949 468 3 949 468 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789,894 789 894
Receipt o f Seller Revenue 0 0 0 1 995 352 1 873 669 1 947 508 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Closing Balance 0 0 0 1 995 352 5 823 137 5 896 976 3 949 468 3 949 468 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894
Application
Opening Balance 0 0 0 1 995 352 5 823 137 5 896 976 3 949 468 3 949 468 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789,894
Class A Notes 0 0 0 1 995 352 5 823 137 5 896 976 3 949 468 3 949 468 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894
Class B Notes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seller Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IN T E R EST
Source
Opening Balance I " - ~5] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portfolio Yield 10 395 000 10 229 122 10 063 245 9 897 367 9 731 489 9 698 314 9 665 138 9 631 963 9 598 787 9 565 612 9 532 436 9 499 261 9 466 085 9 432 910 9,399 734
Liquidity Drawings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Closing Balance 10 395 000 10 229 122 10 063 245 9 897 367 9 731 489 9 698 314 9 665 138 9 631 963 9 598 787 9 565 612 9 532 436 9 499 261 9 466 085 9 432 910 9 399 734
Application
Opening Balance 10 395 000 10 229 122 10 063 245 9 897 367 9 731 489 9 698 314 9 665 138 9 631 963 9 598 787 9 565 612 9 532 436 9 499 261 9 466 085 9 432 910 9 399 734
Senior Expenses 556 250 548 172 540 093 532 015 523 936 522 320 520 705 519 089 517 473 515 858 514 242 512 626 511 011 509 395 507 779
Class A Notes 6 516 000 6 516 000 6 516 000 6 516 000 -6 479 884 6 374 485 6 267 750 6 196 265 6 124 779 6 110 482 6 096 185 -6 081 888 6 067 591 6 053 294 6 038 997
Class B Notes 854 000 854,000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 -854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854,000 854 000 854 000
Diversion o f  Seller Revenue 0 0 0 1 995 352 1 873 669 1 947 508 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seller Lquity 2 468 750 2 310 951 2 153 152 0 0 0 2 022 683 2 062 609 2 102 535 2 085 272 2 068 009 -2 050 746 2 033 483 2 0 1 6  221 1 998 958
Figure 6 4 Cash Flow Waterfall
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[Q uarter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29]
PR IN C IPA L
Source
Opening Balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Redemptions
Recoveries
Receipt o f  Seller Revenue
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
0
789 894 
0
392 553 191 
0 
0
Closing Balancc 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789,894 392 553 191
Application
Opening Balance 789 894 789 894 789,894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 789 894 392 553 191
Class A Notes 
Class B Notes 
Seller Equity
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
-789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
789,894
0
0
789 894 
0 
0
789 894 
0 
0
322 587 726 
40 000 000 
29 965 466
IN TER EST
Source
Opening Balancc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Portfolio Yield 
Liquidity Drawings
9 399 734 
0
9 366 559 
0
9 333 383 
0
9 300 207 
0
9 267 032 
0
9 233 856 
0
9 200 681 
0
9 167 505 
0
9 134 330 
0
9,101 154 
0
9 067 979 
0
9 067 979 
0
9 067 979 
0
9 067 979 
0
9 067 979 
0
Closing Balance 9 399 734 9 366 559 9 333 383 9 300 207 9 267 032 9 233 856 9 200 681 9 1 6 7 5 0 5 9 134 330 9 101 154 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979
Application
Opening Balance 9 399 734 9 366 559 9 333 383 9 300 207 9 267 032 9 233 856 9 200 681 9 167 505 9 134 330 9 101 154 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979
Senior Expenses 
Class A Notes 
Class B Notes
Diversion o f Seller Revenue 
Seller Equity
507 779 
6 038 997 
854 000 
0
1 998 958
506 164 
6 024 700 
854 000 
0
1 981 695
504 548 
6 010 403 
854 000 
0
1 964 432
502 932 
5 996 106 
854 000 
0
1 947 170
501 316 
5 981 809 
854 000 
0
1 929 907
499 701 
5,967 512 
854 000 
0
1 912 644
498 085 
5 953 214 
854 000 
0
1 895 381
496 469 
-5 938 917 
854 000 
0
1 878 119
494 854 
5 924 620 
854,000 
0
1 860 856
493 238 
5 910 323 
854 000 
0
1 843 593
491 622 
5 896 026 
854 000 
0
-1 826 330
491 622 
5,881 729 
854 000 
0
1 840 627
491 622 
5 867 432 
854 000 
0
1 854 924
491 622 
5 853 135 
854 000 
0
1 869 221
-491 622 
5 838 838 
-854 000 
0
1 883 519
Figure 6 5 Cash Flow Waterfall (contd )
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6.4.3 Cash Flow and Coverage Tests
Quarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Expenses
Senior Expenses 556,250 548,172 540,093 532,015 523,936 522,320 520,705 519,089 517,473 515,858 514,242 512,626 511,011 509,395 507,779
Class A Note Interest 6,516,000 6,516,000 6,516,000 6,516,000 6,479,884 6,374,485 6,267,750 6,196,265 6,124,779 6,110,482 6,096,185 6,081,888 6,067,591 6,053,294 6,038,997
Class B Note Interest 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000 854,000
Total Expenses 7,926,250 7,918,172 7,910,093 7,902,015 7,857,820 7,750,806 7,642,455 7,569,354 7,496,253 7,480,340 7,464,427 7,448,514 7,432,602 7,416,689 7,400,776
Interest Coverage
Class A Notes 
Class B Notes
147%
131%
145%
129%
143%
127%
140%
125%
139%
124%
141%
125%
142%
126%
143%
127%
145%
128%
144%
128%
144%
128%
144%
128%
144%
127%
144%
127%
144%
127%
Breach FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Overcollateralisation
Class A Notes 
Class B Notes
125%
113%
123%
111%
121%
109%
119%
107%
118%
106%
119%
107%
121%
108%
122%
109%
123%
110%
123%
110%
123%
110%
122%
109%
122%
109%
122%
109%
122%
109%
Breach FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Liquidity Drawings
Senior Expenses 
Note Interest
-556,250
-7,370,000
-548,172
-7,370,000
-540,093
-7,370,000
-532,015
-7,370,000
-523,936
-7,333,884
-522,320
-7,228,485
-520,705
-7,121,750
-519,089
-7,050,265
-517,473
-6,978,779
-515,858
-6,964,482
-514,242
-6,950,185
-512,626
-6,935,888
-511,011
-6,921,591
-509,395
-6,907,294
-507,779
-6,892,997
Total Expenses -7,926,250 -7,918,172 -7,910,093 -7,902,015 -7,857,820 -7,750,806 -7,642,455 -7,569,354 -7,496,253 -7,480,340 -7,464,427 -7,448,514 -7,432,602 -7,416,689 -7,400,776
Available Revenue 10,395,000 10,229,122 10,063,245 9,897,367 9,731,489 9,698,314 9,665,138 9,631,963 9,598,787 9,565,612 9,532,436 9,499,261 9,466,085 9,432,910 9,399,734
RESULTS 
Principal & Interest
Class A Notes 
Class B Notes 
Seller Equity
6,516,000
854,000
2,468,750
6,516,000
854,000
2,310,951
6,516,000
854,000
2,153,152
8,511,352
854,000
0
12,303,021
854,000
0
12,271,461
854,000
0
10,217,218
854,000
2,022,683
10,145,733
854,000
2,062,609
6,914,673
854,000
2,102,535
6,900,376
854,000
2,085,272
6,886,079
854,000
2,068,009
6,871,782
854,000
2,050,746
6,857,485
854,000
2,033,483
6,843,188
854,000
2,016,221
6,828,890
854,000
1,998,958
F igure 6.6 C ash  F low  and C overage T ests
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Q uarter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Expenses
Senior Expenses 507 779 506 164 504 548 502 932 501 316 499 701 498 085 496 469 494 854 493 238 491 622 491 622 491 622 491 622 491 622
Class A Note Interest 6 038 997 6 024 700 6 010 403 5 996 106 5 981 809 5 967 512 5 953 214 5 938 917 5 924 620 5 910 323 5 896 026 5 881 729 5 867 432 5 853 135 5 838 838
Class B Note Interest 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000
Total Expenses 7 400 776 7 384 863 7 368 951 7 353 038 7 337 125 7 321 212 7 305 300 7 289 387 7 273 474 7 257 561 7 241 648 7 227 351 7 213 054 7 198 757 7 184 460
Interest Coverage
Class A Notes 144% 143% 143% 143% 143% 143% 143% 142% 142% 142% 142% 142% 143% 143% 143%
Class B Notes 127% 127% 127% 126% 126% 126% 126% 126% 126% 125% 125% 125% 126% 126% 126%
Breach FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TALSE FALSE FALSF FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE
Overcollateralisation
Class A Notes 122% 122% 122% 122% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 121% 122%
Class B Notes 109% 109% 109% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 108% 107% 107% 108% 108% 108% 108%
Breach FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE b A L S h FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TALSE
Liquidity Drawings
Senior Expenses 507 779 506 164 504 548 502 932 501 316 499 701 498 085 -496 469 494 854 493 238 491 622 491 622 491 622 491 622 -491 622
Note Interest -6 892 997 6 878 700 6 864 403 6 850 106 6 835 809 6 821 512 6 807 214 6 792 917 6 778 620 6764 323 6 750 026 6 735,729 6 721 432 6 707 135 6 692 838
Total Expenses -7 400 776 7 384 863 7 368 951 7 353 038 7 337 125 7 321 212 7 305 300 7 289 387 7 273 474 7 257 561 7 241 648 7 227 351 7 213 054 7 198 757 7 184 460
Available Revenue 9 399 734 9 366 559 9 333 383 9 300 207 9 267 032 9 233 856 9 200 681 9 167 505 9 134 330 9 101 154 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979 9 067 979
RESULTS
Principal & Interest
Class A Notes 6 828 890 6 814 593 6 800 296 6 785 999 6 771 702 6 757 405 6 743 108 6 728 811 6714 514 6 700 217 6 685 920 6 671 623 6 657 326 6 643 029 328 426 564
Class B Notes 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 854 000 40 854 000
Seller Equity 1 998 958 1 981,695 1 964 432 1 947 170 1 929 907 1 912 644 1 895 381 1 878 119 1 860 856 1 843,593 1,826 330 1 840 627 1 854 924 1 869 221 31,848 984
Figure 6 7 Cash Flow and Coverage Tests (contd )
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6.4.4 Tranche Losses under the Various Scenarios
Loss % Loss % Scenario
Scenario No Senior Notes Mezz. Notes Probability
0 0.0 0.0 0.000%
1 0.0 0.0 0.000%
2 0.0 0.0 0.000%
3 0.0 0.0 0.000%
4 0.0 0.0 0.001%
5 0.0 0.0 0.005%
6 0.0 0.0 0.021%
7 0.0 0.0 0.071%
8 0.0 0.0 0.205%
9 0.0 0.0 0.509%
10 0.0 0.0 1.110%
11 0.0 0.0 2.141%
12 0.0 0.0 3.686%
13 0.0 0.0 5.695%
14 0.0 0.0 7.936%
15 0.0 0.0 10.018%
16 0.0 0.0 11.496%
17 0.0 0.0 12.029%
18 0.0 0.0 11.504%
19 0.0 6.2 10.075%
20 0.0 10.5 8.094%
21 0.0 14.7 5.971%
22 0.0 19.0 4.049%
23 0.0 23.5 2.525%
24 0.0 28.1 1.449%
25 0.0 32.7 0.765%
26 0.0 36.9 0.371%
27 0.0 41.6 0.166%
28 0.0 46.5 0.068%
29 0.1 54.9 0.026%
30 0.6 59.7 0.009%
31 1.6 60.5 0.003%
32 2.6 61.2 0.001%
33 3.6 61.7 0.000%
34 4.7 62.1 0.000%
35 5.7 62.6 0.000%
36 6.7 62.8 0.000%
37 7.8 62.9 0.000%
38 8.2 63.0 0.000%39 9.3 63.2 0.000%
40 10.3 63.4 0.000%41 11.4 63.5 0.000%42 12.5 63.7 0.000%
43 13.5 63.9 0.000%44 14.6 64.1 0.000%
45 15.7 64.2 0.000%
46 16.8 64.2 0.000%47 17.8 64.2 0.000%
Loss % 0.00023% 2.14226% 100.00%
Implied Rating Aaa Baa3
Table 6-2 The Binomial Probability Loss Weighting Scheme
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The expected loss on the senior and m ezzanine tranches are 0.00023%  and 2.14226%  
im plying ratings o f  Aaa and Baa3, respectively.
6.5 Checking the Replication of Moody’s BET
The m odel described above attempts to replicate M oody’s approach to the rating o f  
CDO tranches. In order to gauge the success o f  the replication effort, the m odel was 
used to rate the tranches o f  four securitisations
CDO Tranche M oody’sRating M odel Rating
Galway Bay Class I Aaa Aaa
Class II A2 A3
Class III Baa2 Baa3
Class IV Ba3 Ba3
Clare Island Class I Aaa Aaa
Class II Aa2 Aal
Class III Baa2 Baa2
Class IV Ba3 Ba2
Cashel Rock Al Aaa Aaa
A2 A3 A3
A3 Baa2 Baa3
Tara Hill Class I Aaa Aaa
Class II Aa2 Aa2
Class III Baa2 Baa2
Class IV Ba3 B1
Table 6-3 Comparison between Model Ratings to Moody’s Ratings
Comparing the model tranche ratings to those w hich M oody’s assigned, it is observed  
that the ratings assigned by M oody’s were replicated exactly for 10 o f  the 15 tranches 
w hile in each o f  the five remaining tranches, the difference in ratings was one notch.
In order to determine whether this represents a good replication performance, S&P and 
M oody’s ratings were compared for 104 CDO tranches. O f these tranches, 75 received  
the same rating from both agencies, 25 differed by one notch and four differed by  two  
notches.
Set against this background, the replication appears successful. It m ay be concluded that 
the model is capable o f  inferring M oody’s ratings to CDO tranches.
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This chapter described how  M oody’s BET was replicated Such a model w ill be 
necessary i f  w e are to be able to exam ine the source o f  any difference in tranche quality 
assessm ent betw een the multi-period structural m odel developed m Chapter 5 and 
M oody’s
The comparison between the assessm ent o f  the new  multi-period structural m odel 
developed m this thesis and that o f  M oody’s is the subject o f  Chapter 7
6.6 Conclusion
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Chapter 7. Comparing the CDO Model Results with 
Moody’s Rating and Market Prices
7.1 Chapter Overview
In Chapter 5, a new m odel was developed w hich extended the existing state-of-the-art 
credit portfolio m odelling paradigm to a m ulti-penod framework and incorporated the 
details o f  the indenture in disbursing the cash flow s to the multiple CDO tranches This 
enabled CDO tranches to be valued and the ratings im plied to the tranches
In Chapter 6, M oody’s BET was successfully replicated This allows a M oody’s rating 
to be attributed to tranches o f  any proposed securitisation
The aim o f  this chapter is to compare the tranche ratings im plied from the multi-period  
credit portfolio m odel with M oody’s ratings The differences between the two ratings 
w ill be examined and the reasons for these differences explored
7.2 Comparing Model Outputs
The M oody’s ratings for the senior and m ezzanine tranches are Aaa and Baa3 based on 
loss rates o f  0 00023%  and 2 14%, respectively The corresponding loss rates under the 
new CDO valuation m odel are 0% and 1 28% suggesting ratings o f  Aaa and Baa2 for 
the senior and m ezzanine tranches, respectively
At first glance, the differences appear small -  differences o f  one notch for the same 
tranche between the rating agencies are com m onplace - suggesting that the two m odels 
are capturing a similar dynamic, albeit in com pletely different ways H owever, this may  
not be the result o f  a close alignment o f  m ethodologies
7 2 1 Comparing Default Probability Assumptions
M oody’s default rates are derived from their expected loss table m Table 3-8 above The 
assumption underlying these expected loss rates is o f  a LGD o f  55% Based on these 
figures, the probability o f  default attributed to B-rated assets over a seven-year penod  
are calculated m Table 7-1
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Moody's
Rating
Seven-year 
Probability of 
Default
B1 19.13%
B2 24.01%
B3 31.00%
Table 7-1 Moody’s Default Probabilities
The distribution o f  M oody’s and K M V ’s default probabilities o f  the assets in the 
portfolio is plotted in Figure 7.1:
Histogram of 7-Year Cumulative Default Probabilities
40
35
30
25
§. 20«btt a
15
10
KMV
average
B1
................I 2r
I
Portfolio of 90 Credits
B3
KMVEDF
Moody's Ratings
I I I r
v  v  voN 0sO 00 <N^  -h
7-Year Cumulative Default Probability
Figure 7.1 Distribution of KMV and Moody’s Default Probabilities in the Portfolio
The M oody’s average cumulative default probability over the seven-year period is 
23.91%  compared to K M V ’s average o f  10.67%. This probably reflects the fact that the 
date o f  the analysis is September 2004, a benign point in the credit cycle.
KM V have observed that the average default probability within agency rating categories 
m oves with the stage in the credit cycle. Figure 7.2 below  show s the evolution o f  the 
M oody’s B-rated universe over the five-year period from Novem ber 1999 to Novem ber 
2004. The median one-year probability o f  default is 0.76% compared to the long-term
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average o f  approximately 3%. K M V ’s analysis suggests that M oody’s w ill 
system atically over-estimate default probability in the benign phase o f  the cycle and 
under-estimate it during the stressed stage. M oody’s stated ‘through the cycle’ approach 
to creditworthiness estimation lends further support to this view .
In v iew  o f  the fundamental difference between M oody’s and K M V ’s assessm ent o f  
default probability, it is unlikely that there w ill ever be a close alignment between the 
ratings o f  structured debt based on the two different m odelling approaches. Equally, 
M oody’s assumption that the portfolio’s default characteristics can be summarised in 
one single number differs significantly from the KM V approach where each borrower is 
m odelled individually. Given the PD range in Figure 7.1 w hich KM V estimates exists, 
the assumption appears untenable.
Moody's B
EDF 10th Percentile EDF 25th Percentile EDF 50th Percentile EDF 75th Percentile
Figure 7.2 EDF Percentiles for Moody’s B-rated debt over time
Given this disparity in the fundamental input to the portfolio m odel, it is unlikely that it 
would ever be possible to reconcile the ratings under the two approaches.
7.2.2 Comparing Correlation Assumptions
A section o f  asset correlation matrix embedded in the KM V factor m odel 
implementation is shown in Figure 7.3 below . The average asset correlation among all
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obligor pairs is 0.148. Likewise, the average default correlation among all obligors 
equals 0.019. A  section o f  the default correlation matrix is given in Figure 7.4.
101 102 103 104 105 106 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 116 117 118 119 120
101 1.00 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11
102 0.17 1.00 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.30 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20
103 0.09 0.16 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.12
104 0.09 0.16 0.09 1.00 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.11
105 0.08 0.15 0.09 0.12 1.00 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.11
106 0.13 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.12 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.18
108 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.12 1.00 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10
109 0.12 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.11 1.00 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15
110 0.14 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.19 1.00 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.18
111 0.12 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.16 0.20 1.00 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.16
112 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.14 1.00 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.13
113 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.10 1.00 0.11 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11
114 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 1.00 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13
116 0.16 0.30 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.19 1.00 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.21
117 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.16 1.00 0.11 0.11 0.11
118 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.11 1.00 0.14 0.14
119 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.14 1.00 0.14
120 0.11 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.14 1.00
Figure 7.3 Asset Correlation Matrix
101 102 103 104 105 106 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 116 117 118 119 120
101 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
102 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03
103 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
104 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
105 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
106 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
108 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
109 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 1.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04
110 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
111 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
112 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
113 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
114 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
116 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
117 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.04 0.01 0.02
118 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.03
119 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.01
120 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 1.00
Figure 7.4 Default Correlation Matrix
To the author’s knowledge, there is no obvious way to compare M oody’s Diversity  
Score with asset correlation or default correlation. M oody’s distil the portfolio o f  ninety
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names down to a portfolio o f  forty-seven independent entities. Equally, M oody’s w ould  
suggest the same Diversity Score regardless o f  the firms within the industry. On the 
other hand, K M V ’s correlation value w ill be heavily dependent on company size: larger 
companies are found to have higher R-squared.
7.3 Comparing Implied Spreads to Market Spreads
A s shown in Table 5-1 above, the senior tranche, w hich has a par value o f  €360m  and 
pays a 50bp spread over Libor, was valued at €370.25m  while the m ezzanine tranche 
has a par value o f  €40m , pays a 150bp spread and is valued at €43 .29m.
The senior and m ezzanine tranches would trade at par i f  they were to be paid spreads o f  
24.9bp and 98.4bp, respectively. The spreads chosen for the tranches were typical o f  
spreads available for similarly-rated tranches in 2003. Spreads in the CDO market have 
tightened considerably since then, though not nearly as much as spreads on individual 
corporate names. Current spreads on Aaa- and Baa2-rated CDO tranches based on an 
asset pool with an average maturity o f  seven years are approximately 30bp and 1 lObp, 
respectively.
The m odel spreads are narrower than the market is demanding. However, the spread 
difference is small especially when considered in the light o f  spreads demanded in the 
market only two years ago. Furthermore, there is likely to be som e additional spread 
required as compensation for the illiquidity o f  the tranches vis-à-vis equally-rated 
corporate debt.
7.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the tranche ratings implied by the new ly developed CDO valuation 
model are compared with the ratings attributed to these tranches by M oody’s and the 
m odel-im plied spreads are compared to those available in the market:
•  It is suggested that the differences in the default probability assessm ent o f  the 
underlying assets w ill make it extrem ely unlikely that the rating agency rating w ill 
align with the m odel-im plied rating based on the m odel expected loss.
•  The factor m odel framework makes the correlation measurement in the new  
model explicit. The rating agency approach is heuristic and it is im possible to 
make any comparison between the two m ethodologies.
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•  The m odel-im plied spreads are less than, but nevertheless quite close to, those 
available in the market for similarly-rated CDO tranches This is reassuring the 
extra margin demanded in the market is no more than could be explained by  
liquidity differences
In summary, the market prices seem  to provide reassurance that the m odel outputs are 
realistic
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Chapter 8. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further 
Research
8.1 Chapter Overview
This thesis developed a new  m odel that is capable o f  valuing CDO tranches using the 
current state-of-the-art framework The m odel-im plied tranche ratings were compared to 
those assigned to the tranches by M oody’s using their BET approach The results from  
the two approaches differed, the reasons for these differences were explored and the 
implications for the rating agency approach were assessed
Likewise, the spreads suggested by the m odel were compared to those demanded in the 
marketplace The differences were, once again analysed and reasons were suggested  
which could explain these differences
This final chapter
• summarises the contribution o f  this thesis to the literature,
•  exam ines other applications o f  the m odelling framework developed in this thesis,
•  looks back on the research approach w hich was adopted and critically exam ines 
the w eaknesses o f  the approach, and
• suggests how  the m odelling framework that has been built can be extended to 
evaluate other securities
8.2 Contribution of the Thesis to the Literature
The primary aims o f  this thesis were twofold
•  Extend the market-leading structural approach to credit portfolio m odelling from  
its single period framework into a m ulti-penod nsk-neutral framework capable o f  
pricing structured debt
•  U se this multi-period m odel to gauge whether the rating agency assessment o f  
CDO tranche credit quality accurately captures the risks that such investments 
present
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The approach that was adopted involved the developm ent o f  three major m odels
The first m odel required that the single-period m odel developed by KM V be re­
constructed Such a re-construction has never previously been published This stems 
from the fact that KM V have divulged very little regarding their actual approach their 
limited public utterances were couched in very generic terms The m odel results aligned 
almost com pletely with those produced by  KM V m their Portfolio Manager software 
offering The labelling o f  their approach as ‘black box’ - a criticism w hich has been  
frequently been levelled at them because o f  their unwillingness to publish their portfolio 
m odelling approach -  now  seem s inappropriate These results confirm that K M V ’s 
m ethodology is firmly rooted m the standard factor m odel implementation o f  the 
Markowitz framework
The second major m odel and the key extension to the current literature is the conversion  
o f  the single-period m odel into a nsk-neutral multi-period model capable o f  valuing  
structured debt W hile the m odel addresses CDOs specifically, the framework is 
sufficiently generic to accommodate any credit product w hose cash flow s depend on 
portfolio interactions over m any time periods
The final model was a re-creation o f  M oody’s BET that they em ploy to rate CDOs This 
re-construction was necessary m order to allow  a M oody’s rating to be assigned to the 
various tranches o f  the CDOs that were m odelled The successful replication was 
confirmed by rating structures previously rated by M oody’s
8 2.2 Assessment of Agency Rating for CDO Tranches
The com pletion o f  the multi-period portfolio m odel enabled the calculation o f  the 
expected loss for the CDO tranche This same measure is also an output from the 
M oody’s BET m odel and is the basis on which they assign their rating A comparison o f  
these expected loss measures provides the basis for comparing the two assessments o f  
CDO tranche quality This offers an alternative perspective on tranche quality to that 
provided by the agencies Potentially, the expected loss measure from the new m odel 
ought to be more theoretically-sound than M oody’s measure which is based on an 
heuristic approach Reference to market prices offers an independent assessment o f  the 
same issue
8 2 1 Model Construction
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8.2.3 Assessment of Validity of Agency Approach to the Rating of CDO 
Tranches
The nature o f  the cash flow s from the various tranches points to the m ulti-dimensional 
nature o f  CDO tranche risk. The multi-period m odel shows that the risks presented by  
CDOs are significantly more com plex than those presented by the loans which comprise 
the portfolio. The potential for m ezzanine debt, for example, not to receive the interest 
due to it in the current period -  to receive ‘paym ent-in-kind’ -  substantially com plicates 
risk assessment for the investor. This points to inadequacies in the expected loss-based  
measure to summarise the risks that the tranche presents.
More fundamentally, the agency view  that expected loss is a measure o f  risk is 
questioned. The view  is expressed that expected loss is m erely a cost o f  doing business. 
A s such, the M oody’s rating tells the portfolio manager very little o f  relevance about the 
risk which the tranche presents. This problem is worse still for the regulator for whom  
expected loss is a matter o f  indifference since expected loss is a cost borne by bank 
shareholders. The only real concern to regulators is system ic risk, the potential for loss  
substantially higher than the expected to occur which arises when multiple obligors 
default during the period o f  interest.
The results o f  this research confirm the v iew  expressed in the recent Basel II publication 
that the risks o f  CDO tranches differ significantly from those o f  similarly rated 
corporate debt. Subordinated tranches o f  CDOs embed significantly higher unexpected  
loss than equally rated corporate debt. Furthermore, AAA-rated senior tranches built on 
poorly diversified loan portfolios -  ‘non-granular’ portfolios in Basel-speak -  contain 
more systematic risk than AAA-rated corporate loans. The very notion o f  rating is 
compromised.
If the agency rating concept is to be redeemed, it w ill need to be enriched. W hile the 
current rating could continue to be used as a measure o f  expected loss, the rating should 
be qualified to indicate the extent o f  variation around the expected loss. A  separate 
qualifier may be o f  interest to those managing the institution’s liquidity for w hom  
interruption o f  cash flow s m ay represent unacceptable risk. H owever, it is hard to see 
how  any meaningful measure o f  risk can be obtained w hich w ould satisfy the regulatory 
need for an assessm ent o f  system ic risk embedded in the tranche. The agency  
m ethodology is too contrived to be capable o f  adaptation to measure tranche risk in the 
context o f  bank portfolio.
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8 2 4 Additional Insights for the Credit Portfolio Manager
The single-period model offers two significant additional insights to the credit portfolio 
manager which are not available from the current models available m the market 
Furthermore, the analysis which the model accommodates supports two 
recommendations for changes to the way m which credit portfolios are managed
Marginal impact o f a new facility on a debt portfolio The model developed enables the 
effect o f adding a new facility to a debt portfolio to be measured and the facility Sharpe 
ratio to be evaluated having taken the portfolio character!sties into account This 
addresses the key concern o f portfolio managers, namely, to measure the effect o f 
adding a new facility to the existing portfolio
This new approach is developed in a structural framework using the KMV measure o f 
obligor quality, and their measure o f asset correlation Heretofore, most research has 
relied on the reduced form approach
The further benefit o f this approach is that it greatly expands the universe o f obligors 
that can be accommodated The reduced form approach requires that a liquid credit 
default swap market exist However, such a market exists only for well-known names 
that have access to the bond market and typically to not avail o f bank loans The 
framework developed addresses the needs o f the typical bank since the portfolio impact 
can be determined for all companies whether or not they have quoted debt securities
Optimal Hold Level Almost all banks impose arbitrary limits on facility size They 
have no mechanism for determining the exposure size at which it becomes 
uneconomical to assume further exposure
Using the model developed m this thesis and the approach advocated, the appropnate 
limit on exposure amount to a given counterparty may be set by comparing the available 
market spread to the cost o f writing new business at the marginal capital rate The 
exposure threshold can be set at some minimum EVA Spread taking explicit account o f  
the portfolio composition
Relationship managers in banks constantly argue for further limits to secure other 
income from clients This framework provides a basis for determining the cost o f 
excessive exposure to a relationship client and the basis for levying a concentration 
penalty While most banks that do not implement ‘hard’ limits levy a 4hog tax ’ on these
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customers, such penalties are usually based on intuition rather than quantitative 
approaches.
New Capital Attribution Framework: The model enables a new capital attribution 
methodology -  namely, contribution to ETL - to be tested. The proposed new 
methodology is far more sensitive to concentrations and gives results which are much 
more aligned with market intuition.
Limit-Setting in Portfolios: Finally, it is suggested that this new measure o f  capital 
forms an appropriate basis on which to set limits on exposure to customers, sectors and 
geographies which is consistent with the bank’s risk appetite.
8.3 Assessment of the Modelling Assumptions
The complexity o f  the credit portfolio interactions addressed in this thesis and the 
paucity o f data necessitated that certain assumptions and approximations be made. 
Among the most significant o f these are the following:
Deterministic Interest Rates: Interest rates were assumed to evolve in a deterministic 
fashion. The potential mismatch between fixed- and floating-rate assets and liabilities is 
not addressed. It is naively assumed that the interest rate mismatch that exists between 
the assets and liabilities is perfectly hedged. In reality, this will never occur because the 
swap can never be structured to cater for all potential defaults and prepayments. The 
interest rate mis-match would require modelling the joint movement o f interest rate and 
credit quality.
Prepayment due to Credit Quality Improvement: The option for the underlying assets to 
prepay was ignored. Thus, the prepayment o f  loans and calling o f  bonds that accompany 
credit quality improvement were not addressed. This would cause the actual portfolio 
losses to be under-estimated as the portfolio manager is obliged to re-invest in new 
loans during the re-investment period. Furthermore, the effect beyond the reinvestment 
period will be to cause earlier de-leveraging and paydown o f the senior debt with 
consequent higher risk for the subordinate tranches.
Prepayment due to Declines in Interest Rates: Fixed-rate bonds will often be redeemed 
i f  interest rates decline. An interest rate model would need to be integrated into the 
current model to capture this aspect o f prepayment risk.
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Credit Quality Migration Assumptions: The KMV EDF measure is the key assessment 
o f default probability over various time periods. Unfortunately, this measure assumes 
that the obligor’s liability structure is constant while it models the impact o f asset value. 
This ignores the potential for a firm to take on significant new debt if  its fortunes 
improve, as many companies are wont to do. Thus, an improvement in a com pany’s 
fortunes will not necessarily convert into an improvement in the value o f its debt i f  the 
equity-holders seize the opportunity to re-leverage. Unfortunately, there is no way 
around this problem without access to KM V’s database o f EDF migration histories.
Manager Gamesmanship: The model has not attempted to model manager 
gamesmanship. In practice, some managers m ay attempt to game the O/C test by selling 
assets which are trading above par and buying assets which are trading below par. 
Effectively, they are capitalising on circumstances where the rating agencies are slow to 
downgrade or upgrade; since the O/C test is based on par values, all similarly-rated 
bonds count equally, regardless o f market price. In this way, the manager can keep the 
cash flowing to equity in circumstances where the collateral quality has deteriorated 
significantly. Since most managers are themselves equity-holders, they will find it in 
their interest to do so. M oody’s have recognised this and now identify in their research 
those managers who most egregiously engage in such activity. However, it would be 
very difficult to capture this type o f behaviour in the current model.
8.4 Suggestions for Further Research
The model that was developed was applied to the valuation o f tranches o f a CDO 
structure. However, the framework is sufficiently general to allow the model to be 
applied to many different types o f structured debt securities.
• A financial institution’s equity interest in its portfolio o f debt securities is the 
most obvious candidate for evaluation using this approach. This could provide a 
novel approach to the valuation o f bank portfolios.
• Many investment funds -  for example, split-capital investment trusts -  are 
structured to take leveraged positions in portfolios o f debt securities. The model 
developed here is capable o f being adapted to incorporate the market value 
triggers instead o f the over-collateralisation triggers o f the CDO structure. This 
would enable the valuation o f the equity, senior debt and zero-dividend preference 
shares that comprise the fund’s liabilities.
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•  W hen the credit quality o f an obligor with a floating-rate loan improves, the 
obligor will often choose to prepay the loan This feature could be readily 
incorporated into the model once data was acquired to param etense this 
behaviour
• It is well documented in the literature -  see, for example, Altman et al (2002) - 
that there is a strong link between default rate and recovery rates In other words, 
recovery rates decline when default rates in the economy are higher than average 
This is intuitive -  the value o f assets realised in the event o f default is less in a 
more stressed credit environment as m any firms find themselves as forced sellers 
Making the beta distribution from which the LGD is drawn correlated with the 
portfolio default frequency easily incorporates this correlation between portfolio 
default rates and LGD
• CDOs o f CDOs, or CDO-squared as they have become known in the marketplace, 
are a particularly difficult debt instrument to value The methodologies that the 
rating agencies employ are merely extensions o f their current, heuristic CDO 
rating methodologies The current model could easily accommodate the additional 
complexity presented by the multiple layering A second waterfall would need to 
be overlaid on the individual CDO waterfalls to determine what cash would flow 
to the individual CDO-squared tranches Clearly, the challenge o f collating all the 
underlying data would be substantial, but the additional modelling effort should 
not be overly onerous
• The use o f expected loss as a measure o f the risk o f CDO tranches has been 
questioned A more theoretically correct approach would be to measure the 
variability o f tranche loss A more relevant measure for a portfolio manager 
would be a measure o f tranche loss contribution to the portfolio Similarly, 
regulators would want to measure tranche loss contribution to credit portfolios in 
stressed credit environments The task o f producing such measures -  a huge 
number o f simulations is required -  is challenging and will require new insights
8.5 Final Comment
The 1974 M erton approach -  subsequently called the structural approach —was framed
around a single obligor Subsequent work, most notably by KMV and CreditM etncs,
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moved forward from that single obligor view to a m ulti-obligor portfolio view in a 
single-penod time-frame which could assess the behaviour o f  corporate debt portfolios
This thesis builds on this portfolio view by extending it to a multi-penod time frame 
capable o f valuing structured debt As such, it is a natural extension o f previous research 
efforts However, it takes previous research down a path which has been somewhat 
ignored o f late because o f the spectacular growth which has occurred in the CDS market 
and the associated price transparency Unfortunately, the lure o f  plentiful data and 
robust pricing methodologies has drawn researchers to focus o f the liquid sector o f the 
market -  the mvestment-grade market primarily -  ignoring the bulk o f bank obligors, 
those sub-mvestment-grade names whose debt is seldom, i f  ever, traded It is hoped that 
this thesis goes some way towards redressing that imbalance
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Appendix The CreditMetrics Credit Portfolio 
Modelling Approach
CreditMetrics rely on a model which connects rating changes and defaults to 
movements in an obligor’s asset value “This allows us to model joint rating 
changes across multiple obligors without relying on historical rating change or 
bond spread data ” (Gupton et al, p81) They do so because o f the problems with 
alternative approaches such as non-param etnc methods using direct estimation o f 
joint credit moves and estimates based on bond spreads They summarise their 
two-step asset value model for joint probabilities o f  credit rating changes
• They propose an underlying process which drives credit rating changes 
They attempt to establish a connection between the events that they 
ultimately want to descnbe (rating changes), but which are not readily 
observable, and a process that they understand and can observe
• They estimate the parameters from the process above “If we have been 
successful m the first part, this should be easier than estimating the joint 
rating change probabilities directly ” (p 85)
i
Figure 8.1 S&P’s Rating Changes vs Asset Returns over One Year
They propose that a firm ’s asset value be the process that drives its credit rating 
changes and defaults, a model they claim is essentially M erton’s option theoretic 
model. However, since their focus is on portfolio value changes resulting from 
changes in credit rating as well as default, they do not concentrate solely on the 
default threshold but identify all the rating boundaries. They assume that there are 
asset levels such that they can construct a mapping from asset value in one year’s 
time to rating in one year’s time. Knowing the asset thresholds that correspond to 
rating boundaries, “we only need to model the company’s change in asset value in 
order to describe its credit rating evolution.” (p86)
They then state a fundamental premise on which their m odel’s validity rests: “To 
do this [modelling], we assert that the percentage changes in asset value (that is, 
asset “returns”, which we will denote by R ) are normally distributed, and 
parameterised by a mean \x and standard deviation (or volatility) cr.” (p86) They 
can then define the rating thresholds as corresponding to a cumulative probability 
o f the standard normal distribution. Using S&P’s transition matrix, they establish 
the rating thresholds corresponding to asset return values. An example o f these 
thresholds is shown in Figure 8.1. They comment that for one obligor, they only
need the transition probabilities to describe the evolution o f credit rating changes, 
and the asset value process is not necessary. The benefit o f the asset value 
process, they claim, is only in the consideration o f multiple obligors.
They assume that the asset returns for a two-asset portfolio are bivariate normally 
distributed though they note that any multivariate distribution (including those 
incorporating fat tails or skewness effects) where the joint movements o f asset 
values can be characterised fully by one correlation parameter would be 
applicable. By extension, they assume that the joint distribution o f the asset 
returns o f any collection o f firms is multivariate normal. By way o f example, they 
assume a two-asset portfolio comprising a BB- and an A-rated obligor with a 
correlation o f 0.3 between their asset returns. The distribution is sketched in 
Figure 8.2:
Figure 8.2 Bivariate Normal Distribution of Asset Returns
They calculate the probabilities that the two assets will be in the various 
combinations o f credit states by integrating under the probability density surface. 
The results are shown in Table 8-1:
Obligor A
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC Def Total
AAA 0 00% 0 00% 0 03% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 03%
AA 0 00% 0 01% 0 13% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 14%
A 0 00% 0 04% 0 61% 0 01% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 00% 0 67%
BBB 0 02% 0 35% 7 10% 0 20% 0 02% 0 01% 0 00% 0 00% 7 69%
BB 0 07% 1 79% 73 65% 4 24% 0 56% 0 19% 0 01% 0 04% 80 53%
B 0 00% 0 08% 7 80% 0 79% 0 13% 0 05% 0 00% 0 01% 8 87%
CCC 0 00% 0 01% 0 86% 0 11% 0 02% 0 01% 0 00% 0 00% 1 00%
Def 0 00% 0 01% 0 89% 0 13% 0 02% 0 01% 0 00% 0 00% 1 07%
Total 0 09% 2 29% 91 06% 5 48% 0 75% 0 26% 0 01% 0 06% 100 00%
Table 8-1 Joint Rating Change Probabihties for BB- and A-rated Obligors
The results shown m Table 8-1 are fundamentally dependent on the asset 
correlation estimate CreditM etncs suggest a variety o f approaches could be taken 
to the estimation o f asset correlation, from a simple average correlation approach 
to one that uses equity correlations “One fundamental -  and typically very 
observable -  source o f firm-specific correlation information is equity returns ” 
(p93) They use the correlation between equity returns as a proxy for the 
correlation o f asset returns W hile they acknowledge that this method has the 
drawback o f overlooking the differences between equity and asset correlations, 
they assert that it is more accurate than using a fixed correlation and is based on 
more readily available data than credit spreads or actual joint rating changes They 
accept that it would be desirable if  they could produce correlations for any pair o f 
obligors, but assert that scarcity o f  data for many obligors as well as the 
impossibility o f storing a correlation matrix o f the size that would be necessary, 
would make this approach untenable Therefore, they “resort to a methodology 
which relies on correlations within a set o f indices and a mapping scheme to build 
the obligor-by-obligor correlations from the index correlations ” (p93)
Thus, to produce individual obligor correlations, the correlation between industry 
indices m particular countries is calculated Then they map individual obligors by 
industry participation They also calculate the volatility o f each index and the 
correlation between each index pair In these calculations, they use the last 190 
weekly returns and weight each o f these equally Their motivation for using this 
approach, they say, is that they are interested m computing correlations which are 
valid over the longer horizons for which CreditM etncs will be used The statistics 
tend to be more stable over time, they claim, and reflect longer term trends, 
whereas the statistics in RiskM etncs vary more from day to day, and capture 
shorter term behaviour
IV
They summarise their simulation approach as follows
• Assign weights to each obligor according to its participation in countries 
and industries, and specify how much o f the obligor’s equity movements are 
not explained by the relevant indices
• Express the standardised returns for each obligor as a weighted sum o f the 
returns on the indices and a company-specific component
• Use the weights along with the index correlations to compute the 
correlations between obligors
“By specifying the amount o f an obligor’s equity price movements not explained 
by the relevant indices, we are describing the obligor’s firm-specific, or 
idiosyncratic, risk ” (p98)
